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The first essay studies the influence of credit ratings on the time-series evolution of corporate capital 
structures. We show that better rated firms have significantly more stable leverage ratios over time. By 
comparing firms across the investment-grade cut-off, we conclude using treatment effects estimation, that 
assignment to more stable rating classes leads to more stable capital structures over time. Extending this 
study across the whole range of ratings, we show that a one standard deviation improvement in credit-rating 
quality can reduce the leverage hazard ratio by more than 70%. In alternative investigations, rated firms 
tend to have largely more stable leverage ratios compared to not-rated firms. Matching firms based on their 
propensity to have credit ratings, rated firms take between 1.5 and 9 years longer to change their leverage 
ratios to the same levels as their not-rated counterparts. Our results are robust to the choice of different time 
frames and variety of controls. They extend the literature of the effects of credit ratings on capital structures 
by highlighting the importance of credit ratings on the long-run financing behaviors of firms. 
The second essay studies the stability of various debt-structure dimensions. Survival and long-run 
clustering analyses are used to assess the stability of debt-rank orderings, debt heterogeneity and main debt 
type(s). Firms only maintain stability in their main debt type, while frequently changing the weights and 
priorities of other debt types, heterogeneity indexes and rank orderings. While all debt structure metrics are 
less stable with the assignment of a credit rating, the effect on the stability of the main debt type is minor.  
Firms with higher tax rates, market leverages and cash flow volatilities exhibit higher stability in their debt 
structures.  
The final essay investigates how the optimal corporate debt maturity is influenced by the strength of 
creditor rights and the efficiencies of contract enforcement mechanisms. Using a correlated random effects 
specification, we find that across 42 countries stronger creditor rights are associated with shorter corporate 
debt maturities while greater contract enforcement leads to longer maturities. These empirical results are 
consistent with the differing effects of creditor rights and contract enforcement on the choice of corporate 
maturity predicted by our model. Our results are robust to using different measures of debt maturity, 
individual components of creditor rights and different measures of contract enforcement. Our results are 
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 CHAPTER 1: 
Introduction 
How firms set their financing decisions and optimal capital structures long been of interest in 
corporate finance. Such decisions are influenced by a variety of determinants including firm-
specific, macroeconomic, legal and institutional factors. Capital structures have three essential 
components: first, choice of the amount of debt and thus the resulting leverage ratio; second, the 
combination of different debt types and their relative weights in capital structures that we refer to 
as debt-type structure; and finally, the choice of debt maturity. This thesis addresses the above 
three aspects of capital structure in three separate studies presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively.  
In this thesis we investigate (1) the stability of corporate capital structures and specifically, how 
such stability is influenced by the stability of credit ratings, (2) the stability of corporate debt-type 
structures, and (3) the determinants of debt maturity.  
In Chapter 2 (Essay 1), we explore corporate debt stabilities and investigate how the stability 
of credit rating classes can lead to the choice of more stable capital structures over time. The 
importance of capital structure stability is well documented in the related literature and particularly 
in the seminal work of Robert, Lemmon and Zender (2008). This study suggests that corporate 
leverages are so stable over time that the importance of a firm’s leverage history on today’s 
leverage decision is much higher than that of conventional determinants of capital structure 
combined. The first essay contributes to this discussion by documenting that such stable leverage 
patterns are largely influenced by firms’ tendency to maintain stable credit ratings.  
In doing so, we argue that the influence of credit ratings on corporate leverages can be explored 
using two complementary hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, we suggest that if credit rating 
stability leads to leverage stability, more stable credit rating classes should have more stable capital 
structures over time. In the second hypothesis, we suggest that if firms’ stable leverages are the 
results of their tendency to maintain stable credit ratings, rated firms should exhibit more stable 
leverage ratios over time than unrated firms.  
To deal with the inherent endogeneity between credit ratings and leverage ratios, we follow the 
literature on treatment estimation by focusing on firms just above and just below the narrow band 
of investment grade cut-off (BBB- and BB+). The related literature documents that there is 
considerable randomness for the assignment of firms across this cut-off particularly due to three 
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reasons: (a) the muddled origins of the cut-off, (b) noise and (c) inertia in the assignment of credit 
ratings. We find that an assignment to just above the cut-off significantly lengthens the life of a 
stable leverage policy. 
Methodologically, this study adds to the related literature by introducing a new methodology 
for estimating treatment effects on survival data. This method enables us to directly measure 
leverage stability. Our method follows matching firms based on their propensity score to be located 
just above the cut-off, followed by estimation of the treatment effect while accounting for 
censoring as well as the possibility of missing counterfactuals in the control sample. To address 
any shortcomings of survival analysis, we introduce an alternative home-made test that computes 
the probability of leverage fluctuations across the matched samples without excluding firms from 
the sample as soon as they experience the event. Finally, we document that such stable leverage 
ratios in response to stable credit ratings are actively managed.  
This paper makes four important contributions. First, we extend the literature on credit rating 
targets (Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009 a, b; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2009; 
Altman and Rijken, 2004, Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto, 2000) and the literature concerning the 
inter-relationship between credit ratings and capital structures by showing that the stability of 
credit ratings induces firms to maintain more stable leverage paths over time. Next, our proposed 
methodology effectively addresses the critique of DeAngelo and Roll (2015) that the conventional 
methods used to capture leverage stability, e.g. in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), are 
deficient and possibly misleading. Incorporating survival analysis, we are able to directly measure 
how stable corporate leverages are with no reliance on mean-taking or over-interpretation of fixed 
effect regression results. Third, to the extent of our knowledge, this paper is the first to introduce 
the method for the estimation of treatment effect on survival data to the related literature. Finally, 
we contribute to the policy debate about the regulatory role of credit ratings in financial markets 
by showing that credit rating considerations have long-term effects on corporate capital structure 
behavior.  
In Chapter 3 (Essay 2), we study debt-type structures, as an integral part of capital structure 
decisions. The importance of debt structure has been theoretically known for many decades, which 
include the seminal works of Diamond (1991), Park (2000), and Bolton and Freixas (2000). 
However, empirical studies of debt structure have only been made possible recently as the debt 
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structured data has become available only over the past few years. Therefore, this paper is one of 
the first to explore the determinants of debt structure. 
A large body of the related literature deals with debt structure as a uniform variable. However, 
the emerging literature on corporate debt structures has documented considerable variability in 
debt structures. In this paper, we shed light on an unexplored aspect of debt structures, namely the 
stability of debt structures over time. This study is motivated by the first essay as well as the 
findings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) both documenting long-run stabilities in 
corporate capital structures over time. Particularly, we investigate whether such stable behavior in 
capital structure decisions can also influence debt structures.  
This study enables us, to shed light on two opposing views in the literature regarding the 
possibility of debt structure stability. The first viewpoint, implied by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 
(2008), asserts that similar to capital structures, debt types can also demonstrate stable time-series 
behaviors. In other words, firms may tend to maintain a stable combination of different debt types 
in their capital structures over time. The opposing viewpoint is provided by Rauh and Sufi (2010). 
They argue that large variations in corporate debt structures are in fact a mechanism employed by 
firms to compensate for the lack of variability in capital structures. We find supportive evidence 
for both of these predictions, and provide a more thorough understanding of debt structure 
decisions over time that incorporates both of these seemingly opposing views.   
This study has two goals. First, using the newly available Capital IQ database on debt types, we 
empirically study the stability of debt structures from different perspectives. Using the debt 
categories introduced in the Capital IQ database, we categorize the debt types into the following 
seven distinct categories: (1) Capital Leases, (2) Commercial Papers, (3) Lines of Credit, (4) Term 
Loans, (5) Bonds and Notes, (6) Trusts, and (7) Other Debt.  
Second, we empirically study the influence of credit ratings on the stability of debt structures. 
This examination is particularly motivated by the findings of Rauh and Sufi (2010) that credit 
ratings influence debt structures. This paper suggests that large and rated firms tend to use multiple 
debt types in their debt structures whereas unrated, smaller firms incorporate fewer debt types. 
Using propensity score matching of Dehejia and Wahba (2003) we are able to study the effect of 
treatment (being rated) on the stability of corporate debt structures.  
We introduce a wide range of debt type constructs, including the relative weights and the 
number of different debt types (debt heterogeneity), ranks of different debt types in the debt 
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structure based on their relative weights, the choice of main debt type and the choice of second 
largest debt type. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to provide 
such alternative constructs.  
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find large time-series variations across 
all different measures of debt structure including debt heterogeneity and debt rank indexes. In 
sharp contrast with other debt-structure metrics, the main debt type stays largely stable over time. 
Over a 12 year period, close to 50% of the firms never change their main debt types. Second, we 
find that rated firms tend to have less stable debt-type structures compared to not-rated firms. This 
finding, compared to the findings in the first essay, provides evidence consistent with the idea that 
higher variations in debt structures can compensate for more stability in capital structures.  
This chapter makes four contributions. First, we contribute to the emerging literature of 
corporate debt structures by introducing a comprehensive set of alternative measures of debt 
structures. We also contribute to this literature by investigating the time-series stabilities of these 
measures. Second, we contribute to the literature on the stability of capital structures by 
documenting that firms maintain their single main debt types largely stable over time while 
changing all other debt types, their weights and ranks frequently. Third, we complement the 
findings of Colla et al. (2013) by showing that when extended over multiple years, firms’ 
specialization in a few debt types is almost solely the domain of a single main debt type and does 
not extend to even the second most important debt type. Finally, we contribute to the literature on 
the effects of credit ratings on capital structure decisions by showing that having a credit rating 
largely results in less stability of debt structures.  
In chapter four (third essay), we study corporate debt maturities. Particularly, we investigate 
internationally how the strength of creditor rights and efficiency of contract enforcements 
influence firms’ choices of optimal debt maturities. This study is mainly necessitated by a plethora 
of opposing views about the influence of creditor rights on optimal debt maturity. In this paper, 
we tackle this long standing debate by arguing that this problem is caused by bundling creditor 
rights and contract enforcements together while they have independent and opposing effects on 
optimal debt maturities.  
Across 42 countries, our empirical results show that the strength of creditor rights and 
efficiencies of contract enforcement are largely independent of each other, and have merely a 
correlation of 5%. Using a stylized theoretical model, we are able to disentangle the effect of these 
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two institutional determinants on optimal corporate debt maturity. This is possible since stronger 
creditor rights give upper legal hand at liquidation to the creditors, while better enforcement 
efficiencies shrink the time and costs needed to enforce contracts, i.e. to liquidate a firm’s assets.  
Our model is constructed in the context of asset substation of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Park (2000). We assume there are two projects: safe and risky, where the payoff of the risky 
projects is higher for the manger. Shorter term debt is cheaper for the manager since it relaxes the 
monitoring incentives of creditors. However it restricts the options of the manager particularly in 
terms of being able to choose riskier projects and to engage in risk-shifting activities. Thus when 
creditor rights are strong, the ex-ante costs of bankruptcy for the manager increase and in turn, act 
as a disincentive for taking risky projects. In this regard, it is optimal for the manager to choose 
the safe project and finance the project with short term debt. With no risk-shifting incentives, the 
manager finds long-term debt unnecessarily expensive.  
Longer term debt, on the other hand, is more expensive as creditors need to monitor and thus 
charge additional premiums for the supposedly increased risk associated with longer-term 
contracts. With weak creditor rights the costs of bankruptcy for a manager declines ex-ante, and 
therefore the less restrictive long-term debt with monitoring becomes beneficial.  
On the other hand, contract enforcement reduces the costs of liquidation and simultaneously 
provides legal guarantees that the contract will be implemented in the future according to the terms 
agreed to at the time of contracting. We show that these features of better contract enforcement 
induce both managers and creditors to agree on longer term maturities. In short, our model predicts 
that stronger creditor rights leads to shorter debt maturity while better enforcement lengthens it.  
We address cross-country unobservable heterogeneities using a correlated random effect 
specification (CRE). This method enables us to estimate the time-varying determinants of maturity 
with fixed-effects and its time-invariant determinants with random effects specifications. Our 
results confirm the above hypotheses and document that stronger creditor rights shorten corporate 
debt maturities while better enforcements lengthens them. These effects are robust to firm and 
industry specific controls as well as to the inclusion of countries’ institutional, political and 
macroeconomic determinants. Our results are also robust to the alternative measures of debt 
maturity as introduced by Fan, Titman and Twite (2012) and Saretto et al. (2013), and to alternative 
estimation methods and different subsamples.  
The study reported in this chapter makes three contributions. First, by documenting the opposite 
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and largely independent impacts of creditor rights and contract enforcement efficiencies on capital 
structure decisions, our study contributes to the literature on the effects of the institutional 
environment on a firms’ capital structure decisions (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; 
Giannetti, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Cho et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2012).  
Second, we contribute to the literature on the disentanglement of the effects of institutions on 
economic activities and corporate decisions (North, 1981; and Acemoglu et al., 2005) by 
unbundling the impacts of creditor rights and contract enforcement efficiencies on optimal debt 
maturities. Third, we contribute to the literature concerning the optimal levels of creditor rights in 
an economy by documenting inefficiencies associated with strong creditor protection laws 








2 Credit Ratings and Capital Structure Persistence 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The inter-relationship between credit ratings and capital structure decisions is well-documented 
in the corporate finance literature (Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Ellul, 
Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011). Leverage changes can lead to changes in credit ratings and 
credit-rating changes can motivate changes in financing decisions (Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2009).1  
Interestingly, both leverage ratios and credit ratings exhibit persistence over time. Various studies 
document the long-run targets of credit-ratings over time (e.g., Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 
2009; Altman and Rijken, 2004; Nickell Perraudin and Varotto, 2000).  Lemmon, Roberts and 
Zender (2008) document that leverage ratios are stable over long time periods and question the 
validity of conventional theories of capital structure including the trade-off and pecking order 
theories (Graham and Leary, 2011). The magnitude of leverage stability documented by Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2008) is so large that they conclude that a firm’s history of capital structure 
is a more important determinant of its current capital structure than the combined effect of all 
classic capital structure determinants.  
 In this paper, we introduce a new and unexplored dimension of capital structure persistence and 
study whether credit-rating stability leads to leverage-ratio stability. To do so, we test two 
complementary hypotheses. Our main hypothesis is that firms with more stable rating classes have 
more stable capital structures over time. In order to study this question, we use the rating-based 
market segmentation between investment and speculative grade firms in the capital markets 
(Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012). Specifically, we set up novel treatment effects specifications, 
and use duration and survival analyses to infer causality between these two stable patterns. Our 
second hypothesis is that the stability of capital structure is different across rated and not-rated 
firms. Confirming this hypothesis enables us to extend our results to a broader set of firms.  
Several a priori reasons underpin the expectation that firms with more stable rating classes 
maintain more stable leverage paths, and that rated firms have more stable leverages than their 
not-rated counterparts. First, there is the literature on credit-rating targets and the influence of 
                                                     
1 Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001) use survey data to document that maintaining a good credit rating 
is one of the main priorities of CFOs when making capital structure decisions. 
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credit ratings on corporate capital structure decisions. Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman (2009), 
Altman and Rijken (2004), and Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000) find that firms have credit-
rating targets. The link between capital structure decisions and target ratings is corroborated by 
Kisgen (2009) who reports that firms adjust their leverage ratios in response to departures from 
their target ratings. Studies find that the commencements of bond or syndicated loan ratings 
influence the capital structure decisions of firms (Kisgen, 2006; Sufi, 2009a) and that credit ratings 
can influence the cross-sectional variations in leverage ratios by enhancing access to external 
capital. For example, rated firms have higher leverage ratios mostly due to greater access to capital 
markets (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) or loanable funds (Leary, 2009). Moreover investment 
grade firms have access to more sources of external capital than speculative grade firms 
(Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012). Refinements in rating-agency criteria significantly affect 
leverage ratios (Tang, 2009) and ratings reflect target leverage ratios (Elkahmi, Pungaliya and 
Vijh, 2010). Rated firms also tend to have debt with longer average maturities (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006), which contributes to lower rollover risk.  In turn, this is expected to lead to more 
stable leverage ratios. 
Second, there is a large body of literature on how leverage variations may result in changes in 
rating qualities. All else equal, higher leverage decreases the distance to default in a structural 
credit approach (Leland and Toft, 1996; Duffie, Saita, Wang, 2007). Conditional on different 
determinants of credit quality (Duffie and Singleton, 2003), leverage directly affects a firm’s 
default probability. Not surprisingly, the level of a firm’s leverage is one of the main determinants 
of credit-rating decisions by rating agencies such as S&P and Moody’s,2 where an increase in 
leverage is commonly associated with a decline in rating quality all else held equal, and vice versa. 
Reductions in leverage are also generally associated with improvements in credit ratings, and 
therefore can cause a firm to deviate from its target credit rating (Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 
2009; Kisgen, 2009). Thus, firms can be unwilling to put their credit rating status in jeopardy by 
allowing large fluctuations in their leverage ratios, and particularly when they have a high rating. 
Therefore, we expect that better-rated firms have more stable leverage patterns over time since 
increased leverage signals higher risk to the market and may adversely affect a firm’s credit rating, 
value and operations. 
                                                     




In this study, it is necessary to account for the inherent endogeneity between credit ratings and 
capital structures. Specifically, credit ratings or their qualities are not exogenously assigned to 
firms and thus a third determinant (unobserved characteristic) may be driving the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity of both credit-rating assignments and leverage ratios. Moreover, the self-selection 
into different rating categories makes the use of appropriate econometric methods even more 
necessary. We address these identification challenges using a set of identification strategies 
introduced below.  
We first formally document the long-run stability of rating classes. We do so using the portfolio 
formation method of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). Forming quartile portfolios of firms 
based on their initial credit rating, we show that the average credit rating for these quartiles stays 
highly stable after a period of 27 years but becomes less stable with a lower credit rating. More 
intuitively, an examination of a typical credit rating matrix validates the idea of rating stability 
since there are consistently higher probabilities that a firm preserves its rating unchanged over the 
next period.   
We cannot simply compare investment and speculative grade firms to test our main hypothesis, 
because such a comparison can be confounded by differences in the characteristics between firms 
in these two credit-rating categories. To address this issue, we follow the literature on treatment 
effects estimation and focus predominantly on firms located just above and just below the 
investment grade cut-off (i.e. on firms with BBB- and BB+ ratings with S&P). Economic theory 
suggests that across this threshold firms have similar fundamentals and therefore exhibit similar 
credit risk as well as capital structure determinants. Therefore, a focus on this cut-off provides an 
identification opportunity for estimating the treatment effect of being located just above the cut-
off on the outcome variable, which is the number of years that a firm waits before changing its 
leverage beyond some arbitrary threshold. This strategy to large extent mitigates the problem of 
endogeneity between credit ratings and choice of leverage, when coupled with propensity score 
matching for receiving treatment and appropriate assignment of counterfactuals. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to introduce the estimation of treatment effects for survival data to deal 
with an issue in finance.3  
                                                     
3Discussions of the estimation of treatment effects for survival data are found in Rotnitzky and Robins, 
2006; Vittinghoff, Glidden, Shiboski and McCulloch, 2012; Bai, Tsaitis and O’Brien, 2013. 
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Our treatment effect estimation methodology is different in three main aspects from that of 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) where they use the treatment effect to show the existence of 
market segmentation across investment and speculative grade firms. First, we match firms across 
the investment-grade cut-off not based on similarity in firm-level characteristics, but rather based 
on every firm’s propensity to receive the treatment (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). Based on the related literature of program evaluation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1893; 
Hirano, Imbens and Ridder, 2003; Guo and Fraser, 2015), this should provide more reliable results 
for causality inference than simple characteristic matching. Second, we not only use a matched 
sample to increase the soundness of the comparison, but we also account for possible 
discontinuities in treatment and control samples by generating comparable counterfactuals using 
Weighted Regression-Adjusted (WRA) estimators. Third, since our outcome of interest is survival, 
we account for possible censoring and missing data using classic survival data censoring 
adjustments.  
Despite the mostly arbitrary nature of the investment-grade cut-off and our use of the propensity 
score matching strategy, concerns may still remain about the effect of unobserved variables on our 
results. There may be some unobserved determinants that are only known to the rating agencies 
and may affect the assignment of firms across the investment-grade cut-off. Although we cannot 
perfectly rule out the impact of possible unobservables, we provide two additional examinations 
to address this concern. First, we argue that if the relationship between rating stability and capital 
structure stability exists, it should not be confined to the narrow band just above and below the 
investment grade cut-off. Thus, we use hazard regressions to examine the effect on capital-
structure stability from any improvement in credit-rating quality over the whole spectrum of 
ratings.  
Second, we argue that our results should hold with observable-based model-generated 
counterfactuals. The idea here is that a test that compares treatment firms with model-generated 
observable-based counterfactuals should fail to produce our primary results if the assignment of 
firms across the cut-off is influenced by CRA-specific unobservables. We show that our results 
are robust to this consideration using different estimation methods that include the Regression 
Adjustment (RA), Weighted Regression Adjustment (WRA), Inverse-Probability Weighting 
(IPW), and Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). 
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We find that while firms in higher rating classes have more persistent transition probabilities 
and thus more stable credit ratings over time, they also have largely more stable leverage ratios. 
Matched firms just above the investment grade threshold maintain their leverage stability 3.67 
years longer compared to their speculative grade counterparts, considering a threshold of a 50% 
change in leverage. Extending our study across all credit-rating classes using hazard regressions 
conditional on a set of covariates from the capital structure and credit risk literatures, we show that 
each standard deviation improvement in rating quality (i.e. four notches) results in more than a 
70% reduction in the hazard rates of leverage-ratio changes. Furthermore, the effect of credit-
rating quality on increased leverage stability is much higher than the effect of any other 
determinant.  
We use a number of strategies to test our second hypothesis. First, we test if rated firms have 
more stable leverage ratios over time compared to not-rated firms. Second, we investigate whether 
individual firms with periods of rated and not-rated regimes have significantly more stable 
leverage ratios during their rated periods. Finally, we examine whether the probability of leverage 
ratio changes above any given threshold for rated firms is lower than that of the matched not-rated 
firms.  
To conduct these examinations, we first replicate the portfolio formation method of Lemmon, 
Roberts and Zender (2008) and show that a stable leverage pattern is more dominant for the rated 
sample. We then introduce an alternative strategy to study whether rated firms have more stable 
leverage ratios than not-rated firms. For that we borrow from the literature of program evaluation 
where no basis for a natural experiment is available. Since in this setting there is no clear-cut cut-
off between the treatment and control samples, we match rated and not-rated firms based on their 
propensity to have credit ratings using the sophisticated method of Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and 
report how the application of a treatment (i.e. having credit ratings) to one group of firms stabilizes 
their leverage ratios over time. While causal inference in this sample is not as strong as for the 
tests of the main hypothesis due to the effect of unobserved determinants, a propensity score 
matching makes the two samples largely comparable. Using a formal survival analysis on the 
matched samples, we find that rated firms change their leverage ratios less than not-rated firms 
and that this difference becomes larger at higher leverage variation thresholds. Controlling for 
firm, macroeconomic and industry effects, we show that rated firms minimize leverage 
fluctuations as having a credit rating reduces hazard rates by almost 20%. We further study how 
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the treatment effect of being rated increases the number of years in which the firm maintains a 
stable leverage policy. Using different matching methods and therefore different numbers of 
control and treatment firms in each setting, our results show robustly that credit ratings have a 
significant impact on leverage stability. For example, we document that rated firms delay leverage 
changes of more than 50% by almost 9 years more compared to their not-rated counterparts in 
cluster-matched samples. 
In a set of identification strategies designed to rule out the endogeneity effect, we document 
that starting (or stopping) of credit ratings reports has a significant influence on the future evolution 
of leverage ratios. Firms that begin to have credit ratings tend to maintain more stable leverage 
ratios in the rated periods, while firms whose credit ratings are discontinued tend to exhibit less 
stable leverage ratios in the not-rated periods.  Our results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion 
of zero-leverage firms (as suggested by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008; DeAngelo and Roll, 
2015).  
We also introduce an alternative to survival tests by measuring the fluctuations of leverage 
ratios over time across different thresholds. This new test is motivated by a possible shortcoming 
of survival analyses. As a firm crosses a leverage threshold for the first time, its future leverage 
fluctuations are no longer under study using a survival analysis setting. In our alternative test, we 
retain firms in the sample over the whole study period regardless of how many times a firm crosses 
different leverage thresholds. We then calculate the probability of fluctuations across different 
thresholds for the whole sample at any given point in time. We show that rated firms tend to have 
fewer fluctuations in their leverage ratios over short and long horizons and across different 
thresholds than not-rated firms. This implies that the leverage-ratio stability in rated firms is not 
merely a long-run effect but is a pervasive behavior that extends over both short and long horizons.  
Finally, we address whether the additional leverage stability for rated firms is due to active 
management. Based on active net debt and equity issuance portfolios, we document that rated firms 
have a greater tendency to maintain stable leverages and that active leverage management is 
influenced by the existence or absence of credit ratings. This result leads to the inference that the 
stability and convergence patterns in the rated and not-rated firm samples are in fact due to 
differences in active management. 
This paper makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. First, we extend 
the credit-rating targets literature (Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009 a, b; Graham and 
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Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2009; Altman and Rijken, 2004, Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto, 2000), and 
the literature on the relationship between credit ratings and capital structures by documenting that 
credit-rating stability induces leverage stability. Our results suggest that the interdependence of 
leverage ratios and credit ratings not only influences the amount of debt in every period, but also 
the evolution of and variations in leverage ratios over long periods of time.  
Our second contribution addresses a recent critique dealing with the stability phenomenon by 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) that the reliance on firm fixed effects and formation of quartile 
portfolios as indicators of leverage stability by Lemon, Roberts and Zender (2008) are problematic 
since these methodologies cannot account for short-term leverage variations.  We demonstrate that 
a survival analysis setting with its high sensitivity to short-term leverage fluctuations can be an 
appropriate alternative for exploring such stability. Furthermore, our home-made test for the 
measurement of the probability of leverage fluctuations is another alternative for such 
measurements.  
 Third, our empirical methodology which provides a setting for the estimation of treatment 
effects with survival data using matching and assignment of counterfactuals adds to the literature 
on the use of treatment effect evaluations in finance (Villalonga 2000; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey 2010; Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012). 
 Fourth, by studying the relationships between different rating categories and having a credit 
rating on the financing and capital structure behaviors of firms over time, we contribute to the 
literature on the regulating role that ratings play in capital markets.  In this regard, we also extend 
the literature on market segmentation by showing that segmentation across investment and 
speculative grade categories leads to differential capital-structure behaviors over time.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the sample and data. 
Section 2.3 provides evidence on the stability of rating classes. Section 2.4 studies the relationship 
between the stability of rating classes and leverage stability using samples of firms with ratings 
just above and just below investment grade. Section 2.5 studies the second hypothesis, and 
compares the stability of capital structures across rated and not-rated firms. Section 2.6 concludes 




2.2 SAMPLE AND DATA  
 The initial sample consists of all COMPUSTAT firms drawn from the period of 1985 to 2012 
from which we remove all financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999). 4   The beginning year 
corresponds with the year that credit-rating reports commenced for a considerable number of firms. 
Our choice of an annual frequency is to maintain consistency with the use of annual datasets in the 
debate about leverage stability (specifically, Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008; DeAngelo and 
Roll, 2015). Outliers are also eliminated by removing the top and bottom 0.1% of this initial sample 
based on their market and book leverage observations.  
 The full sample is divided into not-rated and rated firms where not-rated firms are those with 
no credit ratings reported by S&P at any point of time or non-temporary length of time during our 
sample period. COMPUSTAT is our source for S&P credit ratings for the long-term bonds and 
other financial and accounting information for our sample firms. Since the S&P ratings are 
reported mostly on a monthly basis and our data frequency is annual, the assigned credit rating for 
each firm for each fiscal year is based on that firm’s last S&P rating report for that fiscal year.5 
For measuring credit-rating changes, we convert the ratings into a numeric format between 1 and 
24, with AAA as 1, AA+ as 2,…, and ending with D as 24 (as in Hotchkiss, Strömberg and Smith, 
2014).  
 Before proceeding to the empirical results, we examine the summary statistics for the variables 
for each of the three samples (rated, not-rated and combined). Table 2.1 shows that rated firms are, 
on average, larger and more volatile in terms of cash flows. They also have higher average sales, 
profitability, tangible assets and book and market leverage ratios.  
[Please insert Table 2.1 about here] 
2.3  THE STABILITY OF CREDIT-RATING CLASSES 
 To test the main hypothesis of the paper that rating stability results in leverage stability, we first 
need to investigate whether credit-rating classes are stable over time, and whether credit-rating 
stability declines with lower credit-rating quality. To examine the stability of rating classes, we 
                                                     
4 Based on untabulated results, we obtain similar results when the sample is confined to those firms with 
data for at least ten years on book assets during our sample period.  All untabulated results are reported in 
an internet appendix that is available from the authors of this paper.  
5 We obtain similar untabulated results when we assign an annual rating measure by using fiscal year 
averages of monthly numerical rating equivalents for each firm. This is primarily due to our study 
conditioning largely on the existence of a rating, and not the specific rating itself.  
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apply the portfolio formation method of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) to the S&P credit 
ratings for firms. Specifically, we construct quartiles of sample firms based on their relative credit 
ratings in each base year x until the base year is 2012, and then measure the average credit ratings 
of the firms in each quartile over the next 2013-x years from each base year. We then take the 
calendar-year averages of these average credit ratings for each quartile. The upper panel of Figure 
2.1 shows that the rating quartiles are highly stable over a 20-year period. The average rating 
improves over time for the lowest rated quartile (line with triangles) and deteriorates for the highest 
and second to highest rated quartiles (curves with squares and dots). The average ratings hardly 
change for the second to lowest rated quartiles (curve with asterisks). The convergence is largely 
a result of this differential deterioration and improvement in credit ratings over time, especially 
when the highest rated (curve with squares) deteriorates the most and the lowest rated quartile 
(curve with triangles) improves the most. 
 Based on the numerical credit-rating equivalents (Hotchkiss, Strömberg and Smith, 2014), the 
deterioration in the highest rated quartile is about 2 notches. This moves the average rating of 5 
(A+) to 7 (A-) for this quartile over 27 years. Deterioration in the credit-rating of the second-
highest rated quartile is similar, with the equivalent average rating declining from 8 (BBB+) to 10 
(BBB-) over 27 years. The credit-rating improvement for the lowest rated quartile is almost one 
notch from an average of 13 (BB-) to 14 (B+). Since convergence generally is slight, there is little 
change in a firm’s rating class over a 20 year period. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Alp (2013) that investment grade ratings tightened and speculative grade ratings loosened over 
the period of 1985 to 2002, and that this drop was followed by another drop of 1.5 notches between 
2002 and 2007. 
 To account for possible attrition effects, we construct an alternative sample of firms with at 
least 20 years of observations. Based on the plots of the average ratings for each quartile over each 
of the 27 years reported in the lower panel of Figure 2.1, we observe almost a non-existent 
transitory (converging) component. A deterioration of about 2 notches occurs over 27 years for 
each of the categories in a similar fashion, while each rating class remains persistent over time. 
Considering both panels together suggests that average ratings are highly stable over long periods 
of time. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) 
that average ratings declined by three notches from 1985 to 2009 after controlling for firm 
characteristics due to the increasing conservatism of rating agencies. 
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[Please insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
 To further explore how ratings evolve over time, we measure the magnitude and test the 
significance of the differences in mean ratings between event years 0 and 10, 10 and 20, and 0 and 
20. The results for the total sample and the sample of firms with at least 20 annual observations 
are reported in Panels A and B, respectively, of Table 2.2. The improvements in the credit ratings 
of low and medium rated firms (negative sign) and the deteriorations in the ratings of high and 
very highly rated firms (positive sign) is evident in Panel A. However, the rating deteriorations are 
generally more significant than the improvements, consistent with the findings of Alp (2013). As 
reported in Panel B, the general deterioration in ratings across all four quartiles is significant. This 
shows that although the relative position of different rating groups is largely stable, there is a 
significant difference in the base year 0 rating classes going forward. Therefore, stability is chiefly 
a result of a similar magnitude of deterioration (or improvement) across the different rating 
quartiles. 
[Please insert Table 2.2 about here] 
 The notion of credit-rating stability is further supported by investigating a typical rating 
transition matrix. For example, a Moody’s Rating Transition Matrix (2007)6 is reported in Figure 
2.2 for probabilities over 1-year intervals in 2007. The diagonal of this matrix reports the much 
higher probabilities that a firm preserves its credit rating unchanged in the next period (i.e. next 
year). Furthermore, the probabilities located on the diagonal decline almost monotonically with a 
decrease in the credit-rating class. For example, an Aaa-rated firm has a 89% likelihood that it will 
preserve its credit rating in the next period, while this likelihood for a Baa1, Ba1, Caa1, and Ca-C 
firm is 75%, 65%, 59% and 35%, respectively.  We discuss the possible reasons for this 
observation later in the paper.  
 [Please insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
                                                     




2.4  DOES CREDIT-RATING STABILITY RESULT IN LEVERAGE-RATIO 
STABILITY? 
2.4.1 Empirical Methodology 
Building on the result of the previous section that credit-rating stability exists in the long run, 
we now formally test our main hypothesis of whether a firm’s tendency to maintain stable credit 
ratings results in higher leverage stability. In preparation for that examination, we first explain our 
empirical strategy, possible limitations to causal interpretations, proposed solutions, econometric 
model set up and specification methods.   
 An important econometric problem that needs to be addressed when investigating the effects of 
credit-rating stability on leverage stability is that a simple comparison of leverage stability across 
different rating classes (e.g. investment grade versus speculative grade) can be methodologically 
problematic. Such a comparison can be confounded by considerable endogeneity between the 
credit ratings and corporate capital structures. The endogeneity between credit ratings and leverage 
ratios stems from two main sources: (1) Self-selection of firms into the different rating classes 
arising from the possibility that higher-rated firms may have entirely different fundamentals from 
lower-rated firms; and (2) the omitted variable problem since unobserved determinants may affect 
both leverage and credit-rating decisions concurrently.   
 To address these concerns, we employ an econometric approach to measure the treatment effect 
by matching firms just above and just below the investment-grade cut-off (i.e., firms with S&P 
credit ratings in the narrow band of BBB- and BB+). In our setup, firms that are assigned to the 
lowest (just) investment-grade class are in the treatment sample, and those just below the cut-off 
(just speculative-grade) are in the control sample. As an outcome, we expect to detect more stable 
leverage ratios for the matched firms located just above the investment-grade cut-off.  
 The first concern about the characteristics of firms assigned across the investment grade cut-off 
is that a matching method based on observables may fail to capture important unobserved 
determinants. While the selection of different observables as well as a robust matching method is 
effective, the origin of the cut-offs themselves can mitigate further concerns. Fons (2004) and 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) report no significant differences in firm fundamentals above and 
below the investment-grade cut-off. What firms are in fact “speculative-grade” has long been a 
source of debate and confusion. Chernenko and Sunderam (2011) refer to this situation as the 
“muddled origins” of the investment grade cut-off. In the 1930’s when regulatory bodies began 
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applying restrictions on the holdings of “speculative-grade” bonds by financial institutions, a 
serious policy limitation was the definition of such assets and what delineated speculative from 
investment grade bonds. By 1938, Moody’s was able to convince regulators that BBB-rated bonds 
are not “distinctly” speculative. This suggests that at the threshold that divides investment from 
speculative grade there are no material fundamental differences in firm observables across the cut-
off. We argue that this historic concept still applies, and is corroborated by arguments and findings 
of noise and inertia in credit-rating assignments by the rating agencies.  
 The noise and inertia arguments in credit-rating assignments suggest that although credit ratings 
should contain information about a firm’s credit quality and arguably capital structure preferences, 
they are subject to errors, delays and mis-assignments. That being the case, one should be able to 
match firms across rating thresholds so that the matched firms are sufficiently similar in every 
fundamental respect. We now expand on these two arguments.  
 Convincing evidence for the inertia argument is provided by Altman and Rijken (2004) and 
Cantor and Mann (2006). Altman and Rijken (2004) discuss that credit-rating agencies (CRA’s) 
are slow in adjusting their credit-rating assignments primarily due to the fact that they consider 
ratings as reflecting long-term default probabilities. These deviations between what ratings 
indicate and what the actual credit quality of the firms are implies that the investment-grade cut-
off used by the rating agencies can be a very imprecise delineator of the credit quality of firms 
above and below this cut-off. Cantor and Mann (2006) corroborate this argument by showing that 
CRAs have to trade-off the accuracy of ratings they assign versus the stability of these ratings. 
Altman and Kao (1992) show that CRA adjustments in credit ratings are mostly done partially.  
 There are additional reasons to believe that rating assignments are noisy. As argued by 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2012), the organizational structure of CRAs can lead to credit-rating 
noise. For example, Moody’s has separate departments for evaluating investment grade and 
speculative grade credits. The limits of information flow and conflicts of interests in such an 
organizational structure can affect the relative quality of rating assignments. The accuracy of 
credit-rating outlooks as precursors for possible changes in credit ratings further supports the noise 
argument. Cantor and Hamilton (2005) show that firms with positive outlooks default at the same 
frequency as firms with a one-notch better rating over the 1995-2005 period. Moody’s adjusts the 
ratings of issuers one notch higher (lower) for positive (negative) outlooks in order to assess its 
quality of rating assignments versus historical default rates. In this regard, firms just below the 
19 
 
investment grade cut-off (BB+) with positive outlooks should have at least the same rating quality 
as firms above the cut-off (BBB-). Finally, conflicts of interest in CRAs and imprecision in the 
models that they use to determine credit quality also add to the noise in credit ratings (e.g., Bolton, 
Freixax and Shapiro, 2012), 
2.4.1.1 Estimation Method for the Treatment Effects for the Survival Data 
 The above argument about the similarity in firm fundamentals across the investment grade cut-
off provides an interesting opportunity for studying the causal effects of better credit-rating status 
on capital-structure stability, since assignment of firms just above the cut-off can be arguably 
considered as being exogenous. In this setting, the outcome variable of interest is the number of 
years it takes for a firm to change its leverage ratio more than some arbitrary threshold, e.g. 10%, 
20% or 50%, compared to its initial leverage. More formally, we study the “survival outcomes” as 
a result of the treatment, which is being located just above the investment grade cut-off as opposed 
to being located just below it. This answers the question of: “How many years longer does it take 
for a “treatment” firm to change its leverage ratio above some arbitrary threshold compared to a 
“control” firm?”  
 There are still remaining concerns about the matching of firms across the cut-off. The first 
problem is that we need to have close-enough counterfactuals to each treatment observation. 
Suppose, for example, that assignment to the just-investment-grade category is still influenced by 
a set of covariates 𝑋 , whose effects are not yet perfectly exhausted by noise or inertia. For 
simplicity, let us assume that the matrix 𝑋  contains only one single covariate, the firm-level 
volatility. In this regard, firms with higher volatility are more likely to fall below the cut-off and 
vice versa. As long as firms above and below the cut-off have comparable volatilities, we can 
safely estimate the treatment effects. Since there may be situations when no firms with comparable 
volatilities below the cut-off can be found, the minimum volatility in the control sample may 
correspond only to the medium volatilities in the treatment sample. Thus, we need to appropriately 
account for limitations in inference due to missing data, or as it is called in the literature, the 
censoring problem. We use a set of observables from the literature of capital structure (Parsons 
and Titman, 2008) and credit risk (Leland and Toft, 1996; Duffie and Singleton, 2003) to match 
the firms just above and just below the cut-off. This matching is done using propensity scores 
estimated using a multivariate Logit specification (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The matching is 
based on the initial observations of each firm in our sample. For every sample firm, we determine 
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the first observation in the sample and then keep only those with the initial rating of BBB- and 
BB+ and then find matches for the two samples based on the aforementioned set of observables.  
 Another aspect of the censoring problem is that firms in either sample may have missing 
observations or have no events during the study period. To address this concern we use weight-
adjusted censoring estimators. An assumption behind this method is that the time to censoring is 
subject to the following three assumptions: (a) censoring is random, (b) the time to censoring 
comes from a known distribution, and (c) the treatment level does not affect the censoring time. 
Since the censoring in our sample comes mostly from the coverage by the database (Compustat/ 
Capital IQ), we can appropriately proceed as if the above three assumptions hold.  
 Now we discuss how the time to event (survival time) is estimated using the random censoring 
determinant, 𝑡𝐶, and a treatment indicator dummy 𝜏 that equals 1 if the observation comes from 
the treatment sample and zero otherwise. Let us denote the time to event (i.e., the change of 
leverage above some arbitrary threshold) for an investment grade firm (treatment) and a 
speculative-grade firm (control) with 𝑡0 and 𝑡1.  These potential outcomes can be censored or not. 
More formally: 
 
𝑡0̃ = 𝑡𝑐(𝑡0 ≥ 𝑡𝑐) + 𝑡0{1 − (𝑡0 ≥ 𝑡𝑐)} 
𝑡1̃ = 𝑡𝑐(𝑡1 ≥ 𝑡𝑐) + 𝑡1{1 − (𝑡1 ≥ 𝑡𝑐)} 
(2.1)  
 
The potential outcome conditional on knowing 𝜏 can be expressed as: 
𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏) 𝑡0̃ + 𝜏 𝑡1̃ (2.2)  
 
 Our main estimator in this paper is the Weighted Regression Adjustment (WRA). To test the 
robustness of our results to the influence of possible counterfactuals, we also replicate our studies 
using alternative estimators including Regression Adjustment (RA), Inverse-Probability 
Weighting (IPW) and Inverse-Probability-Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA).  The WRA 
estimators are obtained through a four-step procedure described below. In the first step, we 
estimate ?̂? where 𝒘, 𝜸 are covariates and related parameters, respectively, assuming that the time-
to-censoring distribution is 𝐹𝑐(𝑡𝑐|𝒘, 𝜸) . In the second step, we estimate the parameters of a 
parametric survival-time model, denoted by ?̂?𝜏 for each of the treatment levels 𝜏 ∈ {0,1} where 
the survival time distribution is denoted by 𝐹(𝑡|𝑋, 𝜏, 𝛽𝜏). Here, 𝑋 denotes the matrix of covariates 
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(i.e., the factors that lead to longer or shorter waiting times until the threshold change in the 
leverage ratios). ?̂?𝜏 captures the contribution of each of these covariates to the waiting time while 
𝜏 indicates whether the sample is derived from investment grade or speculative grade firms. ?̂?𝜏 are 
estimated using the Weighted Maximum Likelihood (WML) method, where weights are the 




1 − 𝐹𝑐(𝑡𝑐|𝒘, ?̂?)
 (2.3)  
 Next, we need to estimate the expected survival time, Ê(ti|Xi, τ, β̂τ),  using β̂τ and the 
distribution F(t|X, τ, βτ), that shows the possible outcome means (POM) for the treatment effect. 
Finally, we can estimate the average treatment effects (ATE) by comparing the estimated POMs. 
Specifically, ATE can be estimated using a set of simultaneous equations as in Newey (1984) 




∑ ?̂?𝑖{?̂?(𝑡𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝜏 = 1 , ?̂?𝜏=1) − 𝑃𝑂𝑀0̂ −   𝐴𝑇?̂?}
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 0 (2.4)  
 
The ATET is estimated by: 
1
𝑁1
∑ ?̂?𝑖(𝟏{𝜏𝑖=1}){?̂?(𝑡𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝜏 = 1 , ?̂?𝜏=1) − 𝑃𝑂𝑀0̂ −  𝐴𝑇?̂?}
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 0 (2.5)  
 We also create alternative counterfactual samples with different models of the IRW, RA, IPW, 
and IPWRA methods. These methods create model-generated counterfactual observations based 
on a select set of observables in the treatment and control samples. We argue that if our primary 
results are influenced by the effects of any unobserved determinants, then similar tests that 
compare the treatment sample with counterfactual observations created using only observables 
should not confirm our main findings. Using all these alternative methods, we find that our results 
which are only tabulated using the IRW method, are almost identically replicated using the model-
generated counterfactuals. Based on these findings, we contend that our econometric approach 
minimizes any concerns regarding the influence of unobservable variables. 
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2.4.2 Results for the Treatment Effects for Survival Data 
 In table 2.3, we report the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect for the 
treated (ATT) across the investment grade cut-off, where the treated and control samples are the 
ones just above and just below the cut-off point (BBB- and BB+), respectively. The ATE and ATT 
are reported in the first and second rows, respectively, of every panel (50, 20 and 10 percent 
thresholds). The potential-outcome means (POM) are reported in the fifth column. As expected 
for the main hypothesis, there is a large and significant difference across firms above and below 
the investment grade cut-off in terms of their leverage stability. In the first panel, the average time 
to change leverage by more than the 50% threshold for a firm just above the investment grade cut-
off is 3.55 years longer than the 9.15 years for a firm just below the investment grade. The 
importance of this effect can be understood by examining the ratio of the average treatment effect 
to the potential outcome means. In this case, when all firms are located just above the 50% 
threshold, the time to the first cross above the 50% threshold falls by almost 39% relative to the 
case when all firms are located just below the 50% threshold.  
 The second row confirms this finding when the average treatment on treated (ATT) is 
considered (i.e. only the treatment on the just investment-grade firms is taken into account). For 
firms that are located just above the threshold, it takes 3.67 years longer to cross the 50% threshold 
at least once, compared to firms that are located below the 50% threshold. A similar leverage 
stabilizing effect in response to rating quality above the threshold is prevalent for the 20% and 
10% thresholds. Focusing on the ATT estimates, it takes 2.12  (1.88) years longer for firms just 
above the investment-grade cut-off to cross the 20% (10%) leverage threshold, compared to firms 
just below it. In contrast, it takes 7.13 (3.21) years for a firm located below the threshold to cross 
these thresholds. In other words, being rated just above the investment grade cut-off leads to a 30% 
(59%) increase in leverage stability based on the 20% (10%) leverage thresholds.  
 These results strongly confirm our main hypothesis by identifying a causal relation between 
credit rating stability and the stability of leverage ratios over time, where the former influences the 
latter. The large and significant magnitude of this effect implies that long-term credit rating targets 
(Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009) can largely influence how firms set their capital structure 
decisions. Compared to the findings of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), this finding shows 
that a sizeable portion of the leverage stability is induced by the tendency of firms to keep ratings 
stable. Considering that a firm’s capital structure history largely affects today’s leverage decisions 
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even more than the conventional determinants (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008), our findings 
imply that credit-rating considerations are one of the most important capital structure determinants 
both cross-sectional and across time.   
[Please insert Table 2.3 about here] 
 
For illustrational purposes, we also compare the cumulative hazard and survival rates across 
two samples graphically in Figure 3. These graphs take the number of years until the first pass of 
leverage above thresholds of 10%, 20% and 50% compared to the previous leverage ratios. We 
observe a considerable difference between the survival rates of the leverage ratios across the two 
samples. Firms just above the cut-off threshold tend to have more stable leverage ratios across all 
thresholds. The gap between just investment and just speculative grade firms for both the survival 
and cumulative hazard rates widens with the passage of time, and the difference in the survival 
rates of the two samples is more pronounced at wider thresholds.  
[Please insert Figure 2.3 about here]  
 
2.4.3 Evidence from a Parametric Hazard Model  
 We extend the above examinations to investigate the relationship between the stability of credit-
rating classes and leverage stability across the range of all different ratings. For this purpose, we 
use a conditional hazard regression setting, where the covariates are selected from capital structure 
and credit risk literatures and include market leverage, profitability, tangibility, natural logarithms 
of size and sales, total debt and cash flow volatility. We begin by specifying a population 
distribution for the duration outcome (Wooldridge, 2010). This distribution can be specified 
conditional on some covariates listed above. After this conditional distribution is specified, we can 
estimate the parameters of interest, and especially time to the first-pass event using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) methods. The first-pass event in this paper, as explained previously, 
is when a firm changes its leverage by more than some arbitrary threshold (10%, 20% or 50%).  
 For this purpose, we use an exponential distribution with its time-invariant hazard rate, which 
is referred to as the memory-less property (Cameron and Triverdi, 2005). In unreported results, we 
obtain confirming results with three other distributions including Weibull, Gompertz and Gamma. 
Our parametric regression model estimates the effect of these covariates on the hazard rate, where 
negative estimates indicate reductions in the hazard rate (more stable leverage ratios).   
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 As discussed earlier, we expect that higher credit quality leads to higher leverage stability. The 
credit rating variable is the numerical equivalent of S&P’s alphabetical ratings, where better credit 
ratings are assigned greater numbers as in Hotchkiss, Strömberg and Smith (2014). We find that 
the credit-rating quality by itself explains the largest portion of the variations in leverage stability 
and each notch improvement in the rating adds one unit to the numerical measure. Thus, if a better 
credit rating is associated with more stable leverage ratios, we expect a negative and significant 
relationship between the two. 
 The results summarized in Table 2.4 strongly support this expectation as the effect of credit-
rating quality on the hazard functions is larger than for all other determinants. The right panel 
reports results for the 50% leverage change threshold and the left panel for the 20% threshold. The 
reduced number of observations is due to the sample that only includes rated firms. In the most 
conservative case, a standard deviation improvement in credit quality of 4.03 notches (for example 
from BBB to A+) translates into a 81% (73%) reduction in the hazard rate in the univariate 
regression (column 1). This translates into a 51% (51%) lower hazard rate based on the exponential 
hazard distribution for a 50% (20%) threshold for the leverage change.  Results clearly support the 
importance of credit-rating quality and the significance of the association of rating quality with 
leverage stability. These results also confirm our findings in the previous section that an 
assignment just above the investment grade cut-off can lengthen leverage stability.    
[Please insert Table 2.4 about here] 
 
2.5 LEVERAGE STABILITY ACROSS RATED AND NOT-RATED FIRMS 
 In this section, we investigate the complementary hypothesis that rated firms tend to have more 
stable capital structures over time compared to not-rated firms. This is expected if ratings are a 
leverage-stabilizing motivation. This leads to tests of three specific predictions. 
 First, we expect that rated firms wait more years before changing their leverage above any given 
threshold compared to a sample of matched not-rated firms after controlling for other firm-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. Second, we expect that firms with periods of rated 
and not-rated regimes exhibit more leverage stability in their rated regimes. Finally, if rated firms 
are more cautious about changing their leverage ratios, they will change their leverage ratios less 
frequently or by smaller amounts for any given time period. In other words, the more stable pattern 
should not be confined to only longer time-frames or depend on any process of mean-taking. Thus, 
25 
 
rated firms should show fewer tendencies to cross various arbitrary leverage thresholds than not-
rated firms, where the thresholds are defined as the differences between leverage ratios in two 
different periods. Thus, if our complementary hypothesis cannot be rejected, any leverage stability 
difference across the two samples has to persist over both the short and long runs.  
 In the following sections, we start by a simple comparison of rated and not-rated firms in terms 
of their leverage stability using the portfolio formation method of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 
(2008). Since this method cannot address the endogeneity issue and is useful only in showing 
associations, we continue our examination with a more formal investigation of the causal effect 
across rated and not-rated samples using a propensity score matching method.  
2.5.1 Evolution of Leverage Ratios across Rated and Not-rated Firms 
 We start by examining the existence of stable patterns in leverage ratios by applying the method 
of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) to a cross-section of rated and not-rated firms. The 
methodology is as follows: first, we form four quartiles of firms with very high, high, medium and 
low leverage ratios in each calendar year by ranking firms based on their actual leverages. We call 
the year of sorting and grouping the “starting” or “base” or event 0 year for the remainder of this 
paper. Second, we compute the average leverage ratios for firms in each quartile over the next 27 
years (always ending with year 2013) assuming no subsequent rebalancing of the membership in 
each quartile (except for firms no longer in our sample due to firm attrition). Third, we repeat these 
two steps for each subsequent year in our dataset until the base year is 2012. Finally, we compute 
the average leverage ratio for each quartile for each calendar year.  
 The average market and book leverage ratios over 20 years based on this methodology are 
depicted in the upper and lower panels of Figure 2.4, respectively. The left-hand side (LHS) and 
right-hand side (RHS) of both panels are for the rated and not-rated samples, respectively. The 
graphs suggest that the converging and stable leverage patterns for the combined sample are mixes 
of the different time-series behaviors for rated and not-rated firms (particularly for market 
leverage). The stable patterns are more dominant for the rated sample and the converging pattern 
is more dominant for the not-rated sample.   
[Please insert Figure 2.4 about here] 
 The converging pattern of the leverage ratios for the not-rated firms reduces the variability of 
the leverage ratios by almost four times over 27 years from 32% (38% less 6% in Event Year 0) 
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to as low as 8% (24% less 16% in Event Year 27). In contrast, the reduction in the variability of 
leverage over time for the rated sample is reduced around two times from 47.73% (48% less 27% 
in Event Year 0) to 22% (45% less 23% in Event Year 27). The same holds to a lesser extent for 
book leverage.7 While this result suggests that the evolution of leverage ratios can be influenced 
by the existence of credit ratings, it cannot identify the causes of these cross-sectional differences. 
Lemmon et al. (2008) argue that a permanent and a converging factor should be present in capital 
structure decisions since leverage portfolios follow both a stable and converging pattern. If such 
is the case, then Panel A of Figure 2.4 illustrates that rated firms are influenced largely by the 
stable component while the not-rated firms are largely influenced by the transitory component. 
One of the implications of the existence of a permanent component is that it largely influences 
capital structure tests (Hsiao, 2003) since regression models will yield inconsistent results due to 
correlated errors terms. Thus, inconsistency may be a larger concern for rated firms.  
 A potential concern is that our results may be biased due to the effects of attrition induced by 
firms that exit the leverage portfolios over the years since formation. Another concern is that the 
quartile paths shorten as the quartile formation year approaches 2012, since fewer years remain 
for average taking and generating leverage paths. To address this potential concern, we construct 
a sample of survived firms, which only includes firms with at least 20 annual observations. We 
repeat the methodology applied above and plot the results in Panel B of Figure 2.4. These results 
are similar to those for the full samples, and their overall leverage paths are more stable and 
relatively smoother. At the quartile formation year (Event Year 0), the distance between the highest 
and lowest quartiles in the rated sample is larger (55% for the very high quartile vs. 12% for the 
very low quartile) than for the corresponding quartiles in the not-rated sample (36% vs. 14%). 
However, the reduction in this distance is larger for the not-rated sample at the end of the 20th year 
at 50% than for the rated sample at 37%. The book leverage graphs (lower figures) yields the same, 
yet stronger, conclusion. This implies that the differentiation between the leverage ratios of rated 
firms is larger than for not-rated firms and that this cross-sectional difference is robust to the 
passage of time. What contributes to this more stable and distinctive pattern is a question that we 
address in the subsequent sections of this paper.  
                                                     
7 Unreported plots using the logit conversion approach of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) produce qualitatively 
similar results. These results are also robust to the inclusion or exclusion of zero leverage ratios. 
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 To further investigate long-run stability, we measure changes in market leverage ratios for rated 
and not-rated samples over 10 and 20 years using the following method. First, we compute the 
average market leverages of each of the quartiles formed using the above method in event years 0, 
10 and 20. Then we test the differences of the average leverages between event years 0 and 10, 10 
and 20 and 0 and 20. The results, which are reported in Panels A and B of Table 2.5 for the rated 
and not-rated samples, respectively, support the notion that the leverages of rated firms tend to 
remain more stable. The leverage ratio differences are significantly different from zero for only 
one and two of the quartiles of rated firms at the end of the first 10 and 20 years, respectively. In 
contrast, the differences are significant for all quartiles of not-rated firms at the end of the first 10 
and 20 years.  While all of the significant differences for the quartiles of rated firms are equal to -
2%, the significant differences for the quartiles of not-rated firms vary between -5% and 7%. 
[Please insert Table 2.5 about here] 
2.5.2 Propensity Score Matching  
While the endogeneity concerns in the main hypothesis are addressed by focusing on the 
investment-grade cut-off and employing related statistical adjustments, there is no room for such 
a method for testing the second hypothesis. To mitigate these effects, however, we borrow from 
the literature of program evaluation where assignment to a different program can be endogenous. 
The wealth of related literature, particularly in development and labour economics, focuses mainly 
on developing reliable “matching” methods. An assumption in these matching methods is that 
when there is no ground for an experimental setting where treatment and control samples are only 
different at receiving a “random” treatment, one can yet match the treatment and control samples 
based on their propensity to receive treatment conditional on a set of “observables”. Being 
appropriately done, the propensity-score-matched samples provide adequate statistical grounds for 
the study of treatment effects (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Hirano, Imbens and Ridder, 2003; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Cattaneo, Drukker and Holland, 2013). In our case, the treatment of 
interest is assignment to a “rated” sample, and thus the control sample includes not-rated firms. 
Considering the rated sample as treated and the matched sample of not-rated firms as control 
allows us to test the expectation that the rated firms should take longer periods before changing 
their leverage ratios than the matched not-rated firms, across different matching methods.  
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We first match rated and not-rated firms based on a set of observables. For the set of 
observables, we include leverage determinants (Parsons and Titman, 2008) and credit-rating 
determinants according to Moody’s KMV method (Duffie and Singleton, 2003) that include firm 
value and idiosyncratic volatility. We use the matching algorithm in Dehejia and Wahba (2002), 
which is based on propensity scores to acquire a rating (treatment) using a Logit model. In doing 
so, we first sort data according to the propensity score 𝑝(𝑥). Then the observations are grouped 
into strata in which the propensity scores of treated (rated) and control (not-rated) groups are close 
enough. In each stratum, the ideal would be to have no significant differences in the propensity 
scores between rated and not-rated observations. However, if a significant difference exists, then 
a finer grid is used within that stratum (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Any unmatched firms are 
removed from the study, both in plotting the survival and hazard graphs and in reporting the related 
treatment effects.  
This matching method provides grounds for causal inference of the treatment (being rated) on 
the variable of interest (leverage stability), although there are limitations to a causal interpretation 
as well. The most important limitation of this method, compared to the method employed for the 
main hypothesis, is that there may still be unobserved variables that determine assignment to the 
“rated” sample. Since the propensity score matching is essentially performed using observables, 
we cannot rule out this possibility. Thus, while our results suggest large and significant effects on 
the treatment sample, their interpretations have to be done with caution.  
 After the matching is done, we perform a variety of different statistical tests. First, we 
investigate the effect of “being rated” graphically using Kaplan-Meyer survival graphs. We further 
investigate how “being rated” contributes to stabilizing the leverages of firms compared to other 
determinants using conditional hazard models and show that being rated is the single most 
important determinant of higher leverage stability. We then formally estimate the treatment effect 
(being rated) on leverage stability using the above mentioned matching method of Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002), and report the number of additional years a firm waits before changing its leverage 
above different thresholds when assigned to the rated category. In the next set of studies, we 
compare the probabilities of changes in leverage for individual firms during their rated versus not-
rated periods using a home-made unconditional test of leverage fluctuations. Finally, we provide 
evidence that the stability in leverage ratios is actively managed and in fact this management is 
more crucial in the sample of rated firms.   
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2.5.2.1 Survival Analysis 
We measure changes in the leverage ratios of the sample firms in 1-year intervals extending 
over a 27 year period. To study leverage behavior, we measure the probability that a firm passes a 
certain leverage threshold (i.e., arbitrarily chosen thresholds of 10%, 20% and 50% above or below 
its current leverage ratio in absolute value) in any given year and record the first time any of these 
thresholds are crossed as the event time. We record these first-pass times for the two samples of 
rated and not-rated firms. Since our database is annual, this translates into the number of years 
prior to the crossing of each of the three leverage thresholds. Our data in some cases is censored 
(a no-event) because a firm crosses none of the above thresholds during the available years of 
observation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We compare the hazard function and survival rates 
across rated and not-rated firms using the Nelson–Aalen cumulative hazard and Kaplan–Meier 
survival function estimates across different leverage thresholds in Figure 5.  
Figure 5 reports the estimates from survival and hazard functions across different leverage 
thresholds. The Left panel reports hazard function estimates and the right panel reports survival 
function estimates. Upper, mid and bottom graphs use 50%, 20% and 10% leverage thresholds 
respectively. Solid blue curves are for rated firms and the dashed red curves are for not-rated firms. 
This figure shows the important differences in the hazard and survival rates across these two 
samples. In Panel A, rated firms have visibly lower hazard estimates and the difference for this 
measure between the two samples widens over time. After 27 years, the survival rate of the rated 
sample is almost 89%, whereas the survival rate of the not-rated sample is roughly 82%. The 
hazard rates are in general very low, especially for the rated firms. Even after almost three decades, 
only 11% (18%) of the rated (not-rated) firms have ever changed their leverage ratios beyond 50% 
in a given year. Based on Panel B, the difference between the rated and not-rated sample also 
continues over 27 years at the 20% threshold. The survival rate for rated firms is 10% higher (35%) 
after 27 years compared to not-rated firms (25%).   These results are noteworthy since the lower 
propensity to change leverage in the rated sample provides support for the hypothesis that rated 
firms tend to surpass leverage thresholds less frequently. We note that this observation does not 
provide causal inference but helps to identify the mechanism on which such a test is subsequently 
built. We further investigate the causal effect of ratings on leverage stability in later tests.  




Same inferences are drawn from the mid panel. At a 20% leverage threshold level, rated firms 
have consistently longer survival rates and lower hazard functions over the 27 years examined 
herein. However, the magnitude of hazard is increased for both samples. In 27 years, the 
cumulative hazard estimate for rated firms is less than 1 while it reaches 1.3 in the not-rated 
sample. The hazard rates increase further for both samples in the two bottom panels (Panels E and 
F). The striking difference between this panel and the others is the switch in the position of rated 
and not-rated firms after the first 19 years, which widens thereafter until the year 27. At a 10% 
leverage threshold, there are horizons at which rated firms tend to diverge more than not-rated 
firms. Overall, we conclude that rated firms appear to be more cautious about material leverage 
variations compared to not-rated firms and that this tendency becomes particularly important as 
the leverage threshold increases. 
2.5.2.2 The Treatment Effects of being Rated on Leverage Stability 
We estimate the average treatment effect using the different methods of nearest neighbor, 
stratification and kernel matching. For each method, we report standard errors and t-statistics using 
analytical and bootstrapping methods in Table 2.6. The outcome variable here is whether the 
market leverage crosses upper or lower thresholds with 10, 20 and 50 percent differences from its 
current leverage ratio over each of the next 20 years. The first time that a leverage ratio crosses 
any of these thresholds is recorded as the event year. We also note that the stratification method 
can, arguably, yield the more reliable estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated. The 
reason is that about 17% of our sample firms are rated and are better represented in some strata.   
[Please insert Table 2.6 about here] 
 
As Table 2.6 shows, rated firms tend to be more stable than not-rated firms, and all of the 
differences are highly significant across all three matching methods. This effect is much larger as 
the leverage thresholds widen from 10% to 50%. For example, rated firms tend to cross the 10% 
thresholds on average 1.4 years later than not-rated firms based on the stratification matching 
results. Rated firms tend to cross the 50% threshold 9.2 years later than their not-rated matched 
firms. All the differences in the leverage stability durations are highly significant. These stability 
differences further corroborate the association of being rated with the duration of leverage stability.   
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2.5.3 Effect of Being Rated on Leverage-stability Duration 
We extend the above analyses by investigating what factors lengthen the duration of leverage 
stability. Table 2.7 lists the key variables that could influence the duration of leverage stability and 
their expected directional impacts. While this table reports the results of an exponential hazard 
function that assumes that the survival rate is constant, we obtain similar untabulated results using 
three additional hazard distributions (Weibull, Gompertz, and Cox PH). The rated dummy is a 
binary variable that equals one if a firm reports a credit rating and zero otherwise. We note that 
rated firms are generally larger, with more sales and larger leverage ratios. To account for 
multicollinearity, we orthogonalize the rated dummy and these four variables using a modified 
Gram-Schmidt procedure (Golub and Van Loan, 1996).  For ease of interpretation, all variables 
with the exception of the dummies are standardized.  
[Please insert Table 2.7 about here] 
The left panel in Table 2.7 studies cases where leverage diverges more than 50% from its past 
lags and the right panel repeats the same examination for a 20% divergence. Being rated, as column 
1 in the first panel shows, is associated with a 26% reduction in the hazard coefficient. With an 
exponential distribution, this translates into a 21% (𝑒−.26 − 1 = 21%) reduction in the hazard rate. 
Being rated also elongates leverage stability with a 20% threshold. Column 1 in the right panel 
shows that being rated is associated with a 14% lower hazard rate (𝑒−.15 − 1 = 14%).  The second 
column includes other firm-specific determinants including market leverage, profitability, 
tangibility, natural logarithms of size and sales, total debt and cash flow volatility. Rating still 
largely and significantly reduces the hazard ratio. Moreover, this column documents that larger 
firms and firms with more cash flow volatility tend to have lower leverage stability durations, and 
that larger firms with higher sales, profitability and asset tangibility tend to have longer leverage 
stability durations. The third and fourth columns include additional control variables including 
collateral, capital expenditures and initial market leverage. 
The largest effect on leverage stability comes from market leverage. Taking the most 
conservative estimate (fourth column), a one standard deviation increase in market leverage leads 
to a 42% (51%) increase in the hazard rate using an exponential distribution with 50% (20%) 
threshold. For each of the other specifications, a one standard deviation increase in market leverage 
leads to a larger increase in the hazard rate. Size and credit ratings are the largest contributors to 
the reduction of the hazard rate. Based on the fourth column, a standard deviation increase in size 
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reduces the hazard rate by 52% (27%) while having a credit rating reduces the hazard rate by 21% 
(10%) in the left (right) panel.  
2.5.4  Leverage-ratio Stability of Firms with Ratings Starts or Stops  
 In this section, we examine if and how leverage-ratio stability changes when a firm starts or 
stops having a credit rating. We test if leverage fluctuation behavior is different for firms that have 
sufficient observations in which they were with and without a credit rating during our test period. 
Thus, firms are retained for this test if they have at least 18 consecutive (annual) observations, at 
least seven consecutive observations in both their rated and in their not-rated regimes, and the ratio 
of observations in the rated period to the unrated period is between 0.4 and 0.6.  
 Using this sample, we calculate the level of fluctuations above the thresholds of 5, 10, 20, 30 
and 50 percent of their former lags, where the lags vary between 5 and 10. Based on the results 
reported in Table 2.8, we observe that market leverage fluctuations are significantly different 
between a firm’s rated and not-rated periods, and across all periods and thresholds. We conclude 
that leverage fluctuations decrease (increase) for firms after agencies commence (stop) to report 
credit ratings on these firms.  
[Please insert Table 2.8 about here] 
2.5.5 Fluctuations in Leverage Ratios over Time  
 In this section, we investigate if the short- and long-term variations in the leverage ratios differ 
for rated and not-rated firms. We use a non-parametric test of leverage fluctuations that captures 
short, medium and long-term leverage variations at different levels. This addresses the two 
critiques of DeAngelo and Roll (2015) about the method used by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender 
(2008) to test for leverage stability. By examining leverage fluctuations beyond certain thresholds 
at the individual firm and not aggregate quartile level, we deal with the criticism by DeAngelo and 
Roll that the stable patterns generated by the method of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) are 
influenced by the process of portfolio formation and mean taking. By applying this test to a variety 
of short to long term time periods, we also address the criticism by DeAngelo and Roll (2015) that 
the firm fixed effect cannot sufficiently convey the existence of stability since it only captures 
long-term mean differences and fails to capture significant short-run variations of leverage.  
 Our tests measure the proportion of the leverage ratios at specific numbers of years after a base 
year (leads or forwards of 5, 10, 15, and 20 years) that differ from the base year’s leverage ratio 
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by various thresholds (5%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 50%). The proportion for a specific lead and 
threshold is obtained by dividing the number of threshold crosses for that specification by the 
number of firms in the base-year sample. Implementation of the test methodology begins with the 
1985 base year, then repeats with the 1986 base year, and continues until base-year 2004 has been 
completed. Then the average proportion for each of the 20 leads for each threshold is calculated. 
For example, for a starting 1985 base year and a threshold of 5%, we first count the number of 
firms that were in the 1985 base-year sample and have changed their leverage ratios in 1990, 1995, 
2000 and 2005 (i.e., 5, 10, 15 and 20 years after the base-year of 1985) by more than 5% from 
their leverage ratios in 1985. Next, we repeat the same procedure for a 1986 base year by 
measuring the proportion of leverage ratios in years 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006 that are more than 
5% different from their values in base-year 1986. We continue this one-year-forward base-year 
augmentation until we have completed base-year 2004.  
 We report double-digit average proportions of crosses across all thresholds and all leads for 
each of four representative forward-looking years for each of the five thresholds in Panel A of 
Table 2.9. We observe that the leverage ratios of rated firms fluctuate significantly less than those 
of not-rated firms at all lags and across all thresholds. To illustrate, 38.39% and 46.54% of the 
rated and not-rated base-year firms have leverage ratios that are more than 10% different ten years 
after the base year. We also observe significant differences in the leverage ratios between the rated 
and not-rated firms across all thresholds and at all leads of between 14% and 29%. The differences 
increase from the 5th to 15th lead and then decline for the 20th lead. One likely reason for this 
anomaly is attrition where the number of included firms decreases with a larger lead length.  
[Please insert Table 2.9 about here] 
 To examine the possible impact of firm attrition, we report the averages for each of the four 
representative forward-looking years for each of the five thresholds in Panel B of Table 2.9 for the 
base-year firms that survived over a 20 year period (i.e., have at least 20 years of data ending with 
2012). As the last column (Dif.) shows, the difference in variations between rated and not-rated 
firms increases with increases in the number of leads from 5 to 20 monotonically. The magnitude 
of the fluctuation difference is also larger for this sample of firms. For example, the average 
proportions increase from 29% to 33% for a 10% threshold and a lead of 15. Such large and highly 
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significant differences in both panels are supportive of our conjecture that rated firms tend to 
maintain a more stable leverage path over time than their not-rated counterparts.  
2.5.6 Active Leverage Management and Leverage Stability 
 In this section, we investigate the stability of leverage ratios from an “active debt management” 
perspective. Specifically, we address the following questions: Do firms “actively” maintain stable 
leverages through security issuances? If they do, is this behavior more aggressive for rated versus 
not-rated firms? There is a rich body of literature suggesting that firms have rating targets 
(Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009a) and that they actively manage their leverage ratios to 
maintain a target leverage ratio (e.g., Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; Kayhan and Titman, 
2007; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Furthermore, firms reduce net debt 
issuance following a credit downgrade (Kisgen, 2009), and change their security issuance behavior 
to move towards their target leverage ratio (Hovakimian, Kayhan and Titman, 2009a). 
 To answer these questions, we use a methodology similar to the one used to construct Figure 1 
earlier. Specifically, we first form quartiles of firms based on their relative net equity (debt) 
issuance in a base year, and then follow the market leverage ratio behavior of each quartile for the 
following years. We repeat this process until the base year is 2012. The average leverage ratios for 
each calendar year for each net debt and net equity quartile are depicted in Figure 6.  
[Please insert Figure 2.6 about here] 
 Figure 6 shows the market leverage plots for the sample of not-rated firms in the upper panel 
and rated firms in the lower panel for net debt issuance (NDI) and net equity issuance (NEI) 
quartiles in their respective right- and left-side graphs. The NDI graphs depict a clear distinction 
between the debt issuance behavior of rated and not-rated firms. We observe the same ordering 
from very high to low propensities to issue net debt for the quintiles of both the rated and not-rated 
firms and their respective leverage ratios. However, the differences are substantially less distinct 
for the not-rated sample. As in Figure 1, there is a “convergence” in market leverage for the 
quartiles of not-rated firms and greater time-series stability for the quartiles of rated firms. The 
convergence in not-rated firms in the NDI-sorted quartile graph eliminates any easily observable 
differences between the leverage ratios of the quartiles by the end of year 27. The leverage 
difference between the lowest and highest quartiles is a significant 11% (37% - 26%) at its 
maximum (year 5, NDI sorted quartiles), and reduces to a weakly significant -4% (18% - 22%) by 
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the end of year 27. The negative sign indicates that the relative position of these two quartiles has 
reversed. 
 Inferences based on the NEI-sorted quartile graph are similar to those for the NDI-sorted 
quartile graph. For example, there is a clear distinction at the beginning of the period between the 
leverages of the high and very high NEI quartiles of not-rated firms, which almost disappears as 
the ending event years are approached. We observe a similar convergence over time of the leverage 
differences between the medium and low NEI quartiles of not-rated firms. In contrast, leverage 
stability persists over time for the quartiles of rated firms. The clear distinction between the 
leverages of all quartiles of rated firms remains until the end of the study period. The leverage 
difference between the highest and lowest NEI quartiles of rated firms remains significant and is 
only reduced slightly from 10% (40% less 30%) to 8% (34% less 26%) over the 27 years. Most of 
this reduction is due to the decrease in the leverage difference between the medium and high NEI-
sorted quartiles, which remains significant and goes from 5% (38% - 33%) to 4% (32% - 28%) 
over the 27 years. 
 Our results complement the findings of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). They argue that 
a “converging” pattern may emerge due to active equity management. We show that active debt 
or equity management is in fact influenced by the existence or absence of a credit rating, and, in 
turn, helps to determine the ultimate influence of active security-issuance management on 
leverage. This is a significant result since it implies that the existence or absence of a credit rating 
can affect the leverage management decisions of a firm over its life.  
 To further investigate the differences between the leverage behaviors of rated and not-rated 
firms, we compare the mean leverages at event times from 0 to 20 for all NDI- (and NEI-) sorted 
quartiles of the rated firms with their not-rated counterparts. Untabulated results confirm that there 
are significant differences in the leverages between the rated and not-rated firms for all the NDI- 
and NEI-sorted quartiles. 
2.5.7  Role of Initial Leverage Across Rated and Not-Rated Firms 
 In this section, we study how different capital structure determinants influence leverage choices 
for rated and not-rated firms. We begin by showing that the associations between leverage and 
previously identified determinants differ for rated and not-rated firms by estimating the following 
model for leverage type ι (market or book) for firm i for month t, or 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡





𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−10
𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2.6) 
 
 The independent variables in (2.6) include the corresponding book or market leverage lagged 
ten years (referred to as initial leverage herein), firm size, sales, market/book ratio, profitability, 
tangibility, industry leverage, volatility of cash flows, and dividend payer dummy (equal to 1 if a 
firm pays a dividend and zero otherwise). Appendix 1 provides definitions and the expected 
coefficient signs for each of these variables in Table A1 based on the generally consistent findings 
previously reported in the literature (particularly, Frank and Goyal, 2009; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Mackay and Phillips, 2005; Parsons and Titman, 2008; and 
Graham and Leary, 2011). Some of these studies deal with firm, year and industry fixed effects 
and net debt and equity issuance (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 
2008). As Parsons and Titman (2008) note, the use of lagged regressors is the default method for 
regression-based empirical research on capital structure.  Gulen and Ion (2016) argue that using 
lagged regressors significantly reduces simultaneous effects and omitted variable bias. By 
standardizing all variables, each estimated coefficient is interpreted as the change in the dependent 
variable from a one standard deviation change in the independent variable.  The reported t-values 
are robust to year clustering effects. 
 For comparability with prior studies, we begin with a classic pooled regression. The R2 values 
reported by Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) range between 18% and 29% and that reported 
by Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) is around 8%. Our pooled regression results for the full (All) 
sample are reported in Panel A of Table 2.10. Results for market and book leverages (Mkt and 
Book Lev) are reported in columns 1 to 7 and 8 to 14, respectively. The explanatory power of 
initial leverage as the only explanatory variable is reported in four columns (1, 2 and 7 and 8) and 
the absence of this variable is reflected in columns 4 and 10.  Columns 2 and 8 show that adding 
year fixed effects and reflecting year clustering adds minimally to the explanatory power of the 
regressions. While all of the estimated coefficients for the initial leverages are highly significant, 
the explanatory power is higher using market (6% to 8%) versus book (0% to 1%) leverage. The 
traditional variables together explain as much as 18% of market leverage (column 4) and adding 
the initial market leverage increases the R-square to 20% (column 6). The R-squares for the book 
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leverage regressions including the traditional variables remain at 11% after adding the initial book 
leverages (columns 10 and 12).  
[Please insert Table 2.10 about here]  
 From the second columns in Panels B and C of table 2.10, we observe that the explanatory 
power of the initial leverage by itself is higher at 10% for the rated firms compared to 3% for the 
not-rated firms. Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in the initial market leverage 
corresponds to a 29% and 15% increase in the current leverage ratios for rated and not-rated firms, 
respectively. The explanatory powers of the traditional variables separately and together with the 
initial market leverage in columns (4) and (5) are substantially lower for not-rated than for rated 
firms (16-17% and 43-44%, respectively). The large differences in the explanatory power of the 
initial leverage between the not-rated and rated firms illustrate how the effects of their leverage 
histories differ in arriving at their current capital structures.   
 To further study stability, we examine the firm fixed-effects influence on the regression results 
using regression model (1) for rated and not-rated firms.  In these estimations the intercept is 
allowed to vary on a firm-to-firm basis while the error variances and the slopes are held constant. 
We expect to see an increase in the explanatory power for a fixed-effects regression for firms with 
more stable capital structures.  
 The fixed-effect dummies in (1) are estimated using the least squares dummy variable (LSVD) 
technique. The significance of the model and each of the coefficient estimates is tested using the 
incremental F-test. These regression results including all but the initial leverage regressor for the 
“all”, “rated” and “not-rated” samples are reported in Panels A, B and C, respectively, of Table 
2.11. The first (last) two columns of each panel report results for market (book) leverage. The even 
(odd) numbered columns report results for regressions with (no) fixed effects or clustered standard 
errors and t-values which are robust to clustering on both firm and time using the method suggested 
by Petersen (2009).  
[Please insert Table 2.11 about here] 
 As expected, the explanatory power of the regressions increases substantially after the inclusion 
of firm fixed-effects for all three samples.  For the full sample (see Panel A of Table 2.11), the 
explanatory power increases from 18% to 71% for market leverage and from 11% to 70% for book 
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leverage. This result is consistent with the notion of leverage persistence, as noted by Hennessy, 
Livdan, and Miranda (2010) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011). The explanatory power is 
consistently higher with fixed effects for the sample of rated than that for not-rated firms (see 
Panels B and C of Table 2.11) for both market and book leverages. This further supports our 
conjecture that the leverages of rated and not-rated firms are influenced differently by time-
invariant unobserved effects.  
2.5.8 Analysis of Variance 
 Before concluding, we do a parametric analysis using a covariance model to examine how much 
of the variations in leverage ratios for rated and not-rated firms is explained by variations in 
traditional leverage determinants (sales, size, M/B, profitability, tangibility, industry leverage, and 
cash-flow volatility) versus firm and year fixed effects. If rated firms are influenced by their 
history, then the variations in firm-fixed effects and past leverage ratios should contribute 
relatively more to explaining the variations in the current leverage ratios. The summary results for 
the all, rated and not-rated firm samples are reported in Panels A, B and C of Table 2.12, 
respectively. Except for the last row of each panel with R-square values, we report the fraction of 
the total Type III partial sum of squares (PSS) as a measure of the contribution of each of the 
independent variables to the total variation of the leverage ratios for each of the regression models 
(as in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008).8 These values are obtained by first computing the 
partial Type III sum of squares for different specifications for each of the variables identified in 
the left-most column (such as profitability and size). This measures the fraction of the total sum of 
squares that is explained by each of the regressors, and the firm, year, and industry (based on two-
digit SIC) fixed effects after normalization by dividing each partial sum of squares by the total 
sum of squares. To illustrate using a specification similar to that used by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), column (4) of Panel A shows that most of the total variation is explained by profitability 
(15%) and tangibility (56%).9  
[Please insert Table 2.12 about here] 
                                                     
8 A discussion of why Type III sum of squares should be selected instead of Type I SS, please refer to 
Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), p.1588, footnote 10. 
9 When the model only includes one variable, the total variation is explained by that same variable so that 
the number 1 (100%) is reported. 
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 For the “all” sample, a firm fixed effect by itself explains 47% (50%) of the variations for 
market (book) leverage ratios. In contrast, the explanatory power of a year fixed effect does not 
exceed 1% (2%) for market (book) leverage. If credit-rating is one of the time-invariant 
unobserved variables that increase leverage stability for individual firms, we expect that such fixed 
effects are more pronounced for rated than not-rated firms. Our results confirm this possibility as 
a firm fixed effect explains as much as 58% (63%) of the market (book) leverage for rated firms 
compared to 43% (44%) for not-rated firms. As for the all sample, the year-fixed effect has only a 
marginal explanatory power (≤ 2%) for both leverage measures for both rated and not-rated firms.  
 The more striking result in the table is that a firm fixed effect accounts for more than 90% of 
the leverage variations that are explained by the regression models. For example, a firm fixed 
effect in a regression including a year fixed effect can explain 98.3% (95.6%) of the variations in 
market (book) leverages for the all sample [Panel A, Table 2.12, col. (3)]. Furthermore, the firm-
fixed effect accounts for 95.1% (89.4%) of the total model variations explained by the model while 
all the other variables merely capture 4.9% (10.6%) of the variations in the explained market 
(book) leverages in the “all” sample [Panel A, Table 2.12, col. (8)]. These findings extend to the 
two sub-samples where a firm fixed effect explains 95.4% (82.4%) of total variations explained 
by the model for market (book) leverage ratios for the rated sample and 90.9% (88.1%) for the 
not-rated sample. Similarly, the explanatory power of the traditional variables generally is very 
limited but twice as much for the rated than the not-rated firms. To illustrate, the R-square for a 
model excluding a firm-fixed effect and including all traditional variables for market (book) 
leverage is about 11% (21%) for the all sample, 20% (51%) for the rated sample and 13% (15%) 
for the not-rated sample  [Panels A, B & C, Table 2.12, col. (6)].  
 The results so far suggest that the explanatory power of traditional variables and the firm-fixed 
effect for our total sample is lower than those reported in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). 
Since we use a similar construction of the sample and regression specifications, these differences 
may be due to our examination of a different and more volatile time period.10   
 
                                                     
10 For example, the dot com bubble and its deflation and the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC) may 




 This paper examines the impact of credit ratings on the leverage stability of firms. We employ 
innovative identification strategies to capture the mechanisms through which credit ratings 
stabilize capital structure decisions over long periods of time, and infer causality. Our various 
strategies are a mix of different econometric approaches to address two questions. First, does 
membership in a more stable credit-rating class lead to a more stable leverage ratio?  Second, do 
rated firms have more stable leverage ratios than not-rated firms? We design different statistical 
methods for answering these different questions. To address the first question, we primarily focus 
on the survival rates for the narrow band of BBB-, BB+ firms (i.e., just above and just below the 
investment-grade cut-off) where the latter firms are considered as the treatment. The selection of 
this narrow band is motivated by the vast literature of credit ratings, arguing that being located just 
above the investment-grade cut-off can be effectively interpreted as an exogenous event (Cantor 
and Mann, 2006; Altman and Kao, 1992; Cantor and Hamilton, 2005; Chernenko and Sunderam, 
2012). To ascertain the robustness of our causal inference we provide appropriate counterfactuals 
using Weighted Regression Adjustment (WRA) across the cut-off and also make sure that we are 
comparing firms with similar propensities to receive the treatment. We also use the necessary 
censoring-adjustment methods using different distributions to rule out possible censoring biases, 
and show that assignment to just above the cut-off leads to large and significant increases in 
corporate leverage stability. We show that better ratings are associated with largely more stable 
capital structures, and that this effect applies across all different rating classes. Based on a hazard 
regression across all rating classes, a standard deviation improvement in credit ratings (four 
notches) reduces the hazard rates by as much as 79%.  
 To address the second question, we use a propensity score matching strategy and apply survival 
analysis to the matched samples. Matching firms based on their propensity to acquire credit ratings, 
we show that being rated significantly elongates the duration of stable leverage policies. We report 
survival rates, cumulative hazard rates, and measure the treatment effect (being assigned to the 
rated sample) in number of years, and show that the treatment group takes between 1.5 to 9 years 
longer than the not-rated group to change its leverage ratios by a specific percentage. In other tests, 
we show that leverage is more stable during the rated than the not-rated periods for individual 
firms that experience both regimes. 
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 Finally, we introduce our own test to address a shortcoming of hazard models. Since a firm is 
not studied after it first crosses the leverage threshold using a hazard model, we keep firms in our 
test over the whole study period and compute the probability of leverage fluctuations across 
different leverage thresholds at different points in time. Based on this test, we conclude that the 
difference in leverage stability across the rated and not-rated samples persists both over the short 
and long runs, and is also robust to the choice of the fluctuation threshold. We investigate leverage 
stability further using additional tests. Variance decomposition shows that time-invariant variables 
can explain more than 90% of a firm’s leverage choices, and that this explanatory power is higher 
for rated firms.  We also show that the higher stability in the leverage ratios of rated firms is related 
to the intensity of their active debt and equity management behaviors. Overall, our results show 
that leverage stability is a reality in corporate capital structures, is mostly confined to the domain 







3 Stability of Corporate Debt Structures 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of the capital structure literature considers debt structure (i.e. choice and combination of 
different debt types in a firm’s capital structure) to be a uniform variable. However, an emerging 
body of research documents the importance of debt structures and their determinants as important 
considerations in capital structure decisions. While various theoretical examinations of debt 
structures exist (e.g., Diamond, 1991; Park, 2000; Bolton and Freixas, 2000), only a few empirical 
studies examine debt structure determinants, mainly due to the recent availability of debt structure 
databases (e.g., Rauh and Sufi, 2010).  In this paper, we investigate a new and unexplored 
dimension of debt structure. Motivated by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) who document 
that corporate leverage is stable over long periods of time and that this phenomenon is largely the 
result of unobserved firm-specific factors, we investigate whether a similar stable pattern exists in 
a firm’s choice of debt structure. The documentation of capital structure stability by Lemmon et 
al. (2008) is currently at the core of capital structure studies, and questions the validity of 
conventional theories including the trade-off and pecking order theories (Graham and Leary, 
2011). Study of such patterns in debt structure is important due to the recent understanding of the 
large role they play in capital structure decisions (Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 
2013).  To the extent of our knowledge, our study is the first to address this question.  
The literature provides two opposing viewpoints about the existence of debt structure stability. 
The first viewpoint is inferred from the findings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). This 
viewpoint asserts that debt structures could also be stable if such is the case for capital structures. 
This has been partly confirmed by Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013) who find that firms in fact 
“specialize” in few debt types as they mostly follow a year-to-year “one-debt type” policy. The 
second viewpoint asserts that debt structures vary largely and compensate for the lack of variability 
of capital structures. Rauh and Sufi (2010) illustrate the importance of debt structures as an 
essential component of capital structure decisions, and show that debt heterogeneity exhibits 
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significant variability over time unlike mostly invariant leverage ratios for a sample of 305 U.S. 
non-financial firms.  
Thus, this paper has two primary objectives. The first objective is to empirically investigate 
whether the debt structures of publicly traded U.S. firms exhibit time-series stability. This question 
is important mainly because the literature on debt structure determinants is in its early stages and 
the existence of such stability can change our understanding of debt and capital structure choices. 
To this end, we utilize a newly available database from Capital IQ that provides the book values 
of various debt types in a firm’s debt structure, classified into seven debt-type categories of (1) 
Capital Leases, (2) Commercial Papers, (3) Lines of Credit, (4) Term Loans, (5) Bonds and Notes, 
(6) Trusts, and (7) Other Debts. We find that debt structure behaviour is partially consistent with 
each viewpoint. We show that firms tend to maintain a stable “main” debt type (i.e., the one with 
the highest weight) over time but frequently change the weights, priorities and combinations of 
the other debt types in their debt structures.  
The second objective of this paper is to study the effect of credit ratings on the stability of debt 
structures. While credit ratings can influence the capital structure and cost of capital decisions of 
firms (Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011), the 
importance of credit ratings for a firm’s debt structure is also studied in the literature. Rauh and 
Sufi (2010) find that large rated firms use multiple debt types, while Colla et al. (2013) find that 
the majority of largely unrated U.S. firms specialize in a few debt types. Building on these studies, 
we investigate how the stability of debt structures differ among rated versus unrated firms. For this 
purpose, we match firms based on their propensity to be rated and study the survival of various 
debt structure metrics across the two matched samples of rated and unrated firms.  
Our study faces two important empirical challenges. The first is that unlike the simple ratio 
metrics typically used to measure capital structure (such as the debt-to-equity ratio), debt structure 
needs to be measured using a “composite” metric that captures one or more of its various 
dimensions. These dimensions include the relative weights and number of different debt types, the 
relative weight-based rank ordering of the different debt types in a firm’s capital structure, and the 
choice of the main debt type (i.e. the debt type with the largest weight in a firm’s debt structure), 
based on their relative representations in the debt structure. An examination of the interaction of 
various debt structure dimensions is important for a more comprehensive understanding of debt 
structure behaviour, since Rauh and Sufi (2010) are primarily concerned with the “number” of 
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different debt types while Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013) are predominantly concerned with the 
“heterogeneity” of debt types.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly used measure of debt heterogeneity 
(Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2013). This index merely captures the relative weight structure of the 
various debt types. As more fully explained later, the HHI remains unchanged if the relative 
weights remain the same but are merely reshuffled among different debt types. To address this 
limitation, we use the following four measures of debt structure: (1) debt heterogeneity index, (2) 
debt composition based on the ranks of all seven debt types (7D-T rank ordered), (3) the top ranked 
debt type (1D-T rank) and (4) the top two ranked debt types (2D-T ranks). To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to study these new dimensions of debt structure.  
The second empirical challenge is how to measure debt structure stability (persistence). The 
three classical methods introduced by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) could be used to 
assess debt structure persistence. These methods are the use of (1) quartile portfolios, (2) firm 
fixed-effects regressions and (3) variance decompositions (ANCOVA). The main limitation to the 
use of quartile portfolios is its smoothing of short-term variations in capital structures (DeAngelo 
and Roll, 2014) or similarly in debt structures due to its embedded average-taking procedure. The 
second and third methods are also overly focused on long-run persistence while disregarding short-
run instabilities. For example, while a high firm fixed-effect conveys the existence of a large effect 
from a long-run firm-specific average on its capital structure, it essentially ignores short-run 
fluctuations, and thus cannot authentically settle whether stability does or does not exist (Mueller, 
2013).     
We address the above limitations by using survival analyses over short and long periods. 
Compared to the portfolio formation method of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), survival 
analysis has many advantages in capturing persistent patterns. The most important advantage is 
that a survival analysis is not prone to the critique of DeAngelo and Roll (2014) about the portfolio 
formation method whose embedded mean-taking inflates a finding of stability. Survival analysis 
is also robust to the long-run bias of firm-fixed effects specifications because it accounts for both 
short- and long-run debt structure variations.  
We find considerable time-series variations in the debt heterogeneity and debt rank indexes that 
are robust to alternate methods of capturing changes in debt-composition characteristics. 
Importantly, however, we find large persistence in the choice of the main but not the second main 
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debt type. Considering debt heterogeneity variation thresholds of 10% (and 20%), we document 
that only about 10% (25%) of the firms maintain their original debt heterogeneity after 11 years. 
Considering the seven broad debt type categories stated above, we find that firms change the 
relative priority of all but the first debt type considerably over time. Around 50% of the firms never 
change their main debt type for periods up to 12 years. Comparing the debt-type clusters in firm-
1year observations versus firm-12year observations, we find that the tendency to maintain a 
persistent main debt type is stronger using firm-12year observations than firm-1year observations. 
Thus, our findings indicate that firms finance their activities so that a single debt type retains its 
top ranking and that the combination and priorities of their other debt types in their debt structure 
change frequently. With regard to the main contributors to debt structure stability over time, we 
document that firms with higher leverage ratios and lower idiosyncratic volatilities tend to have 
more stable debt-type structures. 
In order to study the stability of debt type choices and priorities, we sort debt types in a firm’s 
debt structure based on their relative weights in every year and compare the similarity between the 
sorted debt ranks across every two consecutive years using Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s rho 
rank-order correlation coefficient indexes. These rank-order indexes measure similarity between 
the sorted debt type sequences. Measuring the survival of these similarity indexes is less restrictive 
compared to a rank-order metric that measures any ranking changes in the strings being compared. 
Small changes in the ordering of different debt types, especially those that are lowly ranked, result 
in minor changes in these two test statistics. Since our results remain robust using these two 
additional indexes, they support the existence of large annual variations in the debt structures with 
the exception of the single main debt type.  
We find that rated firms have less stability in debt-type structures, consistent with the viewpoint 
of Rauh and Sufi (2010) and that this stability reduction is large and significant for various debt 
structure metrics except for the main debt type. For example, comparing the number of years that 
rated and not-rated firms maintain a stable debt structure, we find that reduced stability is as high 
as 30% for the rank orderings and debt heterogeneity indexes while the same reduction for the 
main debt type is limited to only 1%. Our results reported throughout the paper are robust to an 
alternative categorization of the various debt types that is introduced by Colla et al. (2013). 
We also investigate the stability of the main debt type over time using an alternative approach. 
This is necessary since the stability results from a survival analysis may be under-estimated as this 
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test only accounts for the first change in the main debt type and ignores all later changes. To 
address this limitation, we employ a clustering analysis of different debt types over both short- and 
long-runs. The clustering analysis using the long-term averages of relative debt-type weights can 
mitigate the downward bias embedded in the survival analysis. The results of the clustering 
analysis support the existence of long-run stability of the main debt type.  
This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. The first contribution 
is to the fledgling literature on the importance of debt structure and debt heterogeneity in capital 
structure studies by documenting how debt structures evolve over the long run.11 We extend this 
literature by studying what determines the main debt type in terms of its relative proportion in a 
firm’s debt structure and by documenting the determinants of more stable debt structures. The 
second contribution is to the literature on the stability of capital structure determinants by 
providing the implications of debt structure stabilities for the capital structure stability arguments 
of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) and DeAngelo and Roll (2014). We document that firms 
consistently change their debt structures while maintaining the main debt type stable. This is 
consistent with the empirical inference of Rauh and Sufi (2010) that significant variations remain 
in debt structures although capital structures are largely invariant. The third contribution is to show 
under what contexts there is empirical support for the inference drawn by Colla, Ippolito, and Li 
(2014) that firms chiefly specialize in one or a few debt types from year-to-year. Specifically, we 
conclude that such specialization does not extend beyond the main debt type. Fourth, we contribute 
to the literature on the effects of credit ratings on capital structure decisions (Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen 
and Strahan, 2010; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011) by documenting how credit ratings 
affect the stability of various debt structure metrics. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the data and sample 
construction. In Section 3.3, the empirical results are presented and discussed for debt structure 
stability, the determinants of such stability using different empirical methodologies, and the role 
of credit ratings. In section 3.4, various robustness checks are conducted and reviewed. Section 
3.5 concludes the paper.  
 
                                                     
11 These include Rauh and Sufi (2010); Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013); Diamond (1991); Park 
(2000);  Bolton and Freixas (2000);  and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007). 
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3.2 SAMPLE, DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 The Capital IQ database covering the period from 2001 to 2012 is our main source of debt types 
and for creating the debt structure index. Capital IQ contains data regarding every debt component 
in a firm’s capital structure. The broader of its two groupings (namely capital structure type) 
categorizes debt types into seven groups. A finer grouping (named capital structure sub-type) 
elaborates on the terms of each contract, such as seniority, security, and interest charges. To 
minimize any subjectivity due to debt-type aggregation, we use the following seven main debt 
types used by Capital IQ: (1) Capital Leases, (2) Commercial Papers, (3) Lines of Credit, (4) Term 
Loans, (5) Bonds and Notes, (6) Other Debt, and (7) Trusts. In contrast, Colla, Ippolito, and Li 
(2013) split the notes category into senior and subordinate and merge trusts with the other debt 
category. This leads to a significant loss of observations in the data since senior and subordinate 
sub-types constitute only a portion of the “note” debt type.  Such losses include debt sub-types 
such as profit participating certificates; promissory note loans; Class A, B, C and D bonds; market 
debt securities; interest-bearing bonds; (long-term) borrowings from certain institutions; bank 
loans in other currencies; credit from banks, and so forth.12 
We draw data for the firm-specific variables in the resulting sample from Compustat. The 
variables chosen are based on their relevance to capital structure theories (Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Parsons and Titman, 2009; Graham and 
Leary, 2011) and their relevance to debt structures (Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 
2013).  We briefly describe the rationale for the choice of each of the possible determinants of debt 
structure used herein, and provide further details on their computations in Appendix 2. We begin 
with the firm-specific variables which are all winsorized at the 1% level at both tails, and then 
standardized by their respective standard deviations. Market leverage is included to account for 
the possible effect of relative leverage on the choice of debt types and their weightings.  Maturity 
is included since longer debt maturities can lock a firm into a certain debt type over time and thus 
influence debt-type stability. Market to book ratio is included to capture growth opportunities since 
firms with more growth opportunities may use lower leverage (Myers, 1977). Firm size and firm 
sales are included since leverage can increase with firm size and firm sales (Lewellen, 1971). 
Cash-flow volatility increases default probabilities and thus decreases leverage capacity (Saretto 
                                                     
12 For robustness, we test our results with the classification of Colla, Ippolito and Li (2013) and document 
that our results are robust to the choice of debt-type classification. 
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and Tookes, 2013) and increases debt-structure heterogeneity (Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2014).13 
Profitability is included because it can increase leverage according to the cash flow hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1986) or decrease leverage according to the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984), although 
its effect on debt structure is found to be mixed (Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2013).  Tangibility is 
included because it can influence leverage (Saretto and Tookes, 2013) and firms with more 
tangible assets have lower debt heterogeneity (Colla, Ippolito, and Li, 2013). The rating dummy 
variable is included since having a bond rating facilitates access to capital and can lead to higher 
leverage (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) and more feasible debt type choices. The dividend payer 
dummy variable is included since it can affect capital structures (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
Marginal Tax rates are included because they can increase the incentive to use debt (Graham, 
2000) and can influence the relative value of long-term debt contracts (Brick and Ravid, 1985).  
Idiosyncratic volatility is included since increased volatility may induce a firm to delever or choose 
different debt types or different mixes of debt types. 
We also include various possible non-firm determinants. Industry heterogeneity is included 
since certain industry affiliations can significantly determine corporate capital structure behaviour. 
For example, Rauh and Sufi (2012) show how similar “lines of business” can affect corporate 
capital structures over time. Rollover risk is included since greater rollover risk can induce firms 
to choose longer maturities and therefore induce greater stability in debt-type structures. GDP per 
capita, GDP growth and inflation are included because their higher values are associated with 
better economic conditions and a greater availability of capital for firms. Finally, term spread 
changes are included because of their effect on the choice of certain debt maturities and the 
resulting impact on the stability of the structure of debt types.   
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the firms in our sample and their characteristics. There 
are only moderate differences between the summary statistics reported in the left- and right-most 
panels for the full sample and for the sample of firms with at least 10 years of observations 
(henceforth referred to as the longer-lived firms). The longer-lived firms tend to be moderately 
larger, with higher cash flow volatilities, profitabilities, and asset tangibilities. They also have a 
larger mean proportion of rated firms (33% versus 22%), a larger mean proportion of dividend 
                                                     
13 This variable is measured as in Kryzanowski and Mohsni (2013) and alternatively as the volatility of a 
firm’s earnings per share (Compustat item # 19) over the past six years as a test of robustness which 
yields similar empirical results. 
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payers (31% versus 26%), longer mean debt maturities (72% versus 68%) and similar mean 
idiosyncratic volatilities (14% versus 14%). 
[Please insert Table 3.1 here] 
 
3.3 DEBT STRUCTURE METRICS 
The first metric used herein to study corporate debt structures is a normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) similar to the one used by Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013). This debt 















where  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 ,𝑖,𝑡 is debt type 𝑗 for firm 𝑖 at time t. The debt structure only includes one debt 
type when HHI equals one, and includes all seven debt types in equal proportions when HHI equals 
zero.  
 One problem with HHI is that it is defined as the relative weight of different debt types in a 
firm’s debt structure for each year, without fully considering what specific debt types are so 
included. For example, a debt structure with 50%, 30% and 20% consisting of debt types A, B and 
C has the same index value as a debt structure consisting of the same proportions of debt types C, 
B and A. Thus, using the HHI to study debt structure has somewhat limited power to explain a 
firm’s actual debt-structure behaviour and preferences, mostly due to its particular substitutability 
assumption among the different debt types in a firm’s debt structure. Therefore, the information 
obtainable from the debt heterogeneity index, HHI, is limited to the format of the debt structure, 
as it provides no insights into what debt types are chosen, how the choices between debt types are 
made, or what specific debt types in fact contribute to the formation of a specific debt structure.  
As noted earlier, we introduce several variants of another debt structure metric based on rank 
orders to address the shortcomings of the HHI. Each variant uses an annual ranking of the seven 
debt types in a firm’s debt structure where the first (seventh) rank is for the debt type with the 
largest (smallest) relative weight in the firm’s debt structure. Studying the behaviour of debt type 
ranks over time answers an unexplored dimension of debt structure that is: Do firms maintain a 
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stable debt preference structure over time when we consider all or only some of the rank-ordered 
debt types in their debt structures? 
The first variant of this rank-ordered metric uses the rank-ordered set for all seven debt types. 
Unlike the corresponding HHI, this 7debt-type (7D-T) rank-ordered index is sensitive to changes 
in the relative weight-based ordering of the different debt types even if the HHI based on the debt 
weights remains constant. To compute a value for this index variant, we first assign a one-letter 
moniker (in parenthesis) to the seven debt types of Capital Leases (S), Commercial Papers (C), 
Lines of Credit (L), Term Loans (T), Bonds and Notes (N), Trusts (R) and Other Debt (O), 
respectively. We obtain a string of seven elements for each firm-year where the one-letter monikers 
are used for the debt types that are in the debt structure and the moniker X is used for all debt types 
not in the debt structure. We then sort each string of seven monikers by their relative weights in a 
firm’s debt structure so that the first (seventh) moniker in the string contains the most (least) 
important debt type. Two debt structure index values are considered to be different when the two 
strings being compared have different ranked monikers. Unlike the identical HHI values, the 
7debt-type rank-ordered index values differ when a firm has a debt structure with 50%, 30% and 
20% weights in debt types T, C and S compared to when it has a debt structure with the same 
ordered weights for debt types T, S and C, respectively.14 The debt-type rank index value can 
change with the introduction or termination of a specific debt type in a firm’s capital structure or 
a change in the relative weights for the same types of debt in a firm’s debt structure. One limitation 
of this variant is that it may be adversely sensitive to “relative” changes in the rankings of more 
minor or even trivially weighted debt types. 
The second and third variants of this metric use only the debt type in the first or the first two 
ranks, respectively, from the rank-ordered index for each firm-year. Thus, the second (third) 
variant has (generally) no sensitivity to the “relative” changes in the rankings of more minor debt 
types, e.g. sixth and seventh debt types in the rank-ordered string. 
                                                     
14 As another example, assume that a firm’s debt structure in year 2005 consists of 50% lines of credit, 30% 
term loan and 20% capital leases. The ranked preference string for this firm’s debt structure is LTSXXXX. 
If the firm changes the relative weight of its debt structure in 2006 by adding additional commercial paper 
and reducing the amount of capital leases so that their new relative weights are both 10%, the string for this 
new debt structure changes to LTCSXXX. This would indicate a change in its debt structure based on the 




We also measure the similarity of each variant at different points in time using Kendall’s tau-b 
and Spearman’s rho rank-order correlation coefficient indexes. Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s 
rho indexes are less sensitive measures of debt structure stability, since minor changes in debt-type 
ranks over time result in only marginal variations in these indexes. This allows for a different 
quantification of how “similar” are a firm’s debt-type rank structures over time, and for how long 
does it take for a firm to move to a sufficiently dissimilar rank-ordered structure.  
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON THE STABILITY OF DEBT-TYPE 
STRUCTURES 
In the following sections, we compare the debt-structure stability over time using the HHI 
metric and the three variants of the rank-ordered metric. Briefly summarizing our results, we find 
that firms consistently change their debt structures, debt heterogeneities and preferences. We 
document that only the main (first rank-ordered) debt type stays largely stable over time, and that 
this finding is robust to the choice of evaluation metric. We show that the rank-ordered set of all 
seven debt types exhibits the least stability, which indicates that firms greatly change their debt-
type preferences over time. Rank-ordered stability based on the first two rank-ordered (main) debt 
types and all seven rank-ordered debt types are almost identical. Thus we conclude that except for 
the main and second debt types, there are significant variations in the choice of all other debt types 
over time. By matching rated and unrated firms based on their propensity to acquire credit ratings, 
we find based on a survival analysis that the former have significantly less stable debt structures. 
We now discuss these findings in greater detail. 
3.4.1 Results from a survival analysis 
In this section we apply a formal survival analysis to the two metrics of debt-type structure to 
measure the duration of stability in debt-type structures. We graphically depict the stability of these 
metrics based on the Kaplan-Meier Estimator and study the determinants of higher stability using 
parametric survival regressions. We use a logit model to determine the selection of each of the 
main debt types in the debt structures.  
 
3.4.1.1  Survival analysis of the debt heterogeneity index (HHI) 
Figure 3.1 reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the debt heterogeneity index, HHI.  
The vertical axis shows the survival probabilities and the horizontal axis shows the number of 
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years from base year 0 to the year of an event. Panels A and B report the results for debt 
heterogeneity fluctuations beyond the 10% and 20% thresholds, respectively. We observe that only 
about 10% (25%) of the firms retain their original HHI values after 11 years using the 10% (20%) 
change threshold. The important take-away from these graphs is that the relative composite 
weighting of different debt types in the debt structure is short-lived for individual firms.  
[Please insert Figure 3.1 here] 
 
3.4.1.2 Survival analysis of the predominant (main) debt type 
We now address an unexplored aspect of the findings of Colla, Ippolito, and Li (2013); namely, 
that primary debt-type specialization may involve a different debt type at different points in time. 
To illustrate, a firm whose primary debt type is lines of credit in year 1 and notes in year 2 would 
be classified as specializing in its debt structure using the methodology of Colla, Ippolito, and Li 
(2013).  However, this could be interpreted as not indicating main debt-type stability over longer 
periods of time. Thus, in this section, we address the following question: Do firms rely on the same 
single debt type as their major debt type on an ongoing basis?  
The Kaplan-Meier survival curve using the main source of debt financing (main debt type in 
the 1D-T rank-ordered index) based on the sample firms for each year is plotted in Figure 3.2. The 
solid dark line shows the estimated survival function and the two light lines are 95% confidence 
intervals. Based on this figure, we observe that 63% (50%) of the firms maintain the same debt 
type over a 5 (full 11) year period. The stability of the main debt type is in stark contrast with the 
instability indicated by the HHI. This infers that firms tend to have an ongoing preference for the 
same single main debt type, and that this preference does not extend to less dominant debt types.  
[Please insert Figure 3.2 here] 
 
3.4.1.3 Survival analysis of debt-type ranks 
In this section, we study the survival of the two debt-type ranks indexes. As discussed earlier, 
changes in the sequence of different debt types in the rank structure indicate the end of a stable 
debt-type rank policy. Based on the 7D-T ranks ordered index plotted in Panel A of Figure 3.3, we 
observe that almost all firms change the structure of their debt preferences after 11 years, and only 
17% of the firms maintain their initial 7D-T rank-ordered structure by the 5th year. A problem with 
53 
 
this test, however, is that the sensitivity of this index to any change in the debt structure may bias 
it towards finding more instability. Specifically, changes in less important debt types (e.g., rank 
orders of 6th and 7th) are not as important as changes in the main debt types (1st and 2nd in the rank 
structure) and therefore the instability result in this figure may be inflated. To account for any 
possible effects from ranking instabilities of less frequently or intensely used debt types, we plot 
the 2D-T rank ordered index in Panel B of Figure 3.3. The resulting survival graph is almost 
identical to that in Panel A. While the main debt type is largely stable, the second debt type is 
highly unstable. Firms change or discontinue the second important source of their debt financing 
often, and almost as often as they change or discontinue debt types of much lower importance in 
the debt-type structure. This result shows that the main debt type (1st in the debt-type structure) is 
unique in debt structure decisions, and its stability cannot be extended to any other debt type. 
Therefore, we suggest that studies of capital and debt structures should account for the 
determinants of stability of the main debt type and the determinants of the main debt type.  
[Please insert Figure 3.3 about here] 
 
One final problem with the rank-ordered index is that it may still be too limiting in terms of 
capturing changes in the rank-ordered debt-type structure. To examine this possibility, we measure 
the similarity between debt ranks in the firm’s debt structure using Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s 
Rho15 measures. These indexes are less sensitive compared to the simple rank-ordered index in 
that minor changes in the debt preference structure translate into only small changes in the 
similarity index. To implement this test, we compare the debt-type rank index for every firm across 
every two years; e.g. the debt rank index in 2001 is compared to that in 2002, the debt rank index 
in 2002 is compared to that in 2003, and so on. We then investigate how long it takes for the 
Kendall’s tau-b (Spearman’s Rho) to change by more than 10% or 20% compared to its previous 
values. A stable rank-ordered debt-type policy ends the first time a change in the Kendall’s tau 
(Spearman’s Rho) exceeds 10% (20%). Results are shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 using the 
Kendal’s tau index and Spearman’s Rho, respectively. The graphs in each Panel A (B) depict the 
results with the 10% (20%) threshold. We observe almost no stability in the debt ranks for both of 
                                                     
15 This rank correlation coefficient is defined as the Pearson correlation between the ranked variables. 




these measures. After 11 years (10 comparisons) and using Kendal’s tau index, almost all firms 
have changed their debt preferences beyond 10%, and almost 88% of the firms have done so using 
the 20% threshold. Similar results are obtained based on Spearman’s Rho index. These results 
confirm our previous findings that debt structure and debt preferences are highly volatile.   
[Please insert Figures 3.4 and 3.5 here] 
 
3.4.2 What determines the stability of debt-type structures? 
Our main finding to this point is that debt-type structures are generally unstable, with the 
exception of the main debt type. The question that we now address is: What factors lead to more 
stable corporate debt-type structures? To do so, we estimate the following parametric hazard 
regression model using an exponential hazard function: 




where the second equality holds because 𝜆0(𝑡, 𝛼) = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 =  𝑒
𝑎. 
The time until event, 𝑡, is estimated conditional on a set of observable variables 𝒙 that includes 
market leverage, market to book, logarithm of size and sales, cash flow volatility, profitability, 
tangibility, rated dummy, dividend payer dummy, marginal tax rate, maturity index, debt 
heterogeneity of the related industry, term spread, inflation rate, GDP growth and per capita GDP. 
The estimates are reported in Table 3.2. Across all specifications, we control for macro variables 
including term spread, inflation, per capita GDP and the growth rate of GDP. The first two columns 
report the determinants for the stability of the debt heterogeneity index for 20% and 10% 
thresholds, respectively. Column 3 does the same for the largest debt type. The results for the debt-
type rank-ordered indexes with the first two main debt types are reported in Column 4 and with all 
seven debt types in Column 5. The last four columns report results for the stability in debt-type 
ranks using Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s Rho rank correlation measures for different change 
thresholds.  
[Please insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
Based on Table 3.2, we find that larger firms with higher leverages and lower cash flow 
volatilities tend to have more stable debt-type structures. Increased market leverage, firm size, 
tangibility, marginal tax rates, and idiosyncratic volatility reduce the hazard rate for the main debt 
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type. Market leverage is the most important determinant of debt-type structure stability for almost 
all specifications. For example, the hazard ratio for market leverage is -32% in the first 
specification. The effect of market leverage on Spearman’s Rho coefficient is even larger, where 
a standard deviation increase in market leverage almost halves the hazard rate. With an exponential 
distribution, this translates into a 27% (1 − 𝑒−0.31 ≈ 0.27) reduction in the hazard rate with a one 
standard deviation increase in market leverage. The most important factor in destabilizing the debt-
type structure is being rated which increases the hazard function by 15% (1 − 𝑒−0.16 ≈ 0.15) .  
An important result in this table concerns the debt-type ranks. Based on the results reported in 
the third and fourth columns, size, industry heterogeneity, and term spread reduce the hazard rate 
and lead to more stable debt-type ranks, while sales, cash flow volatility, and being rated lead to 
less stable debt-type ranks. The almost identical estimates across both columns support the notion 
that there are no meaningful differences in the stability of debt-type ranks for all seven or simply 
the two largest debt types because most of the firms only use a few debt types in their capital 
structures.  
The destabilizing effect of credit ratings on the debt-type structure complements the findings of 
Kaviani et al. (2015) that rated firms have relatively more stable leverage ratios over time. The 
findings in this table provide primary evidence for the conjecture of Rauh and Sufi (2010) that 
variations in debt-type structures are used to compensate for the relative lack of variability of 
capital structures.  
 
3.4.3 Further evidence on one debt-type policy 
3.4.3.1 Long-term stability using cluster analysis  
The finding of Colla et al (2013) that firms predominantly use one or a few debt types in their 
debt structures on a year-to-year basis may be interpreted incorrectly as an indicator of longer-
term debt structure stability. The reason is that Colla et al. (2013) use firm-1year observations 
based on the assumption that annual debt structure choices are independent. To assess the 
implications of this assumption, we extend the tests of Colla et al. (2013) to firm-12year 
observations. This tells us whether the average behavior of firms indicates debt-type specialization 
over longer periods of time. 
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We now illustrate the importance of such an examination. Assume that the main debt-type for 
a firm is lines of credit for all (12) years except for the fifth year where the firm temporarily 
switches to capital leases. A survival analysis in this case will indicate instability in the choice of 
the main debt type although the firm has a high preference to use lines of credit. However, if we 
take the average invested in each debt type over the 12 years and compare their relative weights, 
we obtain a highly skewed distribution towards the use of a single debt type, which is lines of 
credit in this example. Now consider another example where a firm uses lines of credit for the 
years 1 to 3, capital leases for years 4 to 6, and annually switches between term loans, notes and 
other debt types for the remaining 6 years. Here, the same survival analysis will indicate long-run 
instability in the choice of different debt types, and the average invested in each debt type over the 
long-run would be more uniformly distributed compared to the previous case.  
Thus, the questions we address in this section are: Does the average behavior of firms over the 
long-run still signal a preference for one debt type? What are the behaviors of different debt types 
in clusters over the short and long run? To do so, we conduct a clustering analysis similar to Colla 
et al. (2013) not only using firm-1year observations but also firm-12years observations. Firm 
clustering is based on the contribution of each debt type to the debt structure. The number of 
clusters within a range of 2 to 10 is determined using a Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule. The 
number of optimal clusters is 5 and 6 for firm-1year and firm-12year observations, respectively.  
Results are reported in Panels A and B of Figure 3.6. As this figure suggests, we recognize 
different specializing clusters. For example in tPanel A based on firm-1year observations, “capital 
leases”, “bonds and notes” and “term loans” reach the 80% threshold based on their relative 
weights in their respective clusters (e.g., second for capital leases). Similarly Panel B of Figure 3.6 
indicates that firms not only specialize in a certain type of debt in any given year but also maintain 
this single debt-type policy and their debt-type preferences over long periods of time. The 
concentration in single debt types in each of the clusters is now further magnified. Our inferences 
are robust when we repeat the clustering analyses using 7 clusters for firm-1year and firm-12year 
observations (see the Panel C and D of Figure 3.6). 
[Please insert Figure 3.6 here] 
 
Table 3.3 reports the clustering results using firm-1year and firm-12year observations in the 
Panel A and B, respectively. In the firm-1year examination, the weight of the main debt type is 
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higher than 50% in 5 of the 7 clusters. Particularly, capital lease (91.4%), other debt (66.5%), term 
loans (83.3%), lines of credit (84.5%), and notes (89.4%) are the largest debt types and constitute 
a large fraction of the debt structures in firm-1year observations in clusters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, 
respectively. More than 80% of total debt is captured by lines of credit and notes in cluster 1 and 
by term notes and notes in cluster 6. The clustering is even more significant in Panel B based on 
firm-12year observations. In six of the seven clusters, single debt types constitute more than 50% 
of the debt-type structure. This finding supports the survival analysis results reported previously. 
Firms tend to rely on a single debt type extensively both over the short and long run.  
[Please insert Table 3.3 here] 
 
3.4.3.2 What determines the main debt type?  
Given the finding of a widespread and long-run reliance on a single debt type, we investigate 
the following question in this section: What are the determinants of such a reliance? To do so, we 
identify the determinants of preferences for one debt type (i.e., the one with the largest weight) 
versus the other six debt types.  
Table 3.4 reports the results for seven distinct Logit regression models. Each Logit model has 
as its dependent variable a dummy variable that equals one for the main debt type in every year, 
and zero otherwise. Our choice of firm- and macro-variables is those described earlier in section 
two. Some of the firm-specific explanatory variables are selected from the capital structure and 
debt structure literatures, particularly Parsons and Titman (2009) and Colla et al. (2013), as 
introduced in the data section.  
Columns 1 to 7 in Table 3.4 report the fixed-effects regression results with year and industry 
dummies when the main debt type is commercial paper, lines of credit, term loans, notes, capital 
leases, trusts, and other debt types, respectively.  Each of the seven debt types as the main debt 
type is significantly more likely with higher market leverage. With regard to the first five debt 
types, commercial paper as the main debt type is significantly more likely with higher firm sales 
and marginal tax rates and being rated, and significantly less likely with a higher firm book-to-
market ratio, firm size and maturity index. Lines of credit as the main debt type are significantly 
more likely with higher firm sales, marginal tax rate, firm idiosyncratic risk and inflation rate, and 
significantly less likely with higher firm sales, maturity index, industry heterogeneity and GDP 
per capita, and being rated.  
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[Please insert Table 3.4 about here] 
 
Term loans as the main debt type are significantly more likely with higher firm size, asset 
tangibility, marginal tax rate, maturity index and GDP growth, and significantly less likely with 
higher industry heterogeneity, GDP per capita and GDP growth, and with being a dividend payer. 
Notes as the main debt type are significantly more likely with higher market-to-book ratio, firm 
size, maturity index, term spread, and being rated, and significantly less likely with greater cash-
flow volatility, firm profitability, and asset tangibility. Capital leases as the main debt type are 
significantly more likely with higher market-to-book ratio, firm size, asset tangibility, maturity 
index, term spread, inflation rate, short interest volume and being rated, and significantly less 
likely with higher tax rate and GDP per capita. Thus, greater firm size or longer maturity indexes 
are associated with greater likelihoods of term loans, notes and capital lease usage, and lesser 
likelihoods of commercial paper and lines of credit usage. The results for maturity indexes is as 
expected since Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2009) find that most lines of credit have maturities 
of one year or less.  
 
3.4.3.3 What proportion of the firms utilizes a “one debt-type” policy? 
In this section we investigate the percent of firms that rely on a one debt-type policy in every 
year or over a decade. Our unconditional metric measures the number of firms that incorporate 
predominantly one particular type of debt in their debt structures as a fraction of all firms. Table 
3.5 reports the percent of sample firms that have more than x percent of their total debt in one 
single debt type for various samples of the firms where x ranges between 10 and 90 percent. The 
“base case” columns for both firm-1year and firm-12year observations indicate that 100% of the 
firms in the full sample have more than 30% of their total debt in one single debt type. This 
percentage is still high for greater x values. To illustrate, 64% and 57% of this sample of firms 
have more than 70% of their total debt in one single debt type based on the firm-1year and firm-
12year observations. The corresponding percentages (42% and 33%) are still high for firms with 
more than 90% of their total debt in one single debt type.  




We next examine the possibility that these highly specialized debt structures may be due to very 
low leverage ratios (Strebulaev and Yan, 2013) whose firms do not necessarily need to diversify 
their debt structures. Such a test also addresses an argument similar to the one made by DeAngelo 
and Roll (2014) that a “stable” pattern in leverage ratios is predominantly confined to low leverage 
firms. To explore this possibility, we repeat this study after successively removing firms with less 
than 10%, 20% and then 50% market leverage. The results are robust to these exclusions.  For 
example, 100% of the firms in the full sample still have more than 30% of their debt structures in 
a single debt type based on both the firm-1year and firm-12year observations. In a firm-1year 
setting, removing firms with less than 50% leverage reduces the percent of specializing firms only 
marginally from 42% to 38%. In the firm-12year panel, the same action results in a decline of 3% 
in the percent of specializing firms from 33% to 30%. This shows that low leveraged firms do not 
influence our results in either case.   
 
3.4.4 Credit ratings and the stability of debt-type structures 
In this section, we address the proposition that variations in debt-type structures are used to 
compensate for the relative stabilities of the capital structures. Earlier in Table 3.2 based on hazard 
regressions, we documented that credit ratings result in more intertemporal variation in debt-type 
structures. The hazard regressions provide only primary evidence on this effect, and the room for 
interpretation of this effect is limited due to possible collinearity between variables. To further 
study the effect of credit ratings on the stability of corporate debt-type structures, we run survival 
tests on samples of rated and unrated firms, and compare the number of years a rated versus an 
unrated firm maintains a relatively stable debt-type structure. Comparing the two samples within 
a program evaluation framework provides estimates of the treatment effects,16 which in our context 
is whether a firm has a credit rating and the outcome of interest is the differential wait to change 
the debt-type structure.  
Before applying this method, we need to ensure the comparability of the samples of rated and 
not rated firms since the assignment of a credit rating to the rated sample is not random and credit 
ratings and capital structure decisions are known to be highly endogenous. To tackle this problem, 
                                                     
16 Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Lechner (2002), Jalan and Ravallion (2003), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), 
Smith and Todd (2001), and Rubin (2006). 
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we use a propensity score matching method introduced by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) where firms 
in the two different samples are matched based on their propensity to have ratings. The matching 
is performed based on a set of observables 𝒙 that are drawn from the literatures on capital structure 
determinants (Titman and Parsons, 2008) and credit-rating determinants (Duffie and Singleton, 
2012). After estimating the propensity scores of having credit ratings (𝑥) for all firms in our 
sample, we group the observations into different strata based on their propensity values. The 
assignment to different strata is based on the difference between the (𝑥)’s of different firms. 
Particularly, we require that this difference in any stratum is not significantly different from zero. 
If there is a significant difference between the (𝑥)’s of different firms in a stratum, then we use a 
finer grid for the stratum until the differences are insignificant.   
After removing firms that are not matched we are left with two comparable samples. According 
to Dehejia and Wahba (2002), this method sufficiently accounts for the endogenous effect in 
assigning the treatment especially when an experimental setting is not possible. For these two 
samples, we examine the survival differences of different measures of debt structure using the 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for rated and not rated firms, and we estimate the average 
treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment of the treated (ATT) that indicate changes in the 
number of years a firm takes to change its debt-type structure due to the firm being rated.  
Panel A of Figure 3.7 depicts the survival estimates for the main (largest) debt type for the 
Kaplan-Meier estimates, where the horizontal axis measures time in years and the vertical axis 
reports the estimated survival probabilities. The blue solid (red dashed) line reports the estimates 
for the rated (unrated) sample. As the graph shows, there is a visible difference between the 
survival rates. The rated sample is clearly less stable than the unrated sample and the difference in 
their survival rates increases over time. After 11 years, 37% of the rated firms and 52% of the not 
rated firms have never changed their main debt type. We also plot the debt heterogeneity index for 
thresholds of 10% (Panel B) and 20% (Panel C) in Figure 3.7. Although the survival estimates are 
just marginally higher for the not rated sample with the 10% threshold, this gap widens for the 
20% threshold (lower panel).17 Repeating the same study using debt ranks in Panel C yields the 
same results, as the rated sample is clearly less stable compared to the matched not rated sample, 
for the rank index with all 7 debt types as well as the rank index with the 2 main debt types. 
                                                     
17 In unreported results, we plot the same graphs with thresholds of 30, 40 and 50 percent. The gap between 
rated and not rated samples widens at higher thresholds.  
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[Please insert Figure 3.7 here] 
 
Table 3.6 reports the average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect for the treated 
(ATT) and potential outcome means (POM) in response to a firm being rated for different measures 
of debt-type structure. We observe a large and significant difference between the debt-type 
structure stability of rated and not rated firms. For the debt heterogeneity index with the 20% 
threshold, being rated shortens the stable debt-type life by almost six months (-0.52 measured in 
years). The importance of this effect is computed as the portion of ATE or ATT to POM. The 
number of years for all firms (for only rated firms) to change their debt heterogeneity by more than 
20% (10%) is reduced by 13% (30%).18  The stability of the debt-type ranks are also highly 
affected by the assignment of a rating. The relative reduction in the life of stable debt ranks is 
about 30% ((0.64/2.60) ≈ 30%) when the debt-type ranks index considers all seven debt types 
and by about 29% ((0.63/2.60) ≈ 29%) when it considers only the first two debt types.  
[Please insert Table 3.6 about here] 
 
The results are even less pronounced for the largest debt type. While being rated leads to a 2.11 
years reduction in the life of a stable debt-type structure based on the ATE estimate, this represents 
the lowest relative reduction of only 1% ((2.11/12.60) ≈ 1%). Although statistically significant, 
this change indicates that maintaining a stable main debt-type is only marginally influenced by the 
assignment of a rating. Thus, it appears that the greater stability of capital structures of rated firms 
allows them to have less stability in their debt-type structures beyond the main debt type.  
 
3.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Given the number of categories of debt types and sub-types in the Capital IQ database, results 
could change if they are aggregated differently. In the results presented to this point, we used 
Capital IQ’s seven main debt types as the reference categories in our empirical analyses so as to 
not introduce any researcher biases in the categorization and to obtain an exhaustive set of debt 
types with no loss of data points. In this section, we test the robustness of our results to the 
following categorization of the debt types similar to that used by Colla et al. (2013): (1) 
                                                     
18 For ATE: ((0.52/4.08) ≈ 13%). For ATT: ((1.18/4.08) ≈ 30%). 
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commercial papers, (2) lines of credit, (3) term loans, (4) senior debt, (5) subordinated debt, (6) 
capital leases and (7) other debt. As noted earlier, this categorization leads to a significant loss in 
data because the notes and debt category which is now split between senior and subordinate debt 
types has a variety of other sub types that are not included in these new groupings.  
We repeat the clustering analysis, survival tests and hazard regressions using the new debt-type 
categories. The clustering results with these new debt-type definitions are reported in Figure 3.8. 
This figure confirms our primary clustering results by showing a high concentration of different 
debt types across different clusters. In the first cluster, lines of credit and term loans make up 
almost the total debt structure. In the second cluster, lines of credit make up more than half of the 
debt structure. In the third and fourth clusters, subordinated and senior debt account for the largest 
portion of the debt structure, respectively. In the fifth cluster, senior debt and lines of credit 
constitute the largest portions of the debt. In the sixth cluster, the “other debt” category plays this 
role, and finally in the seventh cluster almost all the debt consists of term loans. Untabulated 
survival graphs and hazard regressions yield similar results to those reported earlier.  
[Please place Figure 3.8 about here] 
 
We further test whether the number of clusters or the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule 
influences our results using the new debt-type categories. Based on the results depicted in Figure 
3.9, we observe that the effect of the main debt type and the existence of clusters with concentration 
in one debt type occurs when using both firm-1year and firm-12year observations. In unreported 
results, we obtain similar results when we test the robustness of our survival estimates using three 
alternative hazard functions: Weibull, Gompertz, and Cox PH. 
 [Please place Figure 3.9 around here] 
 
Thus, these results suggest that our survival findings are robust to the categorizations of debt 
types, the use of less efficient clustering and the choice of hazard function. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 The finance literature has recently placed greater emphasis on the importance of debt-type 
structure as an integral part of capital structure decisions. This fledgling literature has produced 
many unanswered questions, particularly questions dealing with how firms set their debt structure 
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policies over time, with the intertemporal stability of the various debt types in a firm’s debt 
structure, and with what determines relative debt-type preferences of firms. We currently know 
that firms choose specialized debt structures in every year, and that there is significant variability 
in debt structures for rated firms. However, the literature still has not adequately addressed the 
behavior and determinants of debt-type structures over the long-run.  
In this paper, we examined whether corporate debt structures demonstrate long-run stability and 
whether the time-series variations in debt structures act as offsets for capital structure stability. We 
used formal survival tests and long-run cluster analyses to examine the stability of our newly 
introduced metrics of debt-structure stability; namely, the debt heterogeneity index (HHI) and 
varying definitions of debt-type rank orders. Our results show that firms tend to maintain a single 
main debt type unchanged over time, but change all other debt types in their debt structure 
frequently. We show that almost a quarter of the firms never change their main debt type, and more 
than 35% of the firms never reduce the weight of their main debt type below 90% over a 12 year 
period. We document that being rated significantly reduces the intertemporal stability of debt 
structures, consistent with the conjecture of Rauh and Sufi (2010) that being rated with its greater 






4 Corporate Debt Maturity around the World: Role of Creditor 
Rights and Contract Enforcement 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The law and finance literature provides conflicting views about the impact of creditor rights 
and contract enforcement on the choice of debt maturity. A number of empirical studies find that 
maturity increases with the level of protection provided to creditors and the quality of law 
enforcement within a country (e.g., Giannetti, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007).19 Other studies find 
that creditor rights decrease corporate debt maturity (Vig, 2013) 20  or are not important for 
syndicated loan maturities (Bae and Goyal, 2009). Most of the empirical and theoretical studies in 
this area, however, consider creditor rights and law enforcement efficiency jointly and assume that 
they are directional equivalent in terms of their effects on the choice of debt maturity (e.g., 
Diamond, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Qian and Strahan, 2007; 
Fan et al., 2012). Creditor rights are related to laws that determine who have the rights to the 
property of bankrupt firms and who control the insolvency procedures, while strong contract 
enforcement mechanisms give lenders the incentive to monitor and re-contract by increasing 
recovery rates and decreasing the time to handle reorganizations and defaults. The primary 
question that this paper addresses is: Do creditor rights and contract enforcement have similar 
directional impacts on corporate debt maturity choices? Considering the belief that short-term 
financing caused or exacerbated the last recession, the secondary question addressed herein is: Is 
there a case in financial economics for the strengthening of creditor rights or contract 
enforcements?  
 In this paper we revisit the above conflicting results about the impact of creditor rights on 
corporate debt maturity by studying the differential effects of creditor rights and debt enforcement 
efficiencies on corporate debt maturity. We focus on a large cross section of international corporate 
                                                     
19 Qian and Strahan (2007) use fixed-effects regressions and find that stronger creditor protection increases 
syndicated loan maturities. Giannetti (2003) reports that a bundle of stronger creditor rights and stricter 
enforcements is associated with a greater availability of long-term debt for unlisted companies. 
20 Using a quasi-natural experiment, Vig (2013) studies the impact of the passage of a mandatory secured 
transactions law in India and finds that corporate debt maturity shortens due to increased ex-post 
inefficiencies associated with increases in creditor rights. 
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debt maturity structures since almost all of the studies in the related literature have so far only 
studied bank loans. We use publicly listed firms across 42 countries which allows for a 
generalization of our findings to a wider cross-section of firms, especially those that are smaller in 
size and those from developing countries. Our study extends the literature on the effects of legal 
and property rights institutions on financial markets and contracts, especially by documenting that 
creditor rights and contract enforcement efficiencies have opposite effects on the corporate choice 
of debt maturity.  
Our main sources for firm-level variables are the Compustat Global database, Compustat North 
America, and Compustat Securities Daily. We use the creditor rights index of Djankov, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer (2007), and the measure of the efficiency of enforcement from Djankov et al. (2008). 
We employ maturity determinants and control variables from the firm-specific, macroeconomic 
and institutional domains that are drawn from such sources as the World Bank Doing Business, 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Heritage Foundation and Polity IV databases.  
Our empirical strategy exploits the different levels of creditor rights and contract enforcement 
efficiencies in an international setting, as variations in these determinants are largely exogenous 
to the maturity decisions of individual firms. We improve on the econometrics used in previous 
cross sectional examinations of the impact of creditor rights and contract enforcement efficiency 
on capital structure determinants. To address the unobserved heterogeneity inherit in international 
level studies, previous studies have relied on either fixed effects (Qian and Strahan, 2007) or 
random effects (Bae and Goyal, 2009) specifications. We estimate the relationships using the 
correlated random-effects (CRE) model of Mundlak (1978). This modeling specification 
successfully addresses a long-debate in the related literature where institutional variables are 
largely time-invariant and firm-specific variables change over time and across firms. A fixed-
effects model consistently estimates the time-variant determinants but not the time-invariant 
regressors. On the other hand, while a random-effects model can estimate both time-variant and 
time-invariant determinants, its estimates may not be consistent. The CRE estimations used herein 
address these shortcomings by reporting fixed-effect estimates for firm-specific variables while 
simultaneously reporting random-effect estimates for the institutional (time-invariant) variables.  
We find that creditor rights and contract enforcement are almost independent (correlation of 
0.05) and that stronger creditor rights shorten debt maturities while better enforcements lengthen 
them. We also observe that the significant variations in creditor rights and enforcement qualities 
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across countries are independent of the sample countries’ economic status, development status and 
other institutional determinants. We document that the effect of creditor rights and enforcement 
mechanisms are independent of the institutional setting of a country, including its legal origins, 
culture and religion, and the formalism of its legal system. Our results are robust to the choice of 
explanatory variables since all components of the creditor rights index decrease debt maturities, 
and all alternative proxies for contract enforcement lead to longer debt maturities. These relations 
remain large and significant when we use an alternative measure of debt maturity as the dependent 
variable, which is the weighted average of maturities of different debt types in a firm’s capital 
structure as in Saretto et al. (2013). Our results are also robust to alternative estimation methods 
to correlated random effects, including random effects and a Tobit specification, and to alternative 
subsamples that, e.g., eliminate cross-listed firms. 
Using a parsimonious theoretical model we provide the mechanism through which creditor 
rights and contract enforcement impact debt maturity. The model incorporates a costly monitoring 
technology into the simple model of asset substitution of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Park 
(2000). The key idea behind our model is that the manager faces a trade-off in choosing short vs. 
long-term debt. From the manager’s perspective, short term debt is cheaper but restricts his choice 
of different projects. Short term debt also relaxes the necessity of creditor monitoring and leads to 
safer debt repayments by inducing maximum managerial effort (Diamond, 1991; Gertner and 
Scharfstein, 1991). In contrast, long-term debt is more expensive for the manager to compensate 
the creditors for longer commitments and the possibility of risk shifting. This setting leads to two 
predictions. The first is that the manager’s decision to choose between short and long term is 
influenced by the strength of creditor rights, where stronger creditor rights lead to the choice of 
shorter maturities by influencing the manager’s choice between safe and risky projects. The second 
prediction is that weaker creditor rights are associated with riskier projects and is supported in the 
related literature (e.g., Acharya et al., 2011).   
Unlike creditor rights, enforcement mechanisms deal with the ex-post efficiency of procedures 
and operations and directly influence the dollar amount received by creditors at liquidation. With 
low enforcement efficiency, creditors collect a smaller portion of true asset values with liquidation. 
Such inefficiencies include longer times spent in resolution, possible costs due to corruption, and 
the judiciary’s inefficiency in implementing the law. We show that when enforcement efficiencies 
are low, creditors will not monitor since monitoring costs exceed the monitoring benefits, and thus 
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will only offer short term debt, resulting in shorter debt maturities in response to weaker 
enforcements.  
Our paper makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the prior 
literature dealing with the effects of the institutional environment on a firm’s capital structure by 
documenting the differing impacts of legal protection of creditors and the enforcement efficiency 
of contacts on corporate debt maturity. Significant determinants of corporate debt maturity 
previously identified in the literature include the financial development of the country (e.g., 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003), legal rights of creditors (e.g., Qian and 
Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Cho et al., 2014), political settings (e.g., Fan et al., 2012) 
and national culture (Zheng et al., 2012). Second, we add to the literature that attempts to 
disentangle the institutional impacts on economic performance pioneered by North (1981) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2005). We extend this line of inquiry to financial markets by studying the impact 
of two different sets of institutions (namely, creditor rights and enforcement) on a firm’s choice of 
debt maturity. Finally, our paper contributes to the literature that relates increased creditor rights 
to inefficiencies in financial contracting and emphasizes the demand-side determinants of debt 
structure (Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992; Hart et al., 1997; Acharya et al., 2011; Vig, 2013; and 
Cho et al., 2014).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops our theoretical model. 
Section 4.3 describes the data, sample and summary statistics. Section 4.4 provides and discusses 
our main results. Section 4.5 reports and interprets the results of several tests of robustness. Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
4.2 THE MODEL  
In this section, we present our theoretical model that formally describes the mechanisms by 
which creditor rights and contract enforcement influence the choice of corporate debt maturity. 
We empirically test the predictions of the model in subsequent sections of this paper. Our model 
is constructed in the context of an optimal contracting framework and borrows features from the 
Hart and Moore (1999) setting and incorporates the costly monitoring technology of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Park (2000).  
As shown in Figure 16, the model has three dates. At 𝑡 = 0, an entrepreneur attempts to raise 𝐼 
to fund a completely debt-financed project. The debt obtained is in the form of a zero coupon bond, 
and therefore its face value 𝐷 (including accrued interest) has to be repaid at the project end. 
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Before the start of the project, the manager decides on the debt maturity. Maturity can be long or 
short term, where in our set up long-term means 𝜇 = 2 and short term is 𝜇 = 1. Moreover, the 
manager decides on the quality of the project at 𝑡 = 0 . The project can be either safe with 
probability 𝑝 and a certain21 return of S or risky with probability 1 − 𝑝 with the risky return 𝑅. The 
success of the risky project is determined with probability 𝑞 ∈ (0, 1) and this project returns R > 
S when successful and zero if unsuccessful. The payoff structure for the projects is 
𝑞𝐷 < 𝐿 < 𝐷 < 𝑆 < 𝑞𝑅 < 𝑅 
 
(4.1) 
 In (4.1), I is the initial required investment, L is the liquidation value, and D is the face value 
of debt.  Similar to Park (2000), since the project type depends only on a manager’s effort, we can 
also assume without loss of generality that p also reflects the manager’s choice of effort. For the 
manager, the payoff of the risky project is more attractive than that of the safe project, even when 
the success probability of the risky project, 𝑞, is low. This induces a risk-shifting tendency into 
our contract design where a borrower may pursue a risky strategy and shift the risk to lenders. In 
the absence of liquidation, the manager prefers the risky project if the following risk-shifting 
condition holds 
 
(𝑆 − 𝐷) <  𝑞 (𝑅 − 𝐷) 
 
(4.2) 
 When creditors observe the risky project, they prefer to call for project liquidation, since 𝐿 >
𝑞𝐷 . Creditors need to monitor the project in order to observe its quality. They monitor with 
probability 𝑧 , and incur monitoring costs 𝑐 . If creditors monitor, they need to choose their 
monitoring intensity 𝜆, where higher monitoring intensity leads to higher monitoring costs λc. The 
need for monitoring increases with a longer debt maturity since project payoff uncertainty 
increases with time. Thus, monitoring intensity is an increasing function of debt maturity λ: λ(μ) 
(Kristiansen, 2005; Prilmeier, 2013). 
The project type is revealed conditional on monitoring at date one. The probability that lenders 
correctly identify project type is proportional to their monitoring intensity. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that creditors learn the project type at t = 1 with probability λ(μ), and thus 





do not know more than what the public already knows about the project with probability 1 − λ(μ). 
If creditors learn that the project is risky, they call for liquidation. As Figure 16 shows, they can 
be successful in liquidating the firm’s assets with probability 𝛼 and the project may continue with 
probability 1 − 𝛼. If not liquidated at date 1, the project returns cash flows at date two. Since the 
project is fully debt-financed, the manager receives nothing when the project is liquidated.  
[Please place Figure 16 about here] 
 
 If the project is liquidated at 𝑡 = 1, a value 𝐿 will be realized from asset sales in the market. 
Taking the market value of assets at the time of liquidating as 𝐴,  the level of enforcement 
efficiencies affects the effectiveness of liquidation in terms of legal fees and other liquidation-
related costs. Thus, 𝐿 = 𝜃𝐴 where 𝜃 is the portion of asset value that remains after accounting for 
liquidation costs.  
4.2.1 Probability of Liquidation 
The two ways for lenders to address the risk-shifting behavior of a manager are by issuing long-
term debt with monitoring or by issuing short-term debt so that the loan has to be refinanced at 
date 1 with no monitoring. Since 𝑝 is the manager’s effort, creditors set up a monitoring objective 
of the form 𝑝 ≥ 𝑝𝑐 in which they have the right to call for the project liquidation if and only if the 
observed p is below the minimum desired value, 𝑝𝑐. In our case, the most restrictive case is debt 
with a maturity of one year ( μ = 1). Since this is equivalent to pc = 1, the manager should exert 
the maximum effort to be able to finance the project. While creditors do not monitor short-term 
debt, they observe all required information at 𝑡 = 1 in order to decide on the renewal of the 
financing contract. Managers do not prefer short-term debt because such a short maturity can 
effectively bar the manager from pursuing the risky project.   
The probability of liquidation, 𝛼, is a function of debt maturity 𝜇. When maturity is short (𝜇 =
1 in our set up), the probability that a risky project is liquidated is 1 (𝛼 = 1). When maturity is 
long (𝜇 = 2 in our set up), the probability of liquidation can be a number 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) which is an 
increasing function of the monitoring effort of the creditor and the strength of creditor rights, 𝜔, 
in the economy.  
The effect of creditor rights on the relationship between creditors and borrowers is extensively 
studied in Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hart and Moore (1994, 1998), and 
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Djankov et al. (2007). As these papers argue, the credit provided to borrowers is influenced by the 
legal power of creditors particularly in forcing repayments, seizing collaterals, and acquiring 
control of troubled firms. Specifically, Djankov et al. (2007) elaborate how stronger creditor rights 
enable creditors to more successfully call for negotiations and force liquidations in the risky states. 
Their index of creditor rights reflects the abilities of creditors to (1) allow or disallow a manager’s 
debt reorganization request and effectively force liquidation, (2) seize collaterals if reorganizations 
are allowed, (3) effectively receive liquidation proceeds with priority over other stakeholders if 
firms are liquidated, and (4) remove the manager during the reorganization procedure and thus 
delegate the control of the firm to an administrator and not the manager. The latter also incentivizes 
the manager to exert more effort and authorizes the creditors to impose their desired terms more 
easily and to also extract more quality information about the firm’s operations during the 
reorganization period. Thus, stronger creditor rights provide creditors with the ability to better 
force or convince managers to liquidate the risky project in our model. Therefore, the probability 
of liquidation is a function of both creditor rights and the maturity structure of debt; or  𝛼: 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇).  
On the flip side, when the rights of creditors are not well protected, the manager has greater 
flexibility in pursuing his desired risky projects with fewer concerns about interventions from 
creditors even if his projects are monitored. Thus, after the financing phase, the manager decides 
on his optimal choice of effort, 𝑝, that maximize his expected payoffs based on the perceived effect 
of the strength of creditor rights in the economy,  thereby inferring the probability that the risky 
project will be liquidated.  
When there is a probability that the creditors may liquidate the risky project, the benefits of risk 
shifting from Equation (9) are given by  
(𝑆 − 𝐷) − (1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇)) 𝑞 (𝑅 − 𝐷) (4.3) 
 
If the benefits are greater than zero, then the risky project is beneficial for the manager. The 
variable that can determine whether there are benefits to risk shifting is the probability of 
liquidation 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇). According to (10), we can derive a threshold for 𝛼 as 







Equation (4.4) provides the level of the liquidation probability above which risk-shifting is not 
beneficial.  
 For simplicity, we assume there are only two creditor rights regimes: strong 𝜔 and weak 𝜔 
where strong creditor rights, 𝜔, leads to high liquidation probability and weak creditor rights, 𝜔  
leads to a low liquidation probability. The high creditor rights state is the one in which 𝛼(?̅?, 𝜇) >
𝛼∗, and the low creditor rights state is the one where 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇) < 𝛼∗. 
4.2.2 The Manager’s Problem 
 The manager maximizes his payoff choosing the optimal levels of effort 𝑝 and maturity 𝜇.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑝,𝜇𝑢 = {𝑝(𝑆 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)]) + (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇)) 𝑞 (𝑅 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)])} (4.5) 
 
Since the manager can only select one of the projects at t=0, his problem as specified by Equation 
(4.5) can be simplified to  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜇𝑢 = {(𝑆 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)]), (1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇)) 𝑞 (𝑅 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)])} (4.6) 
 
The first part of Equation (4.6) shows the payoff to the manager if the project is safe, and the 
second part if the project is risky. The term d(μ) is the additional interest for longer term debt that 
the manager is required to pay. For simplicity, we can assume that d(1) = 0 and d(2) > 0. 
 The project choice of the manager depends on whether the risk-shifting condition holds based 
on the magnitude of 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇). In Equation (4.6), the expected payoff of the risky project for the 
manager depends on the probability of the project’s success 𝑞  and the probability of project 
liquidation by creditors. If risk-shifting is beneficial, the manager chooses the risky project. Next, 
we study the manager’s choice of project and 𝜇 in response to different creditor rights regimes.  
2.2.1 Strong creditor rights 
 With strong creditor rights, there is a high probability that the creditors will be able to liquidate 
the risky project. Since 𝛼(?̅?, 𝜇) > 𝛼∗, there is no incentive for the manager to take the risky project 
based on Equation (10). Therefore, his payoffs from Equation (4.6) can be written as 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜇𝑢 = {𝑆 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)]} (4.7) 
 
Since the manager wants to maximize his payoff, it is easy to confirm that the optimal maturity 
becomes μ = 1 since 𝑑(𝜇 = 1) = 0 and thus that the manager’s payoff will be  𝑆 − 𝐷. 
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2.2.2 Weak creditor rights  
 When creditor rights are weak, the ex-ante payoffs for the risky project become more attractive 
for the manager since creditors will not be able to liquidate the risky project effectively when 
 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇) < 𝛼∗. From Equation (10), the result from the maximizing problem (4.7) is 
(1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇))  𝑞 (𝑅 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(𝜇)]) (4.8) 
 
We can show that the optimal choice for maturity now is 𝜇 = 2 since it enables the manager to 
reduce the liquidation probability, 𝛼. We note that if the risky project is financed with short term 
debt, the probability of liquidation is 100%, or 𝛼(𝜔, 1) = 1. Therefore, the manager will not 
choose short term debt (𝜇 = 1) because his payoff becomes zero.  
(1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 1)) 𝑞 (𝑅 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(1)]) = 0 (4.9) 
 
With the choice of risky project with long term debt, the probability of liquidation depends on the 
strength of creditor rights, i.e.,  𝛼(?̅?, 2) >  𝛼(𝜔, 2). 
 The only cost to the manager from using long term debt is the additional financing cost, 𝑑(2). 
It is easy to confirm that with low creditor rights since the manager will not choose short term debt 
that he always pays the extra 𝑑(2) and chooses the long-term debt as long as  
(1 − 𝛼(𝜔, 2)) 𝑞 (𝑅 − [𝐷 + 𝑑(2)]) > 0 (4.10) 
 
Equation (4.10) holds as long as 𝑅 > 𝐷 + 𝑑(2). This states that the additional premium plus the 
debt service required for long term debt should be smaller than the payoff of the risky project. 
4.2.3 Creditors’ payoffs 
 The creditors’ expected payoff can be expressed as 
(1 − 𝑧)[𝑝𝐷 + (1 − 𝑝) 𝑞 𝐷] + 𝑧 [𝑝𝐷 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛼(𝜔, 𝜇) 𝐿 − 𝜆(𝜇)𝑐] (4.11) 
 
As shown above, the manager chooses 𝑝 = 1 and applies for short-term debt when creditor rights 
are strong. In this case, creditors will receive a risk-free 𝐷 at the end of the project. With weak 





Both creditor rights and contract enforcement efficiencies affect financing contracts at the time 
of liquidation although their mechanisms differ. Stronger creditor rights, according to La Porta et 
al. (1998) enable creditors to impose more restrictions on managers, call for renegotiations, change 
managers and have priority on liquidation proceedings. On the other hand, better enforcement 
results in more effective liquidation and lowers time and cost to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. 
In our model, greater creditor rights increase the probability of liquidating the risky project while 
more efficient contract enforcement increase the liquidation payoffs for creditors and influence the 
decision of creditors to monitor the activities of managers prior to liquidation. For a monitoring 
cost c, creditors only monitor if 
𝛼(𝜔)𝜃𝐴 − (1 − 𝛼(𝜔))𝑞𝐷 > 𝑐 (4.12) 
 
More efficient enforcement leads to an increase in 𝜃, which is the portion of the value of liquidated 
assets that creditors will receive after liquidation costs and inefficiencies are accounted for. 
Equation (4.12) indicates that creditors will monitor only if their expected incremental payoffs of 
monitoring and being able to liquidate the risky project exceeds their monitoring costs.  
Creditors choose whether or not to monitor the firm based on three criteria; debt maturity, level 
of monitoring cost and strength of the enforcement system. Creditors will not monitor if the debt 
is short–term (𝜇 = 1) and the benefits of monitoring fall short of its costs. Creditors will monitor 
if the debt is  long term and the benefits of monitoring exceed its costs.  
As 𝜃 declines in Equation (4.12) due to enforcement inefficiencies, it becomes less profitable 
for creditors to monitor managers since the marginal benefits of monitoring diminish. In particular, 
when   𝛼(𝜔)𝜃𝐴 − (1 − 𝛼(𝜔))𝑞𝐷 < 𝑐 , then creditors are better off not monitoring. Creditors 
would not agree with long-term debt without monitoring since it means that the manager would 
certainly choose the risky project. Since creditors know ex-ante of this situation, they prefer to 
minimize maturity as a response to enforcement inefficiencies in order to maximize the manager’s 
effort 𝑝.  
4.2.5 Testable Hypotheses 
 We can draw two hypotheses from our theoretical model that are empirically investigated in the 
remainder of this paper. The first hypothesis is that shorter debt maturities are associated with 
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stronger creditor rights. As the model implies, this is mainly due to a greater (lesser) possibility of 
risk shifting to creditors by the manager as creditor rights become weaker (stronger). For this to 
be true empirically, we expect that firms take riskier projects with weaker creditor rights and vice 
versa. This prediction is well confirmed in the literature. Specifically, Acharya, Amihud and Litov 
(2011) find that stronger creditor rights lead to reduced corporate risk-taking. Consistent with the 
current paper’s argument, Acharya et al. (2011) argue that stronger creditor rights can mitigate the 
manager’s risk-shifting tendencies and show that in fact they do inhibit the risk-sharing activities 
of managers. The second testable hypothesis is that longer debt maturities are associated with more 




4.3.1 Main Country-level Variables 
4.3.1.1 Creditor-rights index 
The creditor rights index is the updated version from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) 
for 129 countries.22 The index is the sum of the values of four binary variables, where each variable 
takes a value of one in a country if the country provides a specific type of protection for creditors. 
The first type of protection exists if creditors can call for a reorganization based on criteria such 
as a minimum level of dividend payments. The second type of protection exists if debtors cannot 
legally obtain unilateral protection against borrowers in the case of bankruptcy or if creditors are 
able to discipline managers more effectively during the restructuring process by being able to seize 
collateral. The third type of protection exists if creditors have the highest priority to payouts of the 
proceeds of liquidation. Priority may be granted for managers, government or creditors, and 
therefore the related dummy equals one if creditors have the highest priority. The fourth type of 
protection exists if creditors are legally able to change managers in the case of a formal bankruptcy 
or reorganization.  
Djankov et al. (2007) find that this index is highly persistent over time as only a few changes 
occurred in the index over the past 13 years (Brockman and Unlu, 2009). Thus, we take the level 
                                                     
22 The initial version of the index was introduced by La Porta et al. (1998). 
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of creditor rights for each country as being constant and equal to its 2002 value. This is consistent 
with the use of a constant value of the index for each country by Cho et al. (2014), Kyröläinen, 
Tan and Karjalainen (2013), Miller and Reisel (2012), Benmelech and Bergman (2011), Acharya, 
Amihud and Litov (2011), Houston, Lin and Ma (2010) and Brockman and Unlu (2009). 
4.3.1.2 Contract enforcement   
Measures of contract enforcement are closely related to measures of property rights. Inter-
country differences in laws and their enforcement can determine how costly contract enforcement 
can be (Acemoghlu et al., 2005). Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) show how enforcement of 
debt contracts varies across two post-communist countries (Poland and Czech Republic) and that 
strict enforcement in Poland resulted in a more rapid growth of its financial market while the 
inverse occurred in the Czech Republic. Below, we briefly discuss some of the factors that can 
influence the quality of contract enforcement and the data sources used for measuring these factors.  
Our main proxy for enforcement quality is the measure for debt-enforcement efficiency for each 
of 88 different countries constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) based on practitioner responses to 
the procedures for debt enforcement for an insolvent firm in their country. Djankov et al. (2008) 
compute the likeliness of foreclosure, liquidation, or an attempt at reorganization as three probable 
procedures.  Their index considers time, cost and the probability of asset deposition. Djankov et 
al. (2008) find that this index is related to the inefficiency of the public sector, French legal origins 
and general excessive bureaucracy, number of red tapes and corruption. On the financial market 
side, they also find that the index is related to structural characteristics of the debt market such as 
disrupted bankruptcy procedures, poor structure of appeals, and voting inefficiencies between debt 
holders.  
4.3.1.3 Macroeconomic variables 
The level of a country’s wealth and growth can influence how its institutions are formed and 
function. For example, richer countries enjoy a comparative advantage in terms of debt 
enforcement efficiency due to their more sophisticated mechanisms (Djankov, Glaeser et al., 2003; 
Gennaioli and Rossi, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008; Ayotte and Yun, 2009). We obtain our 
macroeconomic variables (Growth in GDP, per capita GDP and inflation) from the World Bank 
database. We use the thresholds defined by the World Bank based on per capita GNI to categorize 
countries into high, middle and low income.  
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As an aggregate indicator, a country’s sovereign rating reflects the general risk of its economy 
and affects the discount rate (Keck, Levengood and Longfield, 1998). Besides risk and economic 
factors, an increase in sovereign risk rating can be due to a set of political determinants including 
corruption, risk of conflict, and political tension (Kim and Wu, 2008). We use sovereign ratings 
from Fitch that are converted into a numerical scale between 1 and 29 where A equals 1 and D 
equals 29. Thus, a one-notch rating change represents a one unit increase or decrease in the 
equivalent numerical measure. 
4.3.1.4 Legal origins 
One of the important country-wide institutional determinants of creditor rights is a country’s 
legal origin. La Porta et al. (1997) report that the origin of a country’s legal system, especially in 
terms of civil versus common law, has a direct effect on how investors are protected. Watson 
(1974) finds that common law generally provides better protection for investors. Djankov et al. 
(2007) find that legal origins have a large and significant effect on credit-market institutions and 
document significantly higher creditor right scores for common law countries as opposed to civil 
law (French origin) countries. Similar to Djankov et al. (2007), we use four distinct legal origins 
being English, French, German and Nordic that are captured using four dummy variables. 
4.3.2 Firm-level Variables 
Our primary source of non-North American firm level data is the Compustat Global database 
from 1998 to 2013. This database covers more than 100 countries with about 45,000 unique firms. 
We use the Compustat North America database for North American firms given its greater 
coverage for these firms. All data is annual or annualized if it is originally not so. For example, 
stock prices for international firms are available only at a daily frequency in the Compustat 
Security Daily database. Merging these three databases provides the firm-specific dataset for our 
study. For comparison purposes, we convert all monetary values into U.S. dollars using the 
exchange rates extracted from the World Bank official exchange rate database.  
The data on debt-types is obtained from the Capital IQ database, which provides such data for 
over 60,000 public and private world-wide firms since 2000. Other firm-level determinants are 
chosen based on the maturity literature findings of Barclay and Smith (1995), Lewis (1990), 
Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Flannery (1986), and Ozkan (2000). They 
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include firm size, market to book ratio, book leverage, profitability, tangibility and cash flow 
volatility (Colla et al., 2014). Variable construction is explained in detail in Appendix 3.  
4.3.3 Maturity Indexes 
We construct two different measures for debt maturity. The first measure is the long-term debt 
ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities (Fan et al., 2012). This maturity index captures the relative 
tendency of firms to choose short- or long-term debt in every year. Our second measure is the 
weighted-average debt-maturity index (which we refer to as Ave-debt-maturity hereafter) from 
Saretto and Tookes (2013). To construct this measure of maturity, we first group the Capital IQ 
debt structure data for each of our firms into the following seven categories: (1) Capital Leases, 
(2) Commercial Paper, (3) Lines of Credit, (4) Long-term Debt, (5) Notes, (6) Trusts, and (7) Other 
debt types. We then construct this debt-maturity index as the weighted average of the maturities 
of each of the available debt types, where the weights are determined by the market values of each 
of the seven debt types. If the maturity of a debt within a debt type is not available, we assume that 
its maturity is equal to the average maturity of the other debts that share the same debt type for 
that firm. 
4.3.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the institutional, macroeconomic and firm-specific 
variables. The first two variables are the maturity index of Fan et al. (2012) and the weighted-
average debt maturity (Ave-debt-maturity) index. Our first maturity index (first column) is a 
proportional measure and indicates the ratio of long term to total debt. We observe that 52% of the 
debt of an average firm is long term. The Ave-debt-maturity in the second row displays maturity 
in number of years. This maturity index has a mean of 3.01. However, this index is based on only 
about one-half of the observations used for the long-term debt ratio index. The mean strength of 
creditor rights of 1.86 is below the midpoint of its range between 0 and 4. The average efficiency 
of the legal system at 75.71 far exceeds the median of the 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) range for this 
variable and therefore an average country in our sample enjoys a moderate to high level of 
efficiency. Median corruption at 4 indicates that the typical country exceeds the median of the 0 
(lowest) to 6 (highest) scale for this measure. The average rates of inflation and GDP growth are 
2.16 and 2.86 percent, respectively.  The mean for public registries indicates that on average 6.56 
percent of the population are monitored by public institutions whereas the private bureau coverage 
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is much higher at 63.86 percent. The number of private registries per capita also exhibits 
substantial variability with a standard deviation of 29.23%. 
[Please place Table 4.1 about here] 
 
With regard to the firm-specific variables, the market to book ratio has a mean of 1.02 (median 
of 0.63) and a standard deviation of 3.15. Thus, market value is slightly above (substantially below) 
one for an average (typical) firm in our sample. The mean and median profitability ratios are 6 and 
8 percent, respectively. Tangibility ranges from 2 to 100% with a mean and median of 32% and 
27%, respectively. Cash flow volatility is generally low even at the 95th percentile where it is 19 
percent. Finally, the book leverage ratio for an average and typical firm tend to be low at 24% and 
22%, respectively, although they reach 85% at the 95th percentile.  
Table 4.2 reports the number of firms and firm-year observations for each country in our 
sample, and the percentage of firms in each country as a fraction of the total number of firms in 
the sample. The sample has 17,516 firms and 206,575 firm-year observations across the 42 
countries over the 15 years examined herein. Since U.S. firms account for 22.72% of the firm-year 
observations, we later present our results with and without the U.S. firms. After the U.S. in terms 
of number of observations, we find Japan, China and U.K.  Only firms from the U.S. and Japan 
account for more than 7.74% of the firm-year observations in our sample. Furthermore, 73% of 
the countries have a firm-year weight of less than 1% in our sample. 
[Please place Table 4.2 about here] 
 
Table 4.3 presents the correlations between the main variables. The first and second columns 
document the negative correlations between creditor rights and both measures of debt maturity, 
and the positive correlations between these maturity measures and the efficiency of contract 
enforcement. The correlation of 0.35 between the two measures of maturity suggests that it is high 
enough to infer that both variables refer to the same underlying variable but low enough to indicate 
that they are somewhat different measures. A determinant of contract enforcement and property 
rights, corruption, has a zero correlation with creditor rights, corroborating the former observation 
of independence between our measures of credit rights and contract enforcement.  Consistent with 
the predictions of our model, corruption is positively related to both measures of maturity. The 
debt-maturity indexes are positively and significantly correlated with per capita GDP but not 
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significantly correlated with inflation. The debt-maturity indexes are positively correlated with 
firm leverage, tangible assets and firm profitability, which is consistent with the findings of 
Barclays and Smith (1995) and Ozkan (2000, 2002).  
[Please place Table 4.3 about here] 
 
Figure 17 depicts the relative positions of the various countries according to their time-series 
mean corporate debt maturities. To plot this graph, we first take the means of the maturity index 
over time and across all firms in any given country and then sort countries based on their average 
maturities. We observe that the mean ratios of long-term to total liabilities tend to be higher for 
the more advanced economies. The United States has the largest debt maturity based on this 
measure, followed by Norway, New Zealand, and Ireland. In contrast, Zimbabwe has the lowest 
index for this measure with a ratio of 0.1, followed by China, Morocco and Thailand. In the middle 
maturity range, we find Portugal, Brazil, Croatia and Spain with index values near 0.6.  
[Please place Figure 4.1 about here] 
 
As depicted in Figure 18, the distinction between a country’s level of development and debt 
maturity is not as evident in the Ave-debt-maturity index. Mexico, Japan, and Chile now join the 
U.S. as the four countries with the longest weighted-average maturities. The four countries at the 
bottom of the list still include Morocco but now also include India, Sweden and Finland. Sweden 
in these two graphs shows a remarkable behaviour where it has one of the largest ratios of long 
term to total debt, while its average debt maturity in years is one of the lowest. In the middle range, 
we find both developed and developing countries. To illustrate, 14 countries have an Ave-debt-
maturity index of 1.5 years. The countries are Croatia, Zimbabwe, China, Greece, Poland, 
Argentina, Germany, France, Switzerland, Kenya, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium and Hungary.  
[Please place Figure 4.2 about here] 
 
Figure 19 plots the level of the creditor-rights index for the various countries. Similar to Figure 
17, the different regions and levels of economic development are scattered in the graph. The four 
countries of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Kenya and Zimbabwe with the highest creditor 
protections are either highly advanced or largely underdeveloped. This is also the case for the four 
bottom countries of France, Columbia, Peru and Mexico.  
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[Please place Figure 4.3 about here] 
 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.4.1 Estimation Method and Econometric Issues 
In this section, we present the results of the tests designed to identify the legal and institutional 
determinants of debt maturity, and particularly the creditor-rights index. In studying the effect of 
the creditor rights index on debt maturity, we also study the effect of each of its four components 
as identified by Djankov et al. (2007). We use different specifications to address econometric 
issues associated with any unobserved heterogeneity and potential simultaneity induced by the 
omitted variable bias.  
We account for possible omitted variable bias by controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, 
political and legal determinants and control for unobserved country heterogeneity by including 
country effects. If an unobserved heterogeneity problem is caused by observed and unobserved 
factors, the residuals become correlated so that OLS results become biased. In this case, an initial 
solution is to use fixed-effects specifications, which yield consistent estimates (Qian and Strahan, 
2007; Fan, Titman, and Twite, 2012). However, many of our variables of interest either change 
very slowly over time or are time invariant, including the creditor-rights index, its components and 
the enforcement-efficiency index. The persistent natures of legal and institutional variables make 
it impossible for a fixed-effects specification to yield the desired results as the effects of these 
variables cannot be estimated.   
A random-effects specification is defensible when the unobserved heterogeneity is independent 
of the regressors. However, if the true model is fixed effects, a random-effects model yields 
inconsistent estimates. Bae and Goyal (2009) examine the effect of the bundle of creditor rights 
and enforcement on bank loans using a random-effects specification by implicitly assuming that 
the true model is random effects due in large part to the inability of fixed-effects models to estimate 
time-invariant effects. Their finding that creditor rights are not associated with debt maturity 
differs from the fixed-effects findings of Qian et al. (2007) that stronger creditor rights are 
associated with longer debt maturities.  
As an alternative to these two specifications, we use a correlated random effect (CRE) 
specification (Blundell and Powell, 2003; Altonji and Matzkin, 2005; Wooldridge, 2009) as our 
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primary estimation specification due to its many advantages over fixed or random effects 
specifications. Most notably, the CRE specification allows for a fixed-effects estimation of the 
time-varying regressors while providing consistent estimates of the time-invariant regressors. Our 
default CRE specification is: 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 𝑋1 + 𝑏𝑖𝑋2 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝑋3 + 𝑑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . 
 
(4.13) 
In (13), 𝑋1 contains variables (such as the macro variables) that change only across time. 𝑋2 
contains the time-invariant variables (such institutional variables as the creditor rights index and 
its components, enforcement efficiency and legal origins) that change by country but not for firms 
in that country. 𝑋3 contains those variables that change both over time and across firms such as a 
firm’s  size, market to book ratio, profitability, tangibility, cash flow volatility, and leverage. 𝑑𝑖 
captures the unobserved heterogeneity and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the regression error term. We can also define the 
following composite error term that captures the serially correlated errors when there is a 
heterogeneity problem: 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.14) 
 
In (14), the unobserved heterogeneity is decomposed into a time-invariant component and a 
component that is a linear function of the observed regressors (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980, 
1982). This allows us to rewrite the conditional expectation of the unobserved heterogeneity as: 
𝐸[𝑑𝑖 | 𝑋𝑖,𝑠 , 𝑠 ∈ (1, 𝑡) ] =  𝐸[𝑑𝑖 | ?̅?𝑖 ] = 𝛼1 + 𝑋?̅?𝛼2  (4.15) 
 
The unobserved heterogeneity, 𝑑𝑖, can be decomposed into a constant component 𝛼1, a linear 
function of the mean firm-specific variable 𝑋?̅?𝛼2 , and a firm-specific effect given by: 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼1 +  𝑋?̅?𝛼2 + 𝑓𝑖 (4.16) 
 
The composite error term 𝑣𝑖 is the sum of a firm fixed effect and the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡, or: 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4.17) 
 
Using Equations (23) and (24), we can rewrite the main specification as: 




Equation (25) can be estimated using a feasible GLS, with the following variance- covariance 
matrix: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑓𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑠) = 0 , 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑢
2 , ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  
 
(4.19) 
With 𝑣𝑖  as a 𝑇 × 1 vector, the variance- covariance matrix can be rewritten as: 
𝑊 = 𝐸(𝑣𝑖  𝑣𝑖












4.4.2 Does Level of Creditor Rights and Enforcement Influence Debt Maturity? 
 Figure 20 provides primary evidence on how creditor rights and efficiency of contract 
enforcement influence debt maturities. In both panels 5-a and 5-b, the vertical axis is the median 
debt maturity index in any given country, ranging from 0 to 100%. The horizontal axis is the 
strength of creditor rights for each country in figure 20-a and the efficiency of the contract 
enforcement index in figure 20-b. Both panels report estimated trend lines based on simple OLS 
regressions. As the graphs clearly suggest, the maturity index is significantly and negatively related 
with the strength of creditor rights and significantly and positively related with the efficiency of 
enforcement mechanisms.23 Figures 20-c and 5-d reach similar conclusions when the weighted-
average maturity index is used. 
[Please place Figure 4.4 about here] 
 
 We then examine the following multivariate relationship between debt maturity and creditor 
rights, efficiency of contract enforcement and various control variables: 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡−1
+  𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖
+  𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(4.21) 
 
                                                     
23 The estimated slope coefficient for creditor rights is -0.0724 (t-value of 156.39) and for contract enforcement is 
0.004 (t-value of 215.33). 
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Subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑘  refer to firm, country and year, respectively. 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 is a matrix of the 
creditor rights index and its four components for each country j. 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the efficiency 
of the contract enforcement index for each country j from Djankov et al. (2008). 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  is a matrix 
of firm-specific variables including the natural logarithm of size, market to book ratio, 
profitability, tangibility, and cash flow volatility. 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜  is a matrix of country-level 
macroeconomic variables including inflation, GDP growth and the logarithm of per capita GDP. 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒 is a matrix of institutional variables including legal origins. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 captures the time 
trend using time dummy variables. 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜 captures any unobserved heterogeneity. 𝑑𝑖 is the firm 
fixed effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the error term. The time-varying explanatory variables are lagged one 
period, as in Bae and Goyal (2009). Variable construction is described in Appendix 3.  
Our primary goal at this point is to investigate the relations between debt maturity as measured 
by the long-term debt ratio and the creditor rights index, its four components and the efficiency of 
contract enforcement. The components of the creditor-rights index are: (1) existence of restrictions 
on manager (debtor) when manager calls for reorganization, including the requirement of creditor 
consent, (2) whether creditors can seize collateral after reorganization is agreed upon, (3) if secured 
creditors have priority above other stakeholders or the government over liquidation proceeds, and 
(4) if control during a reorganization moves from the manager to a corporate administrator.  
The CRE estimation results with standardized variables and robust t-statistics and year 
clustering are reported in Table 4.4. Due to the large number of observations and their effect on 
standard errors, we report significance levels up to a 0.001 p-value in all tables. To account for the 
effect of enforcement we include the efficiency of contract enforcement of Djankov et al. (2008) 
in the second row. Finally, columns 9 and 10 extend this study into two subsamples of developed 
and developing countries. As expected, long-term debt ratios are smaller with stronger creditor 
rights. Based on the first column of Table 4.4, a one standard deviation increase in the creditor-
rights index translates into a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in the long-term debt ratio. This 
magnitude is similar after controlling for firm-specific determinants (column 2), macroeconomic 
determinants (column 3) and legal origin determinants (column 4). All four creditor rights 
components have similar directional associations with the long-term debt ratio. Consistent with 
Barclay and Smith (1995), increases in size or tangibility are associated with a higher long-term 
debt ratio. Higher long-term debt ratios also are associated with higher market to book ratios, 
profitabilities and leverages and with lower GDPs per capita and inflations. Based on columns 9 
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and 10 of Table 4.4, we find that the estimated coefficient for 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 and 𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 are 
significant for firms in the developed but not developing countries.  This may in effect be the result 
of established institutions in the developed world compared to the fledgling or partially 
dysfunctional institutions in the developing sphere.  
[Please place Table 4.4 about here] 
4.4.3 Alternative Measure of Maturity as a Test of Robustness 
Table 4.5 reports similar inferences based on the CRE results when the weighted-average 
maturity index is used instead of the long-term debt ratio. These new results indicate that weighted-
average debt maturities generally increase with stronger creditor rights and weaker enforcement 
quality. Based on the first row of the first column of Table 4.5, a one standard deviation increase 
in the creditor-rights index is associated with an almost three times as large reduction in the average 
debt-maturity index as for the long-term debt ratio.24 This strongly significant positive association 
is robust to the inclusion of firm-specific, macroeconomic and legal origin determinants. The 
coefficient estimates for the four components of the creditor-rights index are reported in columns 
(5) through (8) of Table 4.5. Except for the third component (i.e., debt-holder priority over 
liquidation proceedings), increases in each of the other components is associated with a shorter 
average-debt maturity that is almost as much as the index itself.  
[Please place Table 4.5 about here] 
 
The second row of Table 4.5 reports the estimated coefficients and their t-values for the 
efficiency of contract enforcement. Based on the first column of the second row, a one standard 
deviation increase in the efficiency of contract enforcement is associated with a 0.5 standard 
deviation increase in the weighted-average maturity index, which is considerably larger than its 
effect on the long-term debt ratio reported in the corresponding column of Table 4.4. Thus, the 
positive, large and significant association of the enforcement mechanism on both of our measures 
of debt maturity persists for all specifications with various sets of controls.  
                                                     
24 Since the numbers of observations for our two measures of maturity are not similar, we conduct 
a test using the same observations. We find that these untabulated results for the long-term debt 
maturity index are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5.   
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4.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
The robustness of our results to alternative measures of contract enforcement, alternative 
subsamples, alternative estimation methods and the inclusion of additional country-level controls 
are now tested.  
4.5.1 Alternative Measures of Contract Enforcement 
 In this section, we investigate the relations between alternative measures of enforcement with 
debt maturity. Property rights institutions differ inter-country and are closely related to the quality 
of contract enforcement. 25 Since creditor-rights provisions deal with the legal position of creditors 
over borrowers in a financial contract, they do not guarantee the legitimacy of legal enforcement 
procedures or how effectively legal enforcement procedures are implemented. If citizens are 
unable to enforce their property rights from expropriation, they may not be able to circumvent 
enforcement problems through contract design (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) or instituting 
additional laws. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that property rights institutions have a more 
dominant effect on financial development and investment decisions across countries than 
contracting institutions.26   
The various proxies used in the literature for property rights are closely related to the 
implementation rather than the nature and “design” of laws. Therefore, we use the terms ‘strength 
of property-rights institutions” and ‘enforcement’ interchangeably (e.g., Bae and Goyal, 2009). As 
a robustness test of our results, we test if the seven measures of property rights discussed below 
have the same effect on debt maturity as the efficiency variable used earlier.  
 Corruption: The corruption index from ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) varies 
between zero and six (lowest corruption) and primarily assesses corruption in a country’s political 
system. According to the ICRG methodology, more corrupt countries tend to wield laws and 
regulations much less effectively, since governmental procedures and bureaucratic red tape in such 
regimes can be violated by the use of bribes through networks of corrupt officials, particularly in 
the acquisition of licenses and loans. Individuals in high corruption regimes receive lower quality 
service if they refuse to provide bribes to the officials that require such (Laszlo et al., 2005).  
                                                     
25 Property rights are the set of rules and regulations that are designed to protect citizens from seizure or 
confiscation of their assets by the elites and particularly governments. 
26 The importance of property rights for financial development and financial markets also is discussed by 
various other authors (e.g., Jones, 1981; De Long and Shleifer, 1993). 
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Corruption can reduce governmental efficiency when the elevation to power of officials and 
politicians is not based on merit. Corruption can increase financial risk if it results in unexpected 
scandals that destabilize country-wide political institutions and functions and even threatens law 
and order. Corruption can deteriorate the efficiency of law enforcement primarily due to higher 
enforcement costs in more corrupt countries. In the aggregate, corruption is costlier than a tax due 
to its inherent need for secrecy (Shleifer and Vishni, 1993). 
 Law and order: The ICRG “law and order” index used herein ranges between zero and six 
(highest law and order), with each of its two components ranging between zero and three. The first 
component, law, measures the impartiality and strength of a country’s legal system. The second 
component, order, measures to what extent citizens are willing to resolve disputes through 
established legal systems and procedures (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Since law and 
order determines how well a legal institution functions (Knack and Keefer, 1995), this index is 
concerned more with the implementation and enforcement of laws rather than how laws are 
designed. Higher levels of this index indicate more willingness of citizens to accept a country’s 
laws. The weak implementation of law and order or lack of effective sanctions can consequently 
lead to increases in crime rates and investment risk.  
 Bureaucracy quality: The ICRG index used herein for bureaucracy quality ranges between 
zero and four (highest quality). A higher value is assigned if a country’s bureaucratic system is 
well developed, has its own hiring and training procedures and can act independently and 
autonomously from the center of political power. A lower rating is assigned if changes in political 
power affect the routines, policies and practices of a country’s bureaucracy. Changes in 
government in these countries tend to adversely affect the administrative functions and destabilize 
long-term policies. The quality of the bureaucratic system is closely related to corruption (Bai and 
Wei, 2000) and to the speed and effectiveness of contract implementation (Bae and Goyal, 2009). 
By acting as a “shock absorbent” to changes in political power, the quality of a bureaucratic system 
affects the adjustment costs associated with changes in governmental processes and regulations. 
 Contract viability: The ICRG index used herein to measure contract viability ranges between 
0 and 4 (highest contract viability). This index captures the risk of unilateral cancellations of 
contracts or governmental appropriations of assets (domestic and/or foreign). Lower contract 
viability weakens property rights institutions and increases the costs of law enforcement. This 
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index also may capture some investment risk that is not already captured by other political or 
institutional determinants.    
 Constraint on executives: The index used herein is from the Polity IV database, and it ranges 
between 0 and 10 (most constrained). This index relates to the regulations and processes that 
monitor and limit the actions of a country’s political executive power, while also capturing the link 
between political and property rights institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Executive 
constraints can be levied by different authorities across different countries such as lawmakers in 
the Western democracies or by ruling parties, monarchies, or the judiciary system in other 
countries.  
 Property rights index: The index of property rights used herein is from the Heritage 
Foundation. Index values that range between 0 and 100 (highest) are higher with increasing 
promptness and efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts, more effective punishment 
of any unlawful confiscation of land or other forms of private property, and lower corruption or 
risk of state confiscation of domestic or foreign assets. The index is closely related to contract 
enforcement (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  Since the index reflects the independence and 
corruption level of the judiciary system and how effectively individuals are able to enforce 
contracts, the index can also be interpreted as showing the extent to which private property rights 
are preserved and how effectively the government enforces these laws. Thus, the lowest values of 
this index are given to those countries with no legal provisions for private property (e.g., where 
the state owns all property), access to courts is extremely limited, filing for litigation is very 
difficult, and corruption is prevalent.  
 Strength of legal rights: The index used herein is drawn from the World Bank Doing Business 
database. Index values range from 0 to 12 (greatest strength). This index captures the protection 
mechanisms instituted by governments for both lenders and borrowers in order to facilitate 
financial contracting.  
 Since some of the property-rights variables are correlated by construction (e.g., corruption is 
embedded in the legal rights index), we report the regression (21) results for each property-rights 
variable separately (including the other controls) in columns 2 through 8 of Table 4.6. In all 
specifications, we include the creditor-rights index to ascertain the robustness of its directional 
association with debt maturity. Consistent with our predictions, lower corruption (higher 
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corruption index) is associated with a higher long-term debt ratio (see column 2 of Table 4.6).27 A 
one standard deviation increase in the corruption index is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation 
increase in the long-term debt ratio. As predicted, stronger property rights are associated with a 
higher long-term debt ratio (see column 3 of Table 4.6). We find similar positive and significant 
associations between long-term debt ratios and contract viability, executive constraints, law and 
order index, bureaucracy quality and strength of the legal system (columns 4 to 8, respectively). 
While all seven measures of property rights significantly increase maturity, the coefficient 
inferences for the creditor rights index remain unchanged.  
[Please place Table 4.6 about here] 
4.5.2 Tobit Estimations  
In Panel A of Table 4.7, we report Tobit regression results with lower censoring to reflect the 
existence of zero-maturity debt structures in the database. The first and second columns report the 
results for the long-term debt ratio and the weighted-average debt maturity, respectively. The 
previously reported results are robust to the zero-maturity cut-off threshold with the exception of 
the estimated coefficient for legal-system efficiency when the long-term debt ratio is the dependent 
variable. This estimated coefficient remains significant but is now negative.  Thus, both measures 
of maturity continue to decrease with stronger credit rights. However, the long-term debt ratio now 
decreases and the weighted-average maturity now increases with greater efficiency of the legal 
system. 
[Please place Table 4.7 about here] 
4.5.3 Alternative Subsamples  
We now examine the effect of a greater representation of firms from some countries in our full 
sample. The CRE regression results for the long-term debt ratios with the removal of firms from 
the U.S., Japan, China separately and all three countries together are reported in columns (3) – (6), 
respectively, of Panel B of Table 4.7. Our previous full-sample results are robust to each of these 
exclusions. Long-term debt ratios are significantly lower with stronger creditor rights and poorer 
enforcement efficiency.  The signs of the other coefficient estimates remain largely consistent with 
those presented earlier. Some notable exceptions are the estimated market-to-book ratio 
coefficients that are now significantly positive, the estimated profitability coefficients that remain 
                                                     
27  We obtain the same inferences using the weighted-average maturity index as the dependent variable.  
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significant but are now negative instead of positive and the estimated inflation coefficients that are 
now insignificant. 
4.5.4 Effect of Additional Country-level Variables  
We now test if our results are robust to inclusion of additional country-level variables. The 
variables, which are more completely described in Appendix 3, include private credit to GDP, 
stocks traded to GDP, Fitch sovereign rating, information sharing dummies based on whether a 
country has private or public registries, public registry coverage ratio, private registry coverage 
ratio, check formalism (i.e., procedural efficiency for collecting a bounced check) and religion. 
Private credit to GDP is obtained from the World Bank database and is used by Qian and Strahan 
(2007). This variable is not only a well-documented measure of financial development (King and 
Levine, 1993; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2010; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Djankov et 
al., 2007) but it also increases with the power of creditors (Djankov et al., 2007). Religion is 
captured by eight dummy variables where each dummy variable equals one if the majority of a 
country’s population practices that particular religion (one religious category is excluded to avoid 
the dummy-variable trap). Religion is a proxy for culture (Qian and Strahan, 2007) and is 
correlated with both a country’s’ legal origins (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) and the 
strength of a country’s creditor rights (Stulz and Williamson, 2003).  
The CRE regression (21) results with the inclusion of these additional variables and the long-
term debt ratio as the dependent variable are reported in Table 4.8. We find that the estimated 
coefficients for creditor rights and enforcement remain essentially unchanged. Of the seven 
additional non-religion variables with consistently significant estimated coefficients, we find that 
the estimated coefficients are consistently significant and positive for Fitch sovereign ratings, 
information sharing and public registry, and consistently significant and negative for private 
registry. We also find that the long-term debt ratio when a dummy variable for religion is included 
is significantly higher in countries where the major religion is Buddhism or significantly lower in 
countries where the major religion is Atheism, Catholicism, Islam or Orthodoxy. 
[Please place Table 4.8 about here] 
4.5.5 Controlling for Cross-listed Firms 
In this section, we test whether our results are robust to the exclusion of cross-listed firms. 
Potential problems with the inclusion of cross-listed firms arise mostly due to the exposure of a 
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cross-listed firm to two or more different country settings, including political, economic and legal 
rules and regulations. This makes the inference regarding the effect of institutional factors 
potentially more difficult. A well-documented example of this limitation can be due to the bonding 
effect where the cross-listing of a firm can act as a mechanism for bonding managers (Lel and 
Miller, 2008; Hope et al, 2004; Lichit and Chi, 2003). Similarly, cross-listing may result in better 
governance with more credible commitments to serving creditor demands if cross-listing subjects 
a firm to stricter enforcement mechanisms and tougher disclosure requirements, as is found for 
firms that cross-list in the U.S. market (Leuz, 2003).  
To account for any possible cross-listing effects on our previous inferences, we test if our main 
results reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are robust to the exclusion of cross-listed firms identified in 
Sarkissian and Schill (2014). Their sample consists of 3,589 firms from 73 home and 33 host 
markets. We redo our main CRE estimation tests after removing the 5,603 observations based on 
the matches between their and our samples of firms. Comparing the new Table 4.9 results when 
the long-term debt ratio is the dependent variable with those reported earlier in Table 4.4, we find 
that the effects of creditor rights and the other determinants remain essentially unchanged across 
all regressions with only some marginal changes in the estimated significance levels. Comparing 
the new Table 4.10 results when the weighted-average debt maturity is the dependent variable with 
those reported earlier in Table 4.5 yields similar inferences. In summary, these results indicate that 
our findings are not influenced materially by the inclusion of cross-listed firms in our original 
sample.   
[Please place Tables 4.9 and 4.10 about here] 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
One strand of the literature posits that increased creditor rights and better enforcement result in 
cheaper credit and a further relaxation of financial constraints (Diamond, 2004; Qian and Strahan, 
2007). An opposing strand of the literature asserts that increased creditor rights may lead to ex-
post inefficiencies that increase the probability of liquidation (Vig, 2014). Thus, while the former 
predicts longer maturities with stronger creditor protection, the latter predicts the reverse.  
We revisit this inferential difference by first proposing a theoretical model in which creditor 
rights and contract enforcement efficiencies influence debt maturity independently (following Hart 
and Moore, 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Park, 2000). We show that the preference of 
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borrowers for long-term debt is related to decreased rollover costs documented by He and Xiong 
(2012), and the preference of creditors for shorter-term debt is related to the higher effort of 
managers and the reduction in monitoring costs by creditors associated with short-term debt. In 
our model, creditors and borrowers enter a bargaining Nash game based on their bargaining power 
at the time of contract initiation.  
We examine the different effects of creditor-rights institutions and contract enforcement 
mechanisms on the choice of debt maturity. This contrasts with most studies in law and financial 
economics that have either examined the joint effects of creditor rights and enforcement efficiency 
or have not sufficiently described the underlying mechanisms through which creditor rights and 
enforcement efficiency influence contracting features and debt maturity. We find that not only are 
these two variables not correlated but that they have opposite effects on debt maturity.  
Consistent with the empirical predictions of our model, we find that increased creditor rights 
across 42 countries leads to shorter-term maturities while better contract enforcement lengthens 
maturity.  Our findings for increased “creditor rights” are consistent with Vig, (2014) and 
Davydenko and Franks (2008) who report that the choice of secured debt is negatively influenced 
by increased creditor rights that increase the cautiousness of creditors and make creditors less 
willing to compromise. Our findings for the effect of enforcement mechanisms are consistent with 
the findings of Bae and Goyal (2009) who find that increased enforcement efficiency lengthens 






  CHAPTER 5: 
5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we study corporate capital structure determinants from three interconnected 
perspectives, namely the leverage ratio, debt-type structure and finally, corporate debt maturity. 
We investigate the time-series stability of leverage ratios and debt structures and provide insights 
on the impact of credit ratings on such corporate behaviours. We find that the stability of leverage 
ratios is largely influenced by the tendency of firms to maintain stable credit ratings. Using 
treatment effect estimations on survival data, we show that assignment to better rating classes can 
lead firms to postpone leverage ratio changes significantly over a range between 1.8 to 3.5 years. 
We also document that across matched rated and unrated firms, being rated is associated with as 
much as 9 years longer wait before a material leverage variation. 
We also study the stability in corporate debt structures. We document that there are large time-
series variations in corporate debt structures. Firms change their selected debt types and their 
priorities frequently. However; they maintain the single main debt type highly stable over time. 
This result extends the findings of Colla et al. (2013) from a year-to-year to a long-run setting and 
sheds light on the time-series behaviour of debt structures. We confirm the finding of Rauh and 
Sufi (2010) that there are large variations in debt structures that can possibly compensate for the 
lack of variations in leverage ratios.  
Finally, we study the optimal corporate debt maturities across different countries by 
investigating how the strength of creditor rights and contract enforcement mechanisms impact 
optimal maturity choice. Using a stylized model, we are able to disentangle the independent effects 
of better creditor rights and stronger contract enforcement on debt maturity. Our model predicts 
that stronger creditor rights shorten debt maturity and better contract enforcement lengthens it. 
Empirically, we test the model predictions across firms located in 42 countries and confirm the 
model predictions. Our results extend the literature on the inefficiency outcomes of stronger 
creditor protections. Moreover, our results imply that the large discrepancy in the literature 
regarding the effects of institutional settings on optimal debt maturity can be the result of the 
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APPENDIX 1. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND THEIR COMPUTATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
This appendix lists the variables used in the paper and explains how they are computed. In Table A1, we 
report the variables used as determinants of market leverage in a selection of past papers and their estimated 
signs. 
 Book Leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣ι) is defined as total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by 
the book value of assets. 
 Cash flow volatility (CFVol) is defined as in Kryzanowski and Mohsni (2013) as the volatility of 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 over the past six years where 
 Collateral: is computed using Inventory (Compustat item #3) + net PPE (Compustat item #8)/ Total 
book assets  
 CAPX: is from Compustat and shows funds, including property and equipment expenditures that are 
used in addition to plant, property and equipment. It excludes acquisition proceedings.  
 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is Income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), 𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the change in working capital 
(or ∆WC) minus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item #14).  
 ∆WC is the change in current operating assets (Compustat item #4), net of cash and short-term 
investments (Compustat item #1), less the change in current operating liabilities (Compustat item #5), 
net of short-term debt (Compustat item #34).  
 Dividend Payer (DivPay) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a dividend payer.  
 Lagged Leverage (Lev−10
l ) is the (market or book) leverage of the firm lagged ten years to capture an 
initial leverage that minimizes loss in the number of years in our time series since our  data starts from 
1985.  
 Market Leverage (Levι) is defined as total debt divided by firm value, where firm value is defined as 
the book value of assets, minus the book value of common equity, plus the market value of equity, plus 
the book value of deferred taxes.  
 Market to Book (Mkt/Bk) is defined as (market equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating value 
(Compustat item #10) – deferred taxes and investment tax credits (Compustat item #35))/book assets.  
 Net Equity Issuance is the split-adjusted change in shares outstanding 
[Compustat item #25𝑡 –  Compustat item #25𝑡−1  ∗  (Compustat item #27𝑡−1/
Compustat item #27𝑡)]  times the split-adjusted average stock price [Compustat 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 #199𝑡  +
Compustat item #199𝑡−1  ∗  (Compustat item #27𝑡/Compustat item #27𝑡−1)] dividend by the end 
of year t−1 total assets.  
 Net Debt Issuance is defined as the change in total debt from year t−1 to year t divided by the total 
assets at the end of year t−1. 
 Profitability (Profit) is defined as earnings before interest and taxes given by operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item #13), divided by the book value of assets.   
 Rating is the S&P credit rating of the firm, where the value 1 corresponds to a Standard and Poor rating 
of AAA; 2 corresponds to AA+, and so on. 
 Rated is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a Standard and Poor’s credit rating.  
 Size is the natural logarithm of total sales in millions of U.S. dollars.  
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 Tangibility (Tang) is defined as net PPE divided by book assets, where PPE is Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (Compustat item #8).  
 Log (Size) is the natural logarithm of book assets (Compustat item #120). 
 Log (Sales) is the natural logarithm of Sales (Compustat item #12). 
 Industry Leverage: Is the average market (book) leverage of firms in the same industry with the same 
first two digits in their SIC codes.   
 
Table A1. Coefficient signs for the independent variables used in previous studies 
 
This table reports the leverage determinants used and the signs of their estimates reported in a selection of 
papers dated from 2006 to 2013.  The table also reports if each paper has accounted for firm, time (year) 
and industry fixed effects.   
            
Variables Used 
Faulkender &  
Petersen (2006) 




Fan, Titman,  
& Twite (2012) 
Saretto &  
Tookes (2013) 
Initial Lev   + +   + 
Size -     + - 
Sales -   +     
Market to Book - - - - - 
Profitability - - -   + 
Tangibility (or Fixed 
Assets) + + + - + 
Industry Lev     +   + 
Cash flow volatility     -     
Dividend Payer   - -     
Existence of Rating +       +/- 
Credit rating + +     +/- 
Net debt issuance   yes yes     
Net equity issuance   yes yes     
Firm Fixed Effect     yes   yes 
Year Fixed Effect     yes   yes 
Industry Fixed Effect     yes   yes 





Table A2. Size-adjusted critical t-values 




𝑇 − 1] (𝑇 − 𝑘) 
where t* is the new critical t value; T and k denote the sample size and the number of regressors in the 
model; and c represents the ratio between the Bayes probabilities of the alternative and null hypotheses. 
Thus, for a 5% level of significance, c = 95%/5% = 19. This formula is derived from Leamer (1978), is a 
refinement of that that used by Connolly (1989) and Davidson and Faff (1999), and has been used by Frino 
and Oetomo (2005), amongst others. See Johnstone (2005) for derivation and further explanation. 
                         
Alternative Null T c 
K= 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
95.00% 5% 10,000 19 3.887 3.887 3.887 3.886 3.886 3.885 3.884 3.883 
99.00% 1% 10,000 99 4.291 4.291 4.291 4.291 4.29 4.289 4.288 4.287 
95.00% 5% 20,000 19 3.975 3.975 3.974 3.974 3.974 3.974 3.973 3.973 
99.00% 1% 20,000 99 4.371 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.37 4.369 4.368 
95.00% 5% 30,000 19 4.025 4.025 4.025 4.025 4.025 4.025 4.024 4.024 
99.00% 1% 30,000 99 4.416 4.416 4.416 4.416 4.416 4.416 4.415 4.415 
95.00% 5% 50,000 19 4.088 4.088 4.088 4.088 4.088 4.088 4.087 4.087 
99.00% 1% 50,000 99 4.474 4.474 4.474 4.474 4.473 4.473 4.473 4.473 
95.00% 5% 75,000 19 4.137 4.137 4.137 4.137 4.137 4.137 4.137 4.137 
99.00% 1% 75,000 99 4.519 4.519 4.519 4.519 4.519 4.518 4.518 4.518 
95.00% 5% 90,000 19 4.159 4.159 4.159 4.159 4.159 4.159 4.159 4.159 
99.00% 1% 90,000 99 4.539 4.539 4.539 4.539 4.539 4.538 4.538 4.538 
95.00% 5% 125,000 19 4.198 4.198 4.198 4.198 4.198 4.198 4.198 4.198 
99.00% 1% 125,000 99 4.575 4.575 4.575 4.575 4.575 4.575 4.574 4.574 
95.00% 5% 175,000 19 4.238 4.238 4.238 4.238 4.238 4.238 4.238 4.238 
99.00% 1% 175,000 99 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.611 4.611 






APPENDIX 2: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION FOR CHAPTER 3 
 Cash flow volatility (CFVol) is defined as in Kryzanowski and Mohsni (2013) as the volatility of 
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑖,𝑡  over the past six years where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is Income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat item #18), 𝐴𝑖,𝑡  is the change in working capital (or ∆WC) minus Depreciation and 
Amortization (Compustat item #14). 
 Dividend Payer (DivPayer) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a dividend payer, and 
zero otherwise.  
 Heterogeneity index (HHIi,t) for firm i at time t is a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) defined as the sum of squared ratios of each debt type from Capital IQ database to the total 
debt. The corresponding formula is from Colla et al. (2013). 
 Industry Maturity (IndMat)/ heterogeneity index (IndHet) is the average maturity/ heterogeneity 
of firms in the same industry with the same first two digits in their SIC codes.   
 Initial heterogeneity: For every firm, this variable refers to the first available debt heterogeneity 
observation.   
 Log (Sales) is the natural logarithm of Sales (Compustat item #12). 
 Market to Book (MTB) is defined as (market equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating 
value (Compustat item #10) – deferred taxes and investment tax credits (Compustat item 
#35))/book assets.  
 Market Leverage is total debt divided by firm value, where firm value is defined as the book 
value of assets, minus the book value of common equity, plus the market value of equity, plus the 
book value of deferred taxes. 
 Maturity Index for firm i at time t (or  𝑀𝐼𝑖,𝑡) is defined as the ratio of long term debt to the total 
debt, according to Fan, Titman, and Twite (2010).  
 Profitability (Profit) is earnings before interest and taxes given by operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item #13), divided by the book value of assets.   
 Rated dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a Standard and Poor’s credit 
rating. A firm has to report at least one rating report in any given year to be consider a rated firm 
in that year.   
 Sales is the SALE variable from COMPUSTAT database. 
 Size is the natural logarithm of total sales in millions of U.S. dollars.  
 Tangibility (Tang) is defined as net PPE divided by book assets, where PPE is Property, Plant, 
and Equipment (Compustat item #8).  
 Tax rates is the marginal tax rate from the Compustat marginal tax rate database.  
 GDP, GDP growth and Inflation come from World Bank database 
 Term spread is constructed using Federal Reserve database 
 Idiosyncratic volatility is the moving average of daily stock prices from CRSP over the past 180 
days.  
 Short interest volatility is the volatility of the short-term interest rate over the past 180 days using 





APPENDIX 3. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND DATA SOURCES FOR CHAPTER 4 
ICRG refers to the International Country Risk Guide database. Compustat refers to the Compustat Global and Compustat North America databases. 
 
Variable Description Source 
Country specific variables 
Bureaucratic quality  
Higher bureaucratic quality index indicates that laws cannot be changed easily with the change of political 




This variable, according to the Polity IV methodology, refers to the institutionalized constraints on executive 
powers be it collective or individual. These limitations can be imposed by different forms of institutions in 
different societies, e.g., this role is played by legislatures in Western democracies. Elsewhere, a similar limiting 
role can be played by ruling parties, powerful advisors (in monarchies), or the military.  
Polity IV 
Contract viability 
Contract viability measures the risk of unilateral contract cancellation or modification, as well as confiscation of 
foreign assets according to the reports in the ICRG database. Higher index levels state better contract viability.  
ICRG database 
Corruption 
Corruption variable concerns a country's political system. Increased corruption has adverse effects on business 
and financial environment and increases the risk of foreign investment. This measure implies that power is 
transferred in other measures than ability and therefore can lead to long term destabilizing consequences. 





The measure comes from the World Bank's per capita GNI definition. In this measure, countries with per capita 
GNI of more than $12,276 are considered rich and those between $3,976 and $12,275 are considered as middle 
income. Our dataset does not contain poor countries due to unavailability of information. 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Creditor rights 
Creditor rights index is the sum of four distinct dummy variables. The first dummy variable equals one if 
restrictions are in place in case a debtor needs to file for reorganization. The second dummy becomes one the 
secured creditors are able to seize collaterals in the case of reorganization. The third dummy becomes one if 
secured lenders are given priority over liquidation proceedings. The fourth dummy becomes one if the 
management cannot continue managing during the reorganization process.  
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Efficiency This index measures the country-specific efficiency of debt enforcement, as in Djankov (2008) Djankov (2008) 
GDP Growth 
Rate of growth in GDP of a country expressed in constant local currency. GDP is calculated without deduction 
of depreciations or depletion of natural resources. 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Inflation 
According to the World Bank data definition, it is the annual rate of growth of the implicit GDP deflators, 
computed as GDP in terms of current currency to the GDP in the same local currency in 2003.  
World Bank, World Development Ind. 
Law and order 
Index between 0 and 10 with 0 being the lowest levels of law and order in a country. The measure shows the 
traditional strength of law and order where, according to Knack and Keefer (1995), increases in this measure can 
be interpreted as reliable political institutions, smoother and ordered transition of political power, and better 
functioning legal system.  
ICRG database 
Legal origins 
Four different legal origins are considered including English, French, German and Nordic. A dummy variable is 
assigned to each of these legal origins.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1999)  
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Ln GDP per cap. Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. World Bank, World Development Ind. 
Property rights 
index 
Mainly considers the effectiveness of laws and institutions of a country to maintain and enforce the asset 
ownerships of private owners.  
Heritage Foundation’s database 
Strength of legal 
rights index 
This measure captures the extent to which the rights of both lenders and borrowers are preserved by the legal 
system, and includes eight "collateral law" aspects as well as two "bankruptcy law" aspects.  
World Bank Doing Business database 
Firm Specific variables 
Ave-debt-maturity  Weighted average of the maturities of each of the available debt types.  Capital IQ debt structure database 
Book leverage Total debt (the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets. Compustat 
Cash flow volatility 
Standard deviation over past five years of the normalized operating income (i.e., operating income divided by 
total assets). 
Compustat  
Log of size Natural logarithm of size, measured by a firm's total book assets (COMPUSTAT Item 6). Compustat  
Market to book 
Market value of equity + total debt + preferred stock liquidating value less preferred taxes and investment tax 
credit, all divided by total book assets. 
Securities Daily, Compustat  
Maturity  The long-term debt ratio, which is long-term debt divided by total liabilities. Compustat  
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes (i.e., operating income before depreciation divided by total book assets). Compustat  




Index of formality that ranges from 1 to 7. Quantifies the “formal” procedures associated with collecting on a 
bounced check, worth 5 percent of the country’s annual income per capita, when the defendant has no 
justification and avoids payment.  
Legal formalism developed in Djankov 
et al. (2003) 
Culture 
Religion is used as a proxy for culture similar to Stulz and Williamson (2003). We recognize six distinct 
religions including Atheist, Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Muslim and Orthodox. A dummy for each of these 
religions equals one if majority of a country practice that certain religion.  
Stulz and Williamson (2003) and the 
CIA Factbook (2003). 
Information sharing  
This dummy variable equals one if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country, zero 
otherwise. 
World Bank Doing Business database 
Private credit to 
GDP 
Measures the financial resources that financial corporations provide for the private sector. These facilities can be 
loans, trade credits and other receivable accounts, according to the World Bank definition. Financial 
corporations may include monetary authorities and banks and other financial corporations conditional on the 
availability of data, and include leasing corporations, insurers, private lenders, pension funds and companies 
active in foreign exchange.  
World Bank 
Private registry  Percent of firms and adults that are covered by private registries.  World Bank Doing Business database 
Public registry  Percent of firms and adults that are covered by public registries.  World Bank Doing Business database 
Sovereign ratings Captures the risk of government default and is interpreted as a general indicator of systematic risk.  Fitch Rating Agency 
Stocks traded to 
GDP 
Total value of stocks traded in a given year normalized by that year's GDP. Captures the annual stock market 
liquidity.  






Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for the various variables 
This table reports the summary statistics for the three main samples used in this paper. The All or left-most panel includes all firms in our sample regardless of 
whether or not they are rated. The Rated or middle panel and the Not-rated or right-most panel have firms with credit rating and no credit rating observations during 
our study period, respectively. The mean difference column reports the differences in the means of the rated and not-rated samples. The variables are described in 
Appendix 1. Initial market and book leverage (Lev) is their current counterparts lagged ten years. Data to compute the variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
database for the period from 1985 to 2012. All financial firms (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) are excluded. Variable values are winsorized at the 0.1% level for the 
market (Mkt) and book leverage (Lev) ratios. N is the sample size. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
  
All  
    
Rated 
    
Not-rated  
    Mean Difference 
(N = 58,000) (N = 19,285) (N = 31,809) 
Variable Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median   
Mkt Lev 0.3 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.07** 
Book Lev  0.28 0.2 0.26 0.33 0.17 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.09*** 
Initial Market Lev 0.3 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.23 0.3 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.04*** 
Initial Book Lev 0.48 10.62 0.24 0.62 16.95 0.28 0.43 5.26 0.21 0.19** 
Ln (Size) 4.79 2.26 4.86 6.73 1.55 6.71 3.52 1.85 3.57 3.21** 
Ln (Sales) 5.72 2.38 5.83 7.79 1.55 7.76 4.37 1.96 4.46 3.42*** 
Market to Book 1.33 2.43 0.96 1.19 0.83 0.95 1.43 3.22 0.96 -0.24** 
Profitability 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.37 0.11 0.08* 
Tangibility 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.42 0.24 0.39 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.13** 
Industry Lev 0.3 0.1 0.28 0.32 0.1 0.31 0.28 0.09 0.27 0.04 
CF Volatility 4.13 231.56 0.7 2.81 84.24 1.05 1.86 68.42 0.51 0.95* 
Net debt issuance 0.12 0.47 0.01 0.07 0.45 0.01 25.96 296.74 3.29 -25.89*** 
Net equity issuance 0.06 0.42 0 0.09 0.45 0.01 0.14 0.48 0.01 -0.05** 
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Table 2.2. Rating differences after formation of the quartiles based on credit ratings 
This table reports average credit ratings at event years 0 (quartile formation date), 10 and 20, and tests of their 
differences for quartiles for the full sample of rated firms in Panel A and for the sample of rated firms with at least 20 
years of observations in Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 




Highly Rated Medium Rated Lowly Rated 
0 5.11 8.38 11.61 14.12 
10 5.57 8.93 11.57 13.54 
20 7.06 9.82 11.93 13.09 
Difference         
0 and 10 0.45*** 0.55*** -0.04 -0.57* 
  (4.76) (12.35) (-0.24) (-1.54) 
10 and 20 1.49*** 0.88*** 0.35 -0.44*** 
  (8.5) (24.72) (1.2) (-2.8) 
0 and 20 1.95*** 1.44*** 0.31*** -1.02** 
  (9.29) (26.21) (3.09) (-2.76) 
          




Highly Rated Medium Rated Lowly Rated 
0 3.87 6.11 8.1 11.06 
10 5.28 7.4 9.32 12.19 
20 6.23 8.2 9.71 12.33 
Difference         
0 and 10 1.41*** 1.28*** 1.22*** 1.12*** 
  (6.68) (22.09) (34.38) (3.42) 
10 and 20 0.94*** 0.79*** 0.38*** 0.14* 
  (23.39) (20.75) (13.14) (1.56) 
0 and 20 2.36*** 2.08*** 1.61*** 1.26*** 
  (13.68) (38.11) (46.11) (5.23) 
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Table 2.3. Average treatment effect for firms just above the investment-grade cut-off 
This table measures the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for firms 
that have a credit rating just above the investment grade cut-off (BBB-) compared to firms with a credit rating just 
below the cut-off (BB+). Propensity score matching is performed based on a series of observables including classic 
capital structure determinants (Titman and Parsons, 2008) and credit-rating determinants used in Moody’s KMV 
methodology (Duffie and Singleton, 2003). “Threshold” is the leverage threshold which takes arbitrary values of 10, 
20 and 50. The second column, headed by “total” reports the number of total observations used in the study, and the 
third column shows the number of “treated” observations. The fourth column reports ATE and ATT, where the first 
row in each panel shows ATE and the second row in each panel shows the ATT. The fifth column “POM” shows the 
potential-outcome means. Weibull distribution is used to derive the results. 
 
  ATE and ATET for Leverage Survival   
 Threshold total treatment ATE/ ATT POM p   
50 
400 20 3.55 9.15 0.00 ATE 
400 20 3.67 9.21 0.00 ATT 
20 
383 219 2.1 7.13 0.00 ATE 
383 219 2.12 6.85 0.00 ATT 
10 
307 271 1.83 3.27 0.00 ATE 





Table 2.4. Stability of rating classes and leverages 
This table reports hazard ratio estimates for a sample confined to rated firms using an exponential hazard function. 
The variable of interest is the stability of the leverage ratios and the event occurs when the leverage diverts by more 
than 50% (left panel) and 20% (right panel) from its lagged value over the subsequent 27 years. Rating indicates the 
rating quality and equals the negative of our original rating indicator. Therefore, an increase in the rating variable 
indicates an improvement in rating quality and vice versa. All variables are standardized, except for the dummies. 
Rating, market leverage, size and sales are orthogonalized using the modified Gram-Schmidt procedure. The t-values 
are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Threshold = 50   Threshold = 20 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rating -0.81*** -0.97*** -0.88*** -0.93***   -0.73*** -0.76*** -0.71*** -0.72*** 
  (-16.10) (-16.33) (-13.13) (-13.40)   (-22.12) (-23.62) (-19.43) (-19.84) 
                    
Market Leverage   0.09 0.06 0.14   -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
    -1.09 -0.67 -1.51   (-0.97) (-0.29) (-0.65) (-0.52) 
                    
Ln(Sales) -0.18*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.21***     0.11** 0.07 0.09* 
  (-5.72) (-6.89) (-4.98) (-4.39)     -3.06 -1.78 -2.16 
                    
Ln(Size)   -0.30*** -0.24** -0.24**     -0.12** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
    (-3.93) (-2.87) (-2.86)     (-3.18) (-3.57) (-3.69) 
                    
Profitability   83.19** 84.83** 90.81**     19.65 43.47 43.73 
    -3.03 -2.71 -2.9     -1.26 -1.85 -1.86 
                    
Tangibility   0.01 0 0.08     -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.15*** 
    -0.11 -0.02 -0.84     (-3.81) (-4.38) (-3.55) 
                    
CF Volatility    0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06***     0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    -20.67 -18.14 -18.15     -7.12 -6.59 -6.69 
                    
Dividend Payer     -1.48*** -1.45***       -0.36*** -0.35*** 
      (-4.16) (-4.08)       (-4.19) (-4.11) 
                    
Market to Book     -0.03 -0.06       -0.23*** -0.25*** 
      (-0.24) (-0.50)       (-3.83) (-4.05) 
                    
Industry 
Leverage 
      -2.77**         -0.77 
        (-2.84)         (-1.76) 
                    
Constant -5.33*** -7.29*** -7.02*** -6.34***   -2.67*** -3.08*** -3.26*** -3.02*** 
  (-65.08) (-11.14) (-10.19) (-8.61)   (-83.85) (-8.37) (-6.25) (-5.53) 





Table 2.5. Market leverage differences after formation of the quartiles based on market 
leverage 
This table reports average market leverages at event years 0 (quartile formation date), 10 and 20, and tests of their 
differences for quartiles of rated firms in Panel A and for not-rated firms in Panel B. The t-statistics are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
          
Panel A: Average Market Leverage, Rated Sample 
Event 
Year Very High Leverage High Leverage Medium Leverage Low Leverage 
0 0.49 0.4 0.32 0.23 
10 0.5 0.4 0.31 0.23 
20 0.47 0.38 0.29 0.23 
Difference         
0 and 10 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
  (0.23) (0.05) (-2.12) (-1.11) 
10 and 20 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.00 
  (-4.06) (-9.08) (-6.43) (-0.25) 
0 and 20 -0.02 -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.00 
  (-1.00) (-3.35) (-6.05) (-1.14) 
          
Panel B: Average Market Leverage, Not-rated Sample 
Event 
Year Very High Leverage High Leverage Medium Leverage Low Leverage 
0 0.38 0.24 0.14 0.06 
10 0.46 0.29 0.19 0.13 
20 0.33 0.22 0.17 0.13 
Difference         
0 and 10 0.07** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 
  (2.81) (7.28) (19.47) (10.07) 
10 and 20 -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.01*** 0.00 
  (-13.59) (-28.63) (-3.87) (0.25) 
0 and 20 -0.05** -0.01** 0.03*** 0.07*** 
  (-1.99) (-2.05) (9.08) (10.94) 





Table 2.6. Rating effects on leverage stability 
This table reports hazard ratio estimates using an exponential hazard function. The variable of interest is the stability 
of the leverage ratio and the event occurs when leverage diverts by more than 50% from its lagged value over a 27 
year period. Rated dummy gets a value of 1 if a firm is rated, and zero otherwise. All variables are standardized, except 
for the dummies. Rated dummy, market leverage, size and sales are orthogonalized using the modified Gram-Schmidt 
procedure. The t-value are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
levels, respectively.    
  Threshold = 50 
 
 Threshold = 20 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rated dummy -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.17***  -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
  (-8.03) (-6.37) (-4.72) (-4.64)  (-10.20) (-7.26) (-5.07) (-4.93) 
         
    
Market Lev.    0.47*** 0.42*** 0.42***  
 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 
    (-15.64) (-13.59) (-12.56)  
 (-38.13) (-35.41) (-33.19) 
         
    
Ln(Size)   -0.52*** -0.49*** -0.49***  
 -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 
    (-15.88) (-13.89) (-13.79)  
 (-16.03) (-13.39) (-13.33) 
         
    
Ln(Sales)   -0.10* -0.08* -0.08  
 0.00 0.03 0.04 
    (-2.46) (-1.98) (-1.96)  
 (-0.21) (-1.53) (-1.62) 
         
    
Profitability   -0.31*** -0.44*** -0.44***  
 0.86 0.80 0.80 
    (-4.21) (-3.65) (-3.64)  
 (-1.66) (-0.55) (-0.55) 
         
    
Tangibility   -0.11** -0.09* -0.09*  
 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
    (-2.82) (-2.28) (-2.11)  
 (-6.94) (-6.41) (-5.74) 
         
    
CF Volatility   0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05***  
 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
    (-29.42) (-30.88) (-30.88)  
 (-2.61) (-3.49) (-3.37) 
         
    
Dividend Payer     -0.96*** -0.96***  
  -0.52*** -0.52*** 
      (-6.03) (-6.03)  
  (-10.07) (-9.99) 
         
    
Market to Book     0.00 0.00  
  -0.01 -0.01 
      (-1.18) (-1.18)  
  (-1.02) (-1.02) 
         
    
Industry 
Leverage 
     -0.05  
   -0.23 
       (-0.11)  
   (-1.22) 
         
    
Constant -4.63*** -4.67*** -4.56*** -4.55***  -2.50
*** -2.44*** -2.35*** -2.28*** 
  (-140.12) (-127.53) (-114.14) (-37.02)  (-156.98) (-129.36) (-51.46) (-30.77) 





Table 2.7. Leverage-ratio stability of firms with ratings starts or stops 
This table provides the percentage of firms with leverage fluctuations that cross thresholds of 5%, 10%, 20%, 30% 
and 50% for firms whose credit ratings were started or stopped to be reported by S&P during the time period examined 
herein. The sample includes firms with at least 18 consecutive (annual) observations, at least seven consecutive 
observations in both their rated and their not-rated regimes, and whose ratio of observations in the rated period to the 
not-rated period is between 0.4 and 0.6. The method for calculating fluctuation differences is similar to that explained 
in Table 7. Since only a few firms have more than ten observations in both the rated and not-rated regimes, the 






















Difference T-test Value 
5 
5% 
19.85% 19.47% 0.38%*** 11.18 
10 3.74% 3.48% 0.27%*** 5.07 
5 
10% 
19.71% 19.32% 0.39%*** 13.66 
10 3.73% 3.47% 0.26%*** 29.47 
5 
20% 
19.37% 19.04% 0.33%*** 6.87 
10 3.71% 3.43% 0.28%*** 9.44 
5 
30% 
19.16% 18.77% 0.39%*** 3.97 
10 3.68% 3.40% 0.28%*** 9.38 
5 
50% 
19.85% 19.47% 0.38%*** 3.63 
10 3.73% 3.47% 0.26%*** 7.15 
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Table 2.8.  Fluctuations in leverage-ratios over time 
This table reports the mean proportions of the rated (not-rated) firms whose market leverage ratios deviate by at least 
5%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 50% from their base year ratios at different future points in event time (namely, leads of 5, 
10, 15 and 20 years after the base or event year 0). The proportions are calculated for all the future points in event 
time beginning with the firms in the sample of (not-) rated firms in the 1985 base year, then for those in the 1986 base 
year, and ending with those in the 2005 base year. The last column reports the differences (Dif.) in the mean 
proportions for rated and not-rated firms and ratio tests of their statistical significance. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on conventional critical t-values. Panel A reports 
the results for all firms in each sample. Panel B reports the results for samples of firms where each firm has at least 
20 years of observations ending in 2012.  
Lead Minimum Deviation 
Panel A: All firms in each sample 
Panel B: Survived firms (Firm ≥ 20 
annual observations ending in 2012) 
Rated  Not-rated  Dif. Rated  Not-rated  Dif. 
5 
5% 
47.50% 54.49% 14%*** 50.00% 58.00% 16%*** 
10 38.55% 46.65% 21%*** 42.00% 51.00% 22%*** 
15 26.16% 33.84% 29%*** 29.00% 39.00% 33%*** 
20 13.32% 16.10% 20%** 16.00% 23.00% 43%*** 
5 
10% 
47.21% 54.33% 15%*** 50.00% 58.00% 16%*** 
10 38.39% 46.54% 21%*** 41.00% 51.00% 22%*** 
15 26.07% 33.78% 29%*** 29.00% 39.00% 33%*** 
20 13.28% 16.07% 21%*** 16.00% 22.00% 43%*** 
5 
20% 
46.71% 54.01% 15%*** 49.00% 57.00% 16%*** 
10 38.09% 46.32% 21%*** 41.00% 50.00% 22%*** 
15 25.90% 33.66% 29%*** 29.00% 39.00% 33%*** 
20 13.21% 16.02% 21%** 16.00% 22.00% 43%*** 
5 
30% 
46.27% 52.31% 13%*** 49.00% 56.00% 14%** 
10 37.79% 44.96% 18%*** 41.00% 49.00% 20%*** 
15 25.73% 32.78% 27%*** 29.00% 38.00% 31%*** 
20 13.13% 15.61% 18%*** 16.00% 22.00% 40%*** 
5 
50% 
47.50% 54.49% 14%*** 50.00% 58.00% 16%*** 
10 38.39% 46.54% 21%*** 41.00% 51.00% 22%*** 
15 25.98% 32.85% 26%*** 29.00% 38.00% 30%*** 






Table 2.9. Pooled regression results for leverage ratio determinants 
This table presents the estimation results for the following pooled OLS regression model for samples of firms with reported book asset values: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−10
𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Mkt Lev and Book Lev are market and book leverage, respectively. The regressors are as defined in Appendix 1. Summary results for all firms, and those in the 
rated and not-rated subsamples are reported in Panels A, B and C, respectively. All variables are first winsorized at the upper and lower 0.1%, and then are 
standardized by dividing by their standard deviations. T-values based on clustered standard errors when so indicated in the last three rows of each panel are reported 
in the parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c indicate significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on conventional critical t-values.  Superscript 
d and e indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on size-adjusted critical t-values as reported in table A2.  
Panel A: All firms (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Mkt Lev Book Lev 
Mkt Lev at t-10 
0.23 c,e 0.22 c,e 0.14 c,e   0.14 c,e 0.14 c,e             
(58.35) (33.14) (24.26)   (39.2) (24.41)             
Book Lev at t-10 
            0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
            -0.26) (0.38) (0.29)   (0.13) (0.21) 
Log (Size) 
    -0.34 c,e -0.36 c,e -0.35 c,e -0.35 c,e     -0.28 c,e -0.29 c,e -0.29 c,e -0.29 c,e 
    (-16.33) (-17.16) (-26.61) (-16.66)     (-12.06) (-12.25) (-22.00) (-12.25) 
Log (Sales) 
    0.26 c,e 0.27 c,e 0.26 c,e 0.26 c,e     0.20 c,e 0.20 c,e 0.20 c,e 0.20 c,e 
    (13.2) (13.68) (19.09) (13.08)     (6.48) (6.45) (14.87) (6.45) 
Market to Book 
    -7.59 -7.86 -7.63 c,e -7.61     3.04 c,e 3.03 c,e 3.08 c,e 3.03 c,e 
    (-1.82) (-1.81) (-29.01) (-1.82)     (4.89) (4.85) (11.68) (4.85) 
Profitability 
    -2.91 a -2.96 a -2.86 c,e -2.87 a     -3.59 b -3.57 b -3.58 c,e -3.57 c,e 
    (-2.04) (-2.03) (-23.80) (-2.03)     (-3.14) (-3.12) (-29.75) (-3.12) 
Tangibility 
    0.04 c,e 0.06 c,e 0.04 c,e 0.04 c,e     0.10 c,e 0.10 c,e 0.10 c,e 0.10 c,e 
    (7.08) (10.01) (9.89) (7.14)     (19.89) (19.80) (23.15) (19.80) 
Industry Lev 
    0.29 c,e 0.32 c,e 0.30 c,e 0.29 c,e     0.18 c,e 0.18 c,e 0.17 c,e 0.18 c,e 
    (40.26) (44.49) (73.19) (-40.73)     (20.19) (20.29) (42.24) (20.29) 
CF Volatility 
      0.05 c,e 0.04 c,e 0.05 c,e       0.03 c,e 0.03 c,e 0.03 c,e 
      (9.47) (9.64) (9.67)       (6.84) (5.90) (6.81) 
Dividend Payer 
      -0.00 c,e -0.00 c,d -0.00 c,e       -0.00 b -0.00 a -0.00 b 
      (-5.44) (-4.21) (-4.65)       (-2.93) (-2.15) (-2.90) 
Constant 
0.04 c,e 0.04 c,e 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 c,e -0.03 c,e 0.06 c 0.06 c 0.06 c,e 0.06 c 
(11.02) (>100.00) (0.08) (0.08) (1.42) (0.21) (-6.68) (>-100.00) (3.59) (3.69) (13.71) (3.69) 
Observations 58,000 58,000 57,998 57,998 57,998 57,998 58,000 58,000 57,998 57,998 57,998 57,998 
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.2 0.18 0.2 0.2 0 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Year Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 





Panel B: Rated  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Mkt Lev Book Lev 
Mkt Lev at t-10 
0.30 c,e 0.29 c,e 0.11 c,e   0.10 c,e 0.11 c,e             
(45.42) (24.62) (11.14)   (17.73) (11.31)             
Book Lev at t-10 
            -0.01 -0.01 a 0.01    0.00 0.00 
            (-1.00) (-2.03) (1.72)   (0.69) (1.53) 
Log (Size) 
    -0.30 c,e -0.34 c,e -0.33 c,e -0.33 c,e     -0.41 c,e -0.45 c,e -0.45 c,e -0.45 c,e 
    (-10.47) (-11.36) (-18.70) (-11.18)     (-14.98) (-15.74) (-22.26) (-15.74) 
Log (Sales) 
    0.08 c 0.07 b 0.09 c,e 0.08 c     0.07 b 0.07 b 0.09 c,e 0.07 b 
    (3.51) (3.21) (5.06) (3.34)     (2.8) (2.56) (4.77) (2.56) 
Market to Book 
    -0.27c,e -0.29 c,e -0.26 c,e -0.27 c,e     0.06 b 0.06 b 0.07 c,e 0.06 b 
    (-12.20) (-12.46) (-39.50) (-12.24)     -2.77 -2.89 -9.38 -2.89 
Profitability 
    -0.25 c,e -0.25 c,e -0.25 c,e -0.25 c,e     -0.14 c,e -0.14 c,e -0.15 c,e -0.14 c,e 
    (-14.34) (-14.15) (-35.48) (-14.38)     (-6.30) (-6.36) (-18.50) (-6.36) 
Tangibility 
    -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 c,e -0.03 a     0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
    (-1.83) (-1.23) (-6.41) (-2.15)     (0.55) (0.27) (-1.67) (0.27) 
Industry Lev 
    0.21 c,e 0.23 c,e 0.23 c,e 0.21 c,e     0.16 c,e 0.16 c,e 0.16 c,e 0.16 c,e 
    (17.71) (24.66) (35.91) (18.43)     (8.88) (9.13) (22.42) (9.12) 
CF Volatility 
      0.07 c,e 0.07 c,e 0.07 c,e       0.04 c,e 0.04 c,e 0.04 c,e 
      (10.07) (8.53) (9.98)       (6.40) (4.74) (6.50) 
Dividend Payer 
      0.00 0.00 0.00       0.00 c,e 0.00 c,e 0.00 c,e 
      (1.05) (1.54) (1.46)       (4.43) (5.32) (4.40) 
Constant 
-0.09 c,e -0.09 c,e -0.06 c,e -0.06 c,e -0.06 c,e -0.06 c,e -0.13 c,e -0.13 c,e -0.10 c,e -0.11 c,e -0.11 c,e -0.11 c,e 
(-13.27) (>-100.00) (-34.15) (-25.62) (-11.05) (-23.94) (-20.07) (>-100.00) (-80.89) (-32.61) (-16.94) (-32.57) 
Observations 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 19,285 
R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.21 
Year Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Clusters NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 





                          
Panel C: Not-rated  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Mkt Lev  Book Lev 
Mkt Lev at t-10 
0.17 c,e 0.15 c,e 0.12 c,e   0.12 c,e 0.12 c,e             
(31.63) (20.04) (16.56)   (23.40) (16.49)             
Book Lev at t-10 
            0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
            (0.20) (0.22) (0.39)   (0.28) (0.39) 
Log (Size) 
    -0.40 c,e -0.42 c,e -0.41 c,e -0.41 c,e     -0.36 c,e -0.37 c,e -0.37 c,e -0.37 c,e 
    (-20.87) (-22.28) (-29.42) (-21.50)     (-16.86) (-17.68) (-27.64) (-17.61) 
Log (Sales) 
    0.26 c,e 0.27 c,e 0.25 c,e 0.26 c,e     0.15 c,e 0.15 c,e 0.15 c,e 0.15 c,e 
    (14.00) (14.32) (17.67) (13.99)     (5.19) (5.19) (11.19) (5.17) 
Market to Book 
    -6.38 a -6.47 a -6.54 c,e -6.40 a     3.30 c,d 3.27 c,d 3.27 c,e 3.27 c,d 
    (-1.96) (-1.96) (-19.13) (-1.97)     (4.01) (3.99) (9.9)2 (3.98) 
Profitability 
    -2.15 a -2.15 a -2.05 c,e -2.13 a     -3.56 b -3.52 b -3.52 c,e -3.52 b 
    (-1.93) (-1.94) (-13.05) (-1.92)     (-3.11) (-3.10) (-23.17) (-3.10) 
Tangibility 
    0.05 c,e 0.06 c,e 0.05 c,e 0.05 c,e     0.08 c,e 0.08 c,e 0.08 c,e 0.08 c,e 
    (6.23) (6.73) (8.76) (6.24)     (13.62) (12.68) (13.76) (12.68) 
Industry Lev 
    0.23 c,e 0.25 c,e 0.25 c,e 0.23 c,e     0.13 c,e 0.13 c,e 0.13 c,e 0.13 c,e 
    (39.17) (37.05) (45.11) (39.05)     (17.64) (17.65) (23.88) (17.57) 
CF Volatility 
      0.07 c,e 0.06 c,e 0.07 c,e       0.08 c,e 0.08 c,e 0.08 c,e 
      (5.02) (5.24) (4.95)       (4.80) (6.63) (4.80) 
Dividend Payer 
      -0.00 c,d -0.00 c -0.00 c,d       -0.00 a -0.00 b -0.00 a 
      (-3.94) (-3.67) (-4.01)       (-2.44) (-3.20) (-2.44) 
Constant 
0.04 c,e 0.04 c,e 0.01 0.02 0.02 b 0.02 -0.04 c,e -0.04 c,e 0.09 c,e 0.09 c 0.09 c,e 0.09 c 
(8.17) (>-100.00) (0.5) (0.6) (2.58) (0.64) (-8.27) (>-100.00) (3.74) (3.88) (14.15) (3.88) 
Observations 31,809 31,809 31,807 31,807 31,807 31,807 31,809 31,809 31,807 31,807 31,807 31,807 
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Year Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Clusters NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES 







Table 2.10. Fixed effects regression results for leverage ratio determinants  
This table reports the estimation results for regression model (1) as specified in table 2 without the initial leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−10
𝑙 ) regressor and with and without firm 
fixed effects for all firms and those in the rated and not-rated subsamples. Mkt Lev and Book Lev are market and book leverage, respectively. The regressors are 
as defined in Appendix 1. All variables are first winsorized at the upper and lower 0.1%, and then are standardized by dividing by their standard deviations. The t-
values based on clustered standard errors when so indicated in the last two rows of each column are reported in the parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c indicate 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively, based on conventional critical t-values.  Superscript d and e indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on size-adjusted critical t-values as reported in table A2. N is the number of observations. All the regressions reflect firm and 
year clustering. 
Variables 
Panel A: All firms (N=57,998) Panel B: Rated firms (N=19,285) Panel C: Not-rated firms (N=31,807) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mkt Lev Book Lev Mkt Lev Book Lev Mkt Lev Book Lev 
Log (Size) 
-0.36 c,e -0.17 c,e -0.29 c,e -0.30 c,e -0.34 c,e -0.20 c,e -0.45 c,e -0.27 c,e -0.42 c,e -0.19 c,e -0.37 c,e -0.30 c,e 
(-11.82) (-3.46) (-8.04) (-5.92) (-7.56) (-3.59) (-7.56) (-4.00) (-14.78) (-4.05) (-11.10) (-5.87) 
Log (Sales) 
0.27 c,e 0.22 c,e 0.20 c,e 0.22 c,e 0.07 0.17 b 0.07 0.07 0.27 c,e 0.15 c,e 0.15 c,e 0.16 b,e 
(8.66) (4.77) (5.19) (4.37) (1.68) (3.07) (1.18) (1.14) (9.62) (3.70) (4.47) (3.26) 
Market to Book 
-7.86 a -14.40 c,e 3.03 -1.56 -0.29 c,e -0.21 c,e 0.06 b 0.03 a -6.47 a -12.05 c,e 3.27 -1.01 
(-2.09) (-4.58) (1.47) (-1.40) (-12.37) (-8.17) (3.18) (1.69) (-2.27) (-4.09) (1.55) (-0.75) 
Profitability 
-2.96 a -5.67 c,e -3.57 c,e -4.44 c,e -0.25 c,e -0.25 c,e -0.14 c,e -0.17 c,e -2.15 a -4.56 c,e -3.52 c,e -4.34 c,e 
(-2.13) (-6.19) (-4.01) (-5.93) (-13.53) (-10.97) (-6.64) (-8.62) (-2.00) (-5.31) (-3.82) (-5.31) 
Tangibility 
0.06 c,e 0.13 c,e 0.10 c,e 0.09 c,e -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.06 c,e 0.18 c,e 0.08 c,e 0.14 c,e 
(5.13) (6.20) (9.03) (4.05) (-0.97) (1.05) (0.15) (-0.64) (3.99) (6.61) (5.60) (4.92) 
Industry Lev 
0.32 c,e 0.30 c,e 0.18 c,e 0.16 c,e 0.23 c,e 0.25 c,e 0.16 c,e 0.13 c,e 0.25 c,e 0.26 c,e 0.13 c,e 0.16 c,e 
(26.46) (21.07) (17.25) (13.09) (13.16) (12.95 (8.35) (6.11) (16.49) (12.83) (10.17) (9.71) 
CF Volatility 
0.05 c,e 0.02 c,e 0.03 c,e 0.01 0.07 c,e 0.04 b 0.04 a 0.01 0.07 b -0.02 0.08 b -0.02 
(4.42) (3.49) (3.41) (0.71) (3.47) (2.86) (2.27) (0.83) (2.97) (-0.43) (2.57) (0.52) 
Dividend Payer 
-0.00 a -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 a 0.00 a 0.00 -0.00 a 0.00 a 0.00 0.00 a 
(-2.44) (-0.67) (-1.43) (-0.74) (0.46) (-2.19) (2.47) (1.10) (-2.47) (1.65) (1.45) (1.76) 
Constant 
0.00 0.00 0.06 a 0.08 a -0.06 c,e -0.05 -0.11 c,e -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09 a 0.07 
(0.08) (0.10) (2.14) (2.38) (-4.09) (-1.62) (-6.36) (-0.75) (0.63) (0.86) (2.45) (1.59) 
R-squared 0.18 0.71 0.11 0.7 0.43 0.8 0.21 0.75 0.16 0.7 0.14 0.71 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm Fixed Effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 





Table 2.11. Variance decomposition  
This table reports the contributions of each traditional variable (as described in Appendix 1) and fixed-effect factors to the explanatory power of the regression 
models for market and book leverages whose results are reported in tables 2 and 3. The contribution of each factor in explaining the total variation in the dependent 
variable (market or book leverage) is calculated by dividing the Type III sum of squares of that variable by the total sum of squares of all variables.  For example, 
in col. (4) for market leverage, 4.7% of the “explained sum of squares” comes from the market to book (M/B) ratio. Panels A, B and C report the contribution for 
the full sample and the rated and not-rated samples, respectively. Firm FE is the firm-fixed effect, Year FE is the year fixed effect and Industry FE (based on the 
two-digit SIC code) is the industry fixed effect. N is the number of observations. The t-values are reported in the parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Superscripts d and e indicate the sample-size adjusted levels of significance for 5% and 1%, respectively, 
as calculated in Table 2.  
Panel A: All firms  Mkt Lev (N = 58,000) Book Lev (N = 58,000) 
Parameter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm FE 
1 c,e    0.983 c,e   0.959 c,e   0.951 c,e 0.951 c,e 1 c,e   0.956 c,e   0.912 c,e   0.894 c,e 0.893 c,e 
(21.14)   (21.49)   (19.47)   (19.03) (18.91) (23.73)   (24.91)   (21.37)   (19.04) (18.99) 
Year FE 
  1 c,e 0.017 c,e 0.113 c,e 0.016 c,e 0.107 c,e 0.006 c,e 0.006 c,e   1 c,e 0.044 c,e 0.166 c,e 0.045 c,e 0.068 c,e 0.005 c 0.005 c 
  (06.61) (13.79) (06.60) (12.40) (07.05) (04.32) (04.32)   (20.88) (43.02) (19.21) (39.65) (11.15) (03.89) (03.89) 
M/B 
      0.047 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.053 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.002 c,e       0.314 c,e 0.022 c,e 0.224 c,e 0.027 c,e 0.027 c,e 
      (70.87) (41.14) (90.89) (40.05) (40.03)       (45.60) (05.56) (55.35) (59.60) (59.42) 
Profitability 
      0.153 c,e 0.011 c,e 0.107 c,e 0.01 c,e 0.01 c,e       0.129 c,e 0.012 c,e 0.097 c,e 0.015 c,e 0.015 c,e 
      (33.28) (09.49) (83.90) (82.30) (82.32)       (87.86) (74.68) (14.65) (06.56) (06.48) 
Tangibility 
      0.565 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.266 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.003 c,e       0.279 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.057 c,e 0.005 c,e 0.005 c,e 
      (59.90) (52.68) (56.22) (63.87) (63.94)       (40.53) (67.14) (42.83) (95.56) (95.24) 
Log(Sale) 
      0.049 c,e 0.004 c,e 0.008 c,e 0.004 c,e 0.004 c,e       0.053 c,e 0.004 c,e 0.007 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.003 c,e 
      (74.01) (81.99) (14.31) (74.78) (74.76)       (59.00) (79.77) (30.58) (64.61) (64.63) 
Log(Size) 
      0.074 c,e 0.005 c,e 0.014 c,e 0.004 c,e 0.004 c,e       0.059 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.007 c,e 0.001 c,e 0.001 c,e 
      (13.23) (02.84) (24.15) (82.66) (82.62)       (76.60) (41.55) (29.08) (24.29) (24.32) 
CF Volatility 
          0.008 c,e 0.000 0.000           0.017 c,e 0.000 c,e 0.000 c,e 
          (13.47) (00.13) (00.13)           (70.83) (08.69) (08.69) 
Dividend Payer 
          0.101 c,e 0.000 0.000           0.106 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.003 c,e 
          (72.28) (00.36) (00.35)           (53.09) (58.15) (57.93) 
Mkt Lev Mean 
          0.297 c,e 0.02 c,e 0.02 c,e           0.41 c,e 0.047 c,e 0.047 c,e 
          (08.71) (80.40) (79.74)           (48.40) (56.46) (56.54) 
Industry FE 
          0.038 c,e   0.000           0.006 c,e   0.000 
          (65.27)   (00.09)           (27.31)   (00.25) 




 Panel B: 
Rated firms 
Mkt Lev (N = 19,285) Book Lev (N = 19,285) 
Parameter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm FE 
1 c,e   0.980 c,e   0.952 c,e   0.954 c,e 0.954 c,e 1 c,e   0.961 c,e   0.829 c,e   0.824 c,e 0.824 c,e 
(33.09)   (33.89)   (27.00)   (25.82) (25.93) (40.91)   (43.87)   (25.57)   (22.46) (22.52) 
Year FE 
  1 b 0.02 c,e 0.214 c,e 0.02 c,e 0.314 c,e 0.007 0.007   1 c,e 0.039 c,e 0.099 c,e 0.048 c,e 0.153 c,e 0.008a 0.008a 
  (02.86) (06.45) (04.47) (05.32) (08.86) (01.77) (01.77)   (05.74) (16.44) (06.30) (13.51) (11.53) (02.10) (02.10) 
M/B 
      0.00 0.002 c,e 0.003 a 0.002 c,e 0.002 c,e       0.253 c,e 0.035 c,e 0.187 c,e 0.035 c,e 0.035 c,e 
      (00.01) (10.36) (02.24) (14.30) (14.30)       (20.19) (56.67) (65.45) (28.10) (28.10) 
Profitability 
      0.155 c,e 0.019 c,e 0.064 c,e 0.018 c,e 0.018 c,e       0.413 c,e 0.086 c,e 0.264 c,e 0.092 c,e 0.092 c,e 
      (84.27) (28.35) (46.99) (15.90) (15.90)       (84.47) (33.06) (17.27) (94.32) (94.32) 
Tangibility 
      0.055 c,e 0.005 c,e 0.006 c,e 0.003 c,e 0.003 c,e       0.061 0.001 c,e 0.011 c,e 0.00 0.00 
      (29.59) (32.52) (04.58) (19.25) (19.25)       (00.82) (05.44) (21.78) (00.03) (00.03) 
Log(Sale) 
      0.139 c,e 0.00 0.073 c,e 0.00 0.00       0.059 c,e 0.00 0.031 c,e 0.00 0.00 
      (75.53) (00.98) (53.31) (01.78) (01.78)       (97.94) (02.56) (59.96) (01.85) (01.85) 
Log(Size) 
      0.437 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.23 c,e 0.001 c,e 0.001 c,e       0.115 c,e 0.00 0.054 c,e 0.00 0.00 
      (36.87) (10.71) (68.51) (07.30) (07.30)       (90.32) (02.39) (06.47) (00.51) (00.51) 
CF 
Volatility 
          0.003 a 0.000 0.000           0.033 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.002 c,e 
          (02.50) (00.08) (00.08)           (64.59) (12.68) (12.68) 
Dividend 
Payer 
          0.186 c,e 0.00 0.00           0.136 c,e 0.004 c,e 0.004 c,e 
          (36.58) (00.64) (00.64)           (66.66) (27.80) (27.80) 
Mkt Lev 
Mean 
          0.121 c,e 0.014 c,e 0.014 c,e           0.128 c,e 0.033 c,e 0.033 c,e 
          (88.98) (87.15) (87.15)           (50.94) (15.48) (15.48) 
Industry FE 
          0.000              0.002    
          (00.00)               (04.62)     




 Panel C: 
Not-rated 
firms 
Mkt Lev (N = 31,809) Book Lev (N = 31,809) 
Parameter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Firm FE 
1 c,e   0.976 c,e   0.916 c,e   0.909 c,e 0.909 c,e 1 c,e   0.944 c,e   0.883 c,e   0.881 c,e 0.881 c,e 
(17.29)   (17.63)   (14.85)   (15.39) (15.38) (17.73)   (18.55)   (16.94)   (16.58) (16.62) 
Year FE 
  1 c 0.024 c,e 0.115 b 0.02 c,e 0.077  0.01 0.01   1 c,e 0.056 c,e 0.2 c,e 0.049 c,e 0.064 b 0.007 a 0.007 a 
  (03.76) (07.33) (03.02) (05.57) (01.94) (02.71) (02.71)   (10.58) (18.58) (08.83) (15.86) (03.14) (02.28) (02.28) 
M/B 
      0.136 c,e 0.007 c,e 0.14 c,e 0.007 c,e 0.007 c,e       0.218 c,e 0.022 c,e 0.21 c,e 0.025 c,e 0.025 c,e 
      (93.53) (51.64) (90.96) (49.91) (49.91)       (50.17) (81.42) (67.48) (03.96) (03.96) 
Profitability 
      0.166 c,e 0.018 c,e 0.149 c,e 0.015 c,e 0.015 c,e       0.102 c,e 0.015 c,e 0.111 c,e 0.017 c,e 0.017 c,e 
      (14.06) (30.37) (96.78) (10.23) (10.23)       (17.17) (24.55) (41.66) (38.20) (38.20) 
Tangibility 
      0.298 c,e 0.011 c,e 0.245 c,e 0.011 c,e 0.011 c,e       0.125 c,e 0.013 c,e 0.065 c,e 0.014 c,e 0.014 c,e 
      (04.15) (81.44) (59.35) (78.65) (78.65)       (43.32) (10.90) (83.41) (14.98) (14.98) 
Log(Sale) 
      0.044 c,e 0.01 c,e 0.013 c,e 0.009 c,e 0.009 c,e       0.133 c,e 0.009 c,e 0.057 c,e 0.008 c,e 0.008 c,e 
      (29.87) (72.09) (08.15) (62.65) (62.65)       (51.88) (79.46) (73.32) (63.69) (63.69) 
Log(Size) 
      0.241 c,e 0.016 c,e 0.135 c,e 0.013 c,e 0.013 c,e       0.222 c,e 0.009 c,e 0.102 c,e 0.007 c,e 0.007 c,e 
      (65.37) (13.98) (88.18) (95.01) (95.01)       (54.14) (71.99) (29.88) (53.92) (53.92) 
CF 
Volatility 
          0.047 c,e 0.002 c,e 0.002 c,e           0.033 c,e 0.001 c,e 0.001 c,e 
          (30.89) (14.35) (14.35)           (42.08) (07.40) (07.40) 
Dividend 
Payer 
          0.048 c,e 0.000 0.000           0.106 c,e 0.005 c,e 0.005 c,e 
          (31.01) (00.11) (00.11)           (34.85) (38.11) (38.11) 
Mkt Lev 
Mean 
          0.131 c,e 0.025 c,e 0.025 c,e           0.252 c,e 0.035 c,e 0.035 c,e 
          (85.31) (85.74) (85.74)           (21.95) (87.83) (87.83) 
Industry FE 
          0.015 c,e              0.000    
          (10.06)               (00.19)     





Table 3.1. Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for firms in our samples. 
Variable construction is explained in detail in Appendix 1. N is the number of observations. 
 
Full Sample (N = 32053) 
 
Survived Sample (N = 24880) 
  Mean S.D. Median 
 
Mean S.D. Median 
Heterogeneity 0.68 0.27 0.66 
 
0.65 0.27 0.61 
Initial heterogeneity 0.69 0.27 0.7 
 
0.66 0.27 0.65 
Market leverage 0.26 0.25 0.19 
 
0.27 0.25 0.2 
Market to book ratio 2.14 10.43 1.16 
 
1.76 7.17 1.11 
Firm size 4.53 2.43 4.71 
 
4.89 2.32 5.06 
Sales 5.37 2.64 5.63 
 
5.79 2.49 6.04 
Cash flow volatility 1.29 2.63 0.61 
 
1.4 2.75 0.68 
Profitability 0.01 0.32 0.1 
 
0.06 0.24 0.11 
Tangibility 0.26 0.24 0.18 
 
0.28 0.23 0.2 
Rating dummy 0.29 0.45 0 
 
0.34 0.47 0 
Dividend payer 0.26 0.44 0 
 
0.31 0.46 0 
Tax rate 0.21 0.13 0.24 
 
0.22 0.13 0.28 
Maturity 0.68 0.36 0.85 
 
0.72 0.34 0.88 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.14 0.33 0.03 
 
0.14 0.29 0.03 
Industry heterogeneity 0 1 0.2 
 
0 1 0.2 
Term spread 0.15 0.01 0.02 
 
0.15 0.01 0.02 
Inflation 0.02 0.01 0.03 
 
0.02 0.01 0.03 
GDP per capita 45096 4193 46443 
 
44869 4220 46443 
GDP growth 0.02 0.17 0.02   0.02 0.17 0.02 
Short interest rate vol. 0.25 0.18 0.23  0.25 0.18 0.23 
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Table 3.2. Determinants of the stability of debt structures 
This table reports the hazard regression results where the dependent variable shows the survival of different measures of debt-type structures. The 
hazard distribution used in this table is exponential. The variable construction is explained in Appendix 1. All variables are standardized, except 
for the dummies. T-values are reported in the parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 











Tau 20%  
Kendall's 





Market Leverage -0.32** -0.05 -0.31*** -0.24* 0.13 -0.56*** 0.22 -0.51*** -0.00 
(-2.46) (-0.39) (-3.03) (-1.96) (1.06) (-2.95) (1.19) (-2.69) (-0.02) 
Market to Book -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.01 
(-1.33) (-0.59) (-1.03) (-0.89) (-1.03) (0.82) (-0.60) (1.37) (0.37) 
Log(Size) -0.07* -0.07* -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.07* -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
(-1.86) (-1.74) (-3.61) (-2.92) (-1.81) (-0.65) (-0.10) (0.06) (0.01) 
Log(Sales) 0.01 0.07* 0.05* 0.05 0.08** 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 
(0.38) (1.78) (1.86) (1.56) (2.15) (1.00) (0.61) (0.12) (0.53) 
CF Volatility 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
(2.64) (2.17) (2.21) (3.38) (2.55) (1.10) (0.87) (0.89) (-0.71) 
Profitability 0.27** 0.06 0.28*** 0.25** 0.13 0.24 0.44** 0.41** 0.31* 
(2.01) (0.44) (2.67) (2.17) (1.12) (1.48) (2.23) (2.22) (1.75) 
Tangibility -0.04 -0.04 -0.40*** -0.09 -0.16 -0.19 -0.07 -0.17 -0.17 
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-3.67) (-0.78) (-1.27) (-1.04) (-0.47) (-0.91) (-0.97) 
Dividend Payer -0.05 0.04 -0.13** -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 
(-0.80) (0.64) (-2.30) (-0.63) (-0.32) (-1.27) (-0.55) (-0.98) (-1.17) 
Rated Dummy 0.16** 0.32*** 0.07 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.13 0.32*** 0.08 0.13 
(2.17) (4.39) (1.10) (2.77) (2.78) (1.25) (3.17) (0.70) (1.26) 
Marginal Tax Rate -0.30 -0.19 -1.10*** -0.59* -0.41 -1.20** -0.50 -1.71*** -1.07** 
(-1.01) (-0.65) (-4.49) (-1.92) (-1.27) (-2.45) (-1.03) (-3.43) (-2.23) 
Maturity 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.08 
(0.92) (0.48) (-0.22) (0.85) (0.95) (0.40) (0.26) (0.72) (0.67) 
Idio. Volatility 0.06 0.21* -0.49*** -0.24* -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 
(0.40) (1.82) (-4.72) (-1.66) (-0.63) (-0.41) (-0.11) (-0.42) (-0.78) 
Industry  
Heterogeneity 
-0.01 -0.07* 0.06* 0.01 -0.09** -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 
(-0.26) (-1.67) (1.81) (0.22) (-1.96) (-1.07) (-0.45) (0.36) (-0.64) 
Term spread -0.03 -0.04 0.29*** -0.06 -0.09** -0.06 -0.15** -0.08 -0.10 
(-0.61) (-0.81) (7.92) (-1.30) (-2.01) (-0.88) (-2.28) (-1.29) (-1.49) 
Inflation 4.26 -0.34 6.32** 7.88** 0.96 5.89 1.35 7.18 -0.96 
(1.13) (-0.09) (2.22) (2.10) (0.23) (1.09) (0.25) (1.35) (-0.18) 
GDP per Capita 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
(4.15) (5.92) (6.79) (4.72) (4.86) (3.73) (5.87) (2.92) (4.90) 
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GDP Growth -0.06*** -0.01 0.02 -0.04** -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
(-2.81) (-0.45) (0.96) (-2.06) (-0.73) (-1.28) (-1.01) (-1.53) (-0.42) 
Constant -2.93*** -3.70*** -3.15*** -2.44*** -2.65*** -2.99*** -3.85*** -2.58*** -3.36*** 
(-7.27) (-9.14) (-11.82) (-6.32) (-6.63) (-5.62) (-7.23) (-4.99) (-6.39) 






Table 3.3. Clustering results  
This table reports the clustering results for firm-1year (upper panel) and firm-12year (lower panel) samples. 
The Stata command 𝑘𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠  is used to do the clustering, where the Calinski/Harabasz stopping rule 
determines the optimal number of clusters. The reported percentages are the means for each of the clusters 
of the ratio of the value of each debt type to the total value of a firm’s debt. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix 1.  
  Panel A: Clustering results for Firm-1Year 
Cluster 





Paper Lease Credit Loans Debt 
1 2.30% 2.10% 42.90% 44.60% 4.80% 0.50% 2.60% 
2 0.00% 91.40% 1.90% 3.10% 2.60% 0.00% 1.10% 
3 1.50% 3.40% 6.00% 12.70% 9.80% 0.20% 66.50% 
4 0.10% 2.20% 9.40% 3.60% 83.30% 0.00% 1.40% 
5 0.10% 2.00% 84.50% 4.40% 7.70% 0.00% 1.30% 
6 3.60% 2.50% 7.90% 43.80% 38.70% 0.30% 3.40% 
7 0.90% 1.90% 3.30% 89.40% 2.50% 0.10% 1.80% 
  Panel B: Clustering results for Firm-12Year 
1 0.40% 2.10% 3.40% 87.90% 4.00% 0.10% 2.30% 
2 2.20% 2.90% 23.80%  50.80% 15.30% 0.30% 4.70% 
3 0.00% 84.30% 3.10% 5.40% 5.30% 0.00% 1.90% 
4 0.20% 2.50% 81.80% 8.20% 5.50% 0.00% 1.80% 
5 0.00% 2.00% 4.20% 7.80% 83.70% 0.00% 2.40% 
6 0.70% 3.90% 5.80% 12.20% 11.70% 0.10% 65.60% 





Table 3.4. Determinants of the main debt type  
This table reports the results of logit regressions for various potential determinants of the selection of each of the seven debt types as the main debt 
type in a firm’s debt structure. Each of the seven dependent variables is a binary variable that is equal to one if the specific debt type is the largest 
debt type for the firm in any given year, and is equal to zero otherwise. The logistic specification uses firm fixed-effects and year dummies. Variable 
construction is explained in Appendix 1. +, * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, based on t-tests.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




 Term loan   Notes  Capital lease Trust Other 
 debt 
                
Market Leverage 0.46
* 0.49*** 0.77*** 1.01*** 0.13* 1.46** 0.24*** 
(2.01) (9.22) (15.98) (16.26) (2.46) (2.95) (4.86) 
Market to Book -3.84+ 0.11 0.02 1.16*** 0.73* -19.9 0.29 
(-1.85) (0.33) (0.05) (3.55) (2.25) (-1.24) (0.86) 
Log (Size)  -3.90*** -1.84*** 0.38* 0.79*** 0.96*** 2.89 0.79*** 
(-4.20) (-8.95) (2.31) (4.09) (4.97) (1.44) (4.38) 
Log (Sales)  7.83*** 2.45*** -0.02 0.19 -0.02 0.17 0.60*** 
(6.53) (10.73) (-0.12) (1.08) (-0.11) (0.07) (3.53) 
CF Volatility -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.14+ -0.14 -0.36 0.03** 
(-1.35) (0.00) (1.36) (-2.66) (-1.17) (-1.14) (2.35) 
Profitability -0.86 0.00 0.09 -0.18** -0.08 2.23 -0.17* 
(-1.35) (0.00) (1.36) (-2.66) (-1.17) (-1.14) (-2.35) 
Tangibility 0.00 0.03 0.36*** -0.26* 0.53*** 0.97 0.25** 
(0.01) (0.32) (4.02) (-2.33) (5.15) (0.94) (2.58) 
Rated dummy 1.88* -0.40** -0.03 1.77*** 0.31* -1.14 -0.27+ 
(2.57) (-2.71) (-0.24) (9.51) (2.14) (-0.42) (-1.89) 
Dividend Payer 0.23 -0.03 -0.32** -0.13 -0.06 -1.59 0.07 
-0.61 (-0.22) (-3.16) (-1.02) (-0.51) (-1.57) -0.61 
Tax rate 0.82** 0.17** 0.11* -0.09 -0.14* -0.09 -0.10+ 
(2.87 -3.04 -2.18 (-1.37) (-2.41) (-0.18) (-1.76) 
Maturity index -0.42** -0.27*** 0.09** 0.32*** 0.07+ 1.06+ 0.03 
(-2.84) (-7.72) -2.68 -8.76 -1.87 -1.79 -0.69 
Idio. Volatility 0.05 0.11** -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.26 0.07+ 
(0.17 (2.93) (-1.06) -0.32 -0.82 (-1.06) -1.92 
Industry  Heterogeneity -0.21 -0.25*** -0.24*** 0.02 -0.02 -1.77*** -0.11* 
(-1.51) (-5.53) (-5.63) -0.25 (-0.30) (-4.05) (-2.37) 
Term Spread 0.60 0.05 0.00 0.71** 0.76*** -8.55+ 0.87*** 
(1.16) (0.23) (0.01) (2.96) (3.77) (-1.68) (4.36) 
Inflation Rate 0.27 0.44*** 0.04 0.09 0.17+ 1.42 -0.15+ 
(1.18) (4.11) (0.47) (0.81) (1.81) (1.17) (-1.79) 
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GDP per cap -0.04 -1.08*** -0.77** -0.32 -0.48+ -14.05+ -0.08 
(-0.05) (-3.62) (-2.82) (-0.91) (-1.66) (-1.74) (-0.28) 
GDP growth -0.07 -0.02 0.11* 0.05 0.09 0.52 -0.02 
(-0.47) (-0.29) (1.98) (0.65) (1.46) (0.56) (-0.29) 
Short interest Vol. 0.31 -0.25 -0.14 0.00 0.34+ -1.71 -0.48** 
(0.66) (-1.15) (-0.80) (0.01) (1.81) (-0.54) (-2.72) 
Observations 1630 12091 12130 8553 9617 443 10781 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.03 
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Table 3.5. Percent of firms with debt structures with more than x% in one debt type 
This table reports the percent of sample firms with more than x% of one debt-type in their debt structures. The first column presents the different 
levels of x using firm-1year and firm-12year observations. The Base case columns report the results for all firms and the columns headed by 
ML>10%, ML>20% and ML>50% report the results when firms with less than 10, 20 and 50 percent market leverage have been removed, 
respectively. For example, in the third row of the firm-1year panel, 90% of the firms have more than 50% of their debt structure consisting of one 
single debt type based on firm-1year observations. Based on the corresponding number in the firm-12year sample, we observe that 87% of the firms 
have more than 50% of their debt structure in one single debt type.  
Percent of sample firms with more than x% of one debt-type in their debt-type structures 
    Firm-1year   Firm-12year 
>x%   




10% ML > 20% ML > 50% 
20%   100% 100% 100% 100%   100% 100% 100% 100% 
30%   100% 100% 100% 100%   100% 100% 100% 100% 
50%   90% 89% 88% 90%   87% 85% 85% 88% 
70%   64% 58% 57% 63%   57% 51% 50% 57% 
90%   42% 34% 32% 38%   33% 25% 24% 30% 
Observations  32053 22853 16586 6184  5903 3822 2933 1316 
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Table 3.6. Treatment effects estimates 
This table reports the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
using a Weibull distribution for a matched sample of firms with and without credit ratings. Firms are 
matched using propensity score matching using a series of observables including classic capital structure 
determinants (Titman and Parsons, 2008) and credit-rating determinants used in Moody’s KMV 
methodology (Duffie and Singleton, 2003). “POM” reports the potential-outcome means. The p-values are 
reported in the parentheses.  
Variable Observations Treatment ATE ATT POM 
Debt Heterogeneity, 20% 3795 1910 -0.52  4.08 
    (-0.05)  (0.00) 
     -1.18 5.44 
     (-0.34) (0.00) 
Debt Heterogeneity, 10% 3057 1789 -0.9  3.42 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
     -1.1 3.95 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
Largest Debt Type 8392 2740 -2.11  12.6 
    (0.00)  -0.09 
     -0.64 4.95 
     (-0.28) (0.00) 
Debt Type Ranks - All seven 2165 1407 -0.64  2.6 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
     -0.94 3.18 
     (-0.09) (0.00) 
Debt Type Ranks - First two 2165 1407 -0.64  2.6 
    (0.00)  (0.00) 
     -0.94 3.18 






Table 3.7. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for a sample of firms in 42 countries. Variables of interest are selected from 
three broad categories including institutional, macroeconomic and firm-specific determinants. Column 1 shows the 
number of observations and column 2 reports the mean for each variable. Columns 3-6 report the variable values in 
the 5th, 50th, 95th and 100th percentiles, respectively, and the last column reports the standard deviation. The first row 
measures maturity as the ratio of long term to total debt similar to Fan et al (2012) and therefore varies between 0 and 
1. The second row measures maturity similar to Saretto et al (2013) as the weighted-average maturity over different 
types of debt. The creditor rights index is a measure between 0 and 4 where 4 stands for the strongest creditor rights. 
Construction of each variable is described in Appendix 1. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables N Mean P5 Median P95 Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
Maturity 206575 0.52 0.00 0.56 1.00 5.67 0.35 
Ave-debt-maturity 128070 3.01 0.00 2.13 8.81 153.44 3.24 
Creditor rights 206575 1.86 1.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 0.99 
Efficiency 206575 75.71 39.80 85.80 95.90 96.10 22.15 
Log (GDP per capita) 206564 10.06 7.88 10.50 10.87 11.52 0.99 
Inflation 204879 2.16 -0.72 2.12 5.41 22.56 2.03 
GDP growth 206575 2.89 -2.62 2.45 9.30 15.24 3.30 
Public registry 135210 6.56 0.00 0.00 42.40 96.00 14.25 
Private Bureau 135210 63.86 0.00 76.20 100.00 100.00 39.23 
Information sharing  206575 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.03 
Corruption 206575 3.74 2.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 1.05 
Private cred. To GDP 187866 142.62 46.12 157.83 199.87 232.10 47.70 
Stocks trad. to GDP 191942 118.67 13.72 90.58 309.65 434.87 90.42 
Log (Size) 179602 5.38 2.04 5.34 8.88 11.94 2.05 
MtB 206575 1.02 0.04 0.63 2.64 124.26 3.15 
Profitability 206131 0.06 -0.19 0.08 0.24 2.27 0.20 
Tangibility 206513 0.32 0.02 0.27 0.79 1.00 0.24 
CF Volatility 206363 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.19 2.13 0.11 





Table 3.8. Number of firms and firm-years by country 
Columns 1 to 3 report the number of firms, firm-year observations and percent of firm-years as a fraction of total 
sample firms for each of the sample countries.  
        
 (1) (2) (3) 
Country Number of firms 
Number of firm-
years 
Percent of firm-year in the 
total sample 
Argentina 69 700 0.34% 
Australia 1596 9082 4.40% 
Austria 109 866 0.42% 
Belgium 134 1227 0.59% 
Brazil 306 1963 0.95% 
Canada 2117 11235 5.44% 
Chile 150 1317 0.64% 
China 2283 15995 7.74% 
Colombia 35 238 0.12% 
Croatia 37 246 0.12% 
Denmark 172 1345 0.65% 
Finland 147 1457 0.71% 
France 875 7319 3.54% 
Germany 903 6683 3.24% 
Greece 235 2247 1.09% 
Hungary 28 207 0.10% 
Indonesia 345 2612 1.26% 
Ireland 116 796 0.39% 
Italy 319 2774 1.34% 
Japan 3695 35810 17.34% 
Malaysia 985 8881 4.30% 
Mexico 117 1027 0.50% 
Netherland 215 1655 0.80% 
New 
Zealand 
144 1031 0.50% 
Norway 286 1763 0.85% 
Peru 82 664 0.32% 
Philippine 167 1336 0.65% 
Poland 442 2642 1.28% 
Portugal 62 588 0.28% 
Romania 44 132 0.06% 
Singapore 714 5802 2.81% 
South Africa 323 2676 1.30% 
Spain 159 1428 0.69% 
Sri Lanka 181 1226 0.59% 
Sweden 466 3136 1.52% 
Switzerland 248 2333 1.13% 
Thailand 487 4235 2.05% 
Turkey 192 1196 0.58% 
United Kin 2122 13321 6.45% 
United 
States 
8065 46937 22.72% 
Sum 29231 206575  
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Table 3.9. Correlation matrix 
This table reports the Pearson correlations for the main variables of interest. The first row (maturity) is the ratio of long term to total debt similar to Fan et al. (2012) 
and therefore varies between 0 and 1. The second row is for weighted-average maturity over different types of debt. The creditor rights index ranges between 0 and 
4 where higher levels of the index indicate stronger creditor protection provisions. Efficiency is the efficiency of debt contracts. Log of per capita GDP is the 
logarithm of per capita GDP. Inflation captures annual changes in the consumer prices index. Public and private registry variables are percentages of adults and 
firms covered by public and private registries, respectively. Log of size is the logarithm of total book assets. Market to book (MtB) is market value of equity divided 
by total book assets. Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total book assets. Tangibility is net property, plant and equipment divided by total 
book assets. Cash flow (CF) volatility is the standard deviation over past five years of operating income divided by total assets. Book leverage is the sum of short 
and long-term debt divided by total assets. Construction of each variable is described in Appendix 1.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Maturity  1.00                    
Ave-debt-maturity 0.35 1.00                   
Creditor rights -0.15 -0.17 1.00                  
Efficiency- Debt 
Enforcement 0.18 0.17 0.05 1.00                 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.27 0.19 -0.07 0.87 1.00                
Inflation -0.01 -0.10 0.05 -0.53 -0.44 1.00               
GDP growth -0.21 -0.18 0.07 -0.54 -0.61 0.39 1.00              
Legal origins 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.20 -0.15 1.00             
Public registry -0.16 -0.12 0.20 -0.60 -0.51 0.16 0.33 -0.03 1.00            
Private Bureau 0.32 0.19 -0.15 0.72 0.82 -0.26 -0.58 0.45 -0.45 1.00           
Information -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00          
Corruption 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.72 0.84 -0.27 -0.38 0.35 -0.47 0.70 0.04 1.00         
Private cred. To GDP 0.20 0.23 -0.06 0.67 0.68 -0.46 -0.50 0.23 -0.40 0.57 0.06 0.45 1.00        
Stocks trad. to GDP 0.21 0.19 -0.23 0.33 0.42 -0.06 -0.20 0.37 -0.32 0.38 0.05 0.28 0.58 1.00       
Log (Size) 0.31 0.35 -0.16 0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 -0.18 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.08 1.00      
MtB -0.06 -0.06 0.08 -0.14 -0.13 0.07 0.12 -0.11 0.05 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08 1.00     
Profitability 0.13 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.35 -0.02 1.00    
Tangibility 0.18 0.15 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 0.14 0.00 0.07 1.00   
CF Volatility -0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.16 -0.05 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.08 -0.34 0.04 -0.44 -0.07 1.00  
Book Leverage 0.21 0.18 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 -0.05 0.24 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 3.10. Maturity index, creditor rights and contract enforcement 
This table reports regression results using a correlated random effects (CRE) specification where the dependent variable is maturity 
as measured by the ratio of long term debt to total debt. This table provides the relationship of creditor rights and its four components 
(CR1 to CR4) and the efficiency of contract enforcement on the maturity structure of corporate debt. The last two columns are for 
firms in developed and developing countries, respectively, based on the World Bank’s GNI thresholds for 2013. Significance at 
the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using +, *, **, and ***, respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are 
based on clustered standard errors at the firm-level and year dummies, and are heteroscedasticity consistent. Construction of each 
variable is described in Appendix 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         Developed Developing 
Creditor 
rights 
-0.11*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08***     -0.09*** -0.04 
(-24.27) (-19.61) (-13.64) (-16.51)     (-17.63) (-1.63) 
Efficiency 
0.17*** 0.17*** 0.03** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.01 
(35.66) (36.15) (2.67) (7.35) (3.23) (5.64) (6.31) (9.19) (4.81) (0.28) 
cr1 
    -0.06***      
    (-10.82)      
cr2 
     -0.07***     
     (-14.44)     
cr3 
      -0.06***    
      (-8.35)    
cr4 
       -0.06***   
       (-10.83)   
Log Size 
 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 
 (23.11) (19.72) (20.27) (20.25) (19.88) (20.19) (20.29) (18.35) (8.98) 
Market to 
book 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 
 (1.41) (1.19) (1.14) (1.16) (1.18) (1.20) (1.13) (2.31) (0.11) 
Profitability 
 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05** 
 (9.03) (9.79) (9.58) (9.59) (9.66) (9.60) (9.59) (8.97) (3.16) 
Tangibility 
 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 
 (10.37) (11.49) (11.02) (11.02) (11.13) (11.04) (11.03) (10.85) (3.75) 
Cash flow 
volatility 
 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.00 
 (-1.35) (-1.60) (-1.93) (-1.82) (-1.94) (-1.78) (-1.85) (-1.92) (-0.27) 
 Book 
leverage 
 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
 (22.72) (22.52) (22.84) (22.79) (22.84) (22.76) (22.81) (21.26) (8.68) 
Log GDP 
per cap 
  0.22*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.13*** 
  (18.45) (7.52) (8.43) (10.14) (9.66) (7.31) (1.20) (4.49) 
Inflation 
  0.07*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
  (14.95) (4.26) (4.66) (4.06) (3.72) (4.95) (4.01) (5.50) 
GDP growth 
  -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
  (-9.32) (-7.27) (-6.83) (-6.84) (-7.27) (-8.31) (-3.38) (-3.98) 
English legal 
origin 
   -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.08 
   (-5.70) (-6.92) (-5.09) (-6.41) (-5.71) (-6.32) (-1.36) 
French legal 
origin 
   -0.22*** -0.30*** -0.14*** -0.26*** -0.09** -0.44*** 0.00 
   (-6.85) (-8.63) (-4.37) (-7.50) (-2.82) (-10.33) (.) 
German 
legal origin 
   -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.73*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.48*** 
   (-27.33) (-27.61) (-28.37) (-27.45) (-24.96) (-24.79) (-10.29) 
Constant 
-0.12** -0.09* -0.15*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.23*** -0.08 
(-2.81) (-2.14) (-3.55) (3.96) (4.63) (3.64) (4.25) (3.36) (4.22) (-0.75) 
Observation
s 
206575 179134 177432 177432 177432 177432 177432 177432 145215 31989 
Within  R2 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Between R2 0.12 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.38 
Overall R2 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.30 
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Table 3.11. Alternative- maturity index, creditor rights and contract enforcement 
This table reports the CRE regression results using the weighted-average maturity index in years of Saretto et al. 
(2013) as the dependent variable. This table also includes the effect of creditor rights and its four components (CR1 
to CR4). Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using +, *, **, and ***, respectively. The 
t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the firm-level and year dummies. The 
estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of each variable is described in Appendix 1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         Developed Developing 
Creditor rights 
-0.32*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.29***     -0.32*** 0.09 
(-20.97) (-17.69) (-15.17) (-16.34)     (-17.66) (0.67) 
Efficiency 
0.54*** 0.49*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.05 0.13** 0.15*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.10 
(33.23) (29.05) (6.60) (5.85) (1.32) (3.28) (3.86) (8.21) (6.61) (0.84) 
cr1 
    -0.25***      
    (-12.12)      
cr2 
     -0.33***     
     (-18.78)     
cr3 
      0.07**    
      (2.77)    
cr4 
       -0.23***   
       (-11.20)   
Log Size 
 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.45*** 
 (14.51) (13.62) (13.31) (13.26) (12.89) (13.06) (13.34) (11.88) (4.86) 
Market to book 
 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.62) 
(0.01) 
0.24) (0.29) (0.30) (0.38) (0.30) (0.22) (0.87) (0.42) 
Profitability 
 -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** -0.04** 0.00 
 (-3.12) (-2.78) (-2.70) (-2.63) (-2.60) (-2.57) (-2.68) (-2.76) (0.04) 
Tangibility 
 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 
 (4.51) (4.78) (4.84) (4.83) (4.92) (4.91) (4.89) (4.09) (3.41) 
Cash flow 
volatility 
 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05+ 
 (-1.58) (-1.45) (-1.61) (-1.43) (-1.70) (-1.35) (-1.46) (-1.18) (-1.83) 
Book leverage 
 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (12.41) (12.39) (12.39) (12.37) (12.44) (12.32) (12.31) (11.04) (5.15) 
Log GDP  per 
cap 
  0.23*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.16** -0.11+ 0.15 
  (5.06) (3.61) (4.59) (7.14) (6.31) (3.07) (-1.66) (1.45) 
inflation 
  0.05** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.06+ 0.06** 
  (3.26) (-0.42) (0.11) (-0.73) (0.03) (0.09) (-1.80) (2.87) 
GDP  growth 
  -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.12*** 0.01 
  (-12.98) (-12.75) (-12.37) (-11.52) (-13.17) (-14.04) (-7.78) (0.27) 
English legal 
origin 
   1.41*** 1.26*** 1.53*** 1.33*** 1.40*** 1.32*** 2.04*** 
   (17.58) (15.91) (18.64) (16.95) (17.46) (15.74) (9.35) 
French legal 
origin 
   1.06*** 0.69*** 1.42*** 1.36*** 1.55*** 1.09*** 2.06*** 
   (8.61) (5.34) (11.65) (9.86) (12.71) (6.26) (4.52) 
German legal 
origin 
   0.87*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.89*** 1.06*** 0.77*** 1.58*** 
   (9.82) (8.54) (8.68) (10.13) (11.79) (8.28) (7.02) 
Constant 
2.28*** 2.16*** 2.10*** 0.94*** 1.07*** 0.82*** 0.89*** 0.83*** 1.15*** 0.00 
(16.71) (18.64) (17.73) (6.52) (7.40) (5.69) (6.18) (5.75) (6.61) (0.11) 
Observations 128047 110604 109471 109471 109471 109471 109471 109471 90129 19342 
Within  R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Between R2 0.11 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.12 




Table 3.12. Alternative measures of contract enforcement 
This table presents the CRE regression results using alternative measures of enforcement quality on the dependent 
variable, debt maturity structure, as proxied by the long-term to total debt ratio. The seven additional variables are 
“corruption”, “law and order”, “bureaucracy quality”, “contract viability”; “constraints on executives”; “property 
rights” index, and “strength of legal rights”.  Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using 
+, *, **, and ***, respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the 
firm-level and year dummies. The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of each variable is 
described in Appendix 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.15*** 
(-13.64) (-16.81) (-17.60) (-13.44) (-14.49) (-16.47) (-18.24) (-26.77) 
Efficiency 0.03**        
(2.67)        
Corruption (lack of)  0.12***       
 (23.39)       
Property rights   0.27***      
  (36.98)      
Contract viability    0.18***     
   (22.60)     
Constraint on 
Executives 
    0.04***    
    (6.05)    
Law and order      0.07***   
     (10.92)   
Bureaucracy quality       0.40***  
         (8.42)  
Strength of legal 
rights index 
       0.23*** 
       (37.94) 
Log Size 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 
(19.72) (21.62) (22.06) (21.13) (20.33) (20.90) (22.13) (19.28) 
Market to book 0.00 0.00 0.01+ 0.00 0.01+ 0.01+ 0.00 0.01*** 
(1.19) (1.45) (1.70) (1.05) (1.69) (1.82) (1.53) (3.83) 
Profitability 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
(9.79) (9.94) (9.51) (9.93) (10.04) (10.06) (9.66) (8.10) 
Tangibility 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
(11.49) (12.26) (11.99) (12.57) (12.79) (12.44) (12.14) (10.73) 
Cash flow volatility -0.01 -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
(-1.60) (-1.77) (-1.94) (-1.74) (-1.61) (-1.51) (-1.52) (0.51) 
Book leverage 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(22.52) (23.53) (22.69) (23.15) (23.09) (23.15) (23.18) (19.18) 
Log Gdp per cap 0.22*** 0.02** -0.07*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.09*** 0.03*** 
(18.45) (2.70) (-8.61) (9.40) (16.81) (10.59) (-9.59) (4.42) 
Inflation 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 
(14.95) (5.75) (6.84) (8.47) (6.13) (7.70) (6.72) (1.04) 
Gdp growth -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.00 0.01* 
(-9.32) (-10.43) (-2.40) (-6.37) (-4.77) (-7.64) (0.59) (2.46) 
Constant -0.15*** -0.13** -0.07+ -0.74*** -0.14** -0.43*** -1.46*** -0.19*** 
(-3.55) (-3.11) (-1.68) (-14.61) (-3.18) (-8.54) (-25.64) (-3.83) 
Observations 177432 193766 192438 193766 193766 193766 193766 131041 
Within  R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Between R2 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.30 




Table 3.13. Tobit and CRE sub-sample regression results  
The dependent variable is the weighted-average maturity in column 2, and the ratio of long term debt to total debt in 
all other columns. Tobit estimations are reported in columns 1 and 2 to rule out the possibility of biased estimates due 
to existence of zero maturity ratios. Remaining columns are for CRE regressions for subsamples that exclude three 
countries with the highest number of observations to assess the possible effect of their over-representation in the total 
sample. The firms from the U.S., Japan, and China separately, and the three countries together, are excluded in 
columns 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively.  Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are indicated using +, *, **, 
and ***, respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the firm-level 
and year dummies. The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of each variable is described in 
Appendix 1. 
 Panel A: Tobit 
Regressions 
Panel B: CRE Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Ex US Ex Japan Ex China Ex. the 
three  Maturity Ave-
debt-
maturity 
Maturity Maturity Maturity Maturity 
Creditor rights -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.02* 
 (-21.54) (-20.50) (-6.76) (-12.75) (-17.22) (-2.31) 
Efficiency -0.04*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 
 (-3.41) (9.91) (6.54) (7.09) (5.26) (6.73) 
Log Size 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
 (58.59) (31.17) (6.73) (10.82) (4.00) (4.41) 
Market to book 0.02*** -0.00 0.02*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (4.82) (-0.55) (4.20) (3.15) (5.23) (3.76) 
Profitability 0.06*** -0.01* -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (16.16) (-2.55) (-6.91) (-10.81) (-3.87) (-5.17) 
Tangibility 0.12*** 0.00 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 
 (20.18) (0.62) (15.64) (20.66) (18.83) (14.53) 
Cash flow volatility -0.01* -0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(-1.99) (-4.33) (1.01) (0.86) (0.69) (0.17) 
Book leverage 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (32.71) (26.85) (7.36) (9.25) (9.29) (6.44) 
Log Gdp per cap 0.27*** -0.16*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (19.58) (-7.33) (9.63) (9.86) (11.12) (7.94) 
inflation 0.08*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01+ 
 (11.12) (-3.95) (-1.64) (-2.10) (-1.99) (-1.88) 
Gdp growth -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (-10.34) (-8.13) (16.13) (22.86) (22.23) (14.97) 
English legal origin 0.03 0.77*** -0.23*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.25*** 
(0.88) (24.17) (-8.30) (-4.97) (-6.52) (-9.03) 
French legal origin -0.28*** 0.70*** -0.20*** -0.09* -0.36*** -0.17*** 
(-7.39) (14.77) (-6.16) (-2.45) (-10.22) (-4.57) 
German legal origin -0.64*** 0.77*** -0.69*** -0.53*** -0.68*** -0.18*** 
(-20.64) (21.32) (-25.80) (-16.72) (-25.32) (-5.19) 
Constant 0.07 0.67*** 0.20*** 0.11* 0.21*** 0.14* 
 (1.34) (9.74) (3.83) (2.11) (4.22) (2.07) 
Observations 177432 109471 130677 141638 161447 78898 
Within  R2   0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Between R2   0.31 0.38 0.31 0.28 
Overall R2   0.24 0.31 0.26 0.22 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.04     
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Table 3.14. Additional country-level controls  
This table examines the robustness of our CRE regression results for long-term debt to total debt as the dependent 
variable with the inclusion of additional country-level institutional and macroeconomic variables. These variables are: 
private credit to GDP, stocks traded to GDP, Fitch sovereign ratings, Information sharing dummy that reflects whether 
a country has public or private registry bureaus, public registry and private bureau’s coverage ratios that determine 
the percentage of individuals and firms covered by each type of institution, and check formalism as a measure of the 
well-functioning of courts that addresses the procedural efficiencies for collecting a bounced check, dummies for 
English, French and German legal origins (Nordic dummy omitted), and dummies for Atheism, Buddhism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Islam and Orthodoxy.  Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using 
+, *, **, and ***, respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the 
firm-level and year dummies. The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of each variable is 
described in Appendix 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creditor rights -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
 (-16.33) (-14.08) (-17.57) (-16.74) (-14.12) (-13.61) (-6.79) (-10.77) 
Efficiency 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (3.70) (5.58) (7.44) (7.73) (0.64) (0.67) (6.20) (7.32) 
Log Size 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 
 (18.55) (19.29) (20.56) (20.31) (19.16) (19.46) (15.59) (21.53) 
Market to book 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.38) (1.08) (1.14) (3.15) (3.23) (1.01) (1.00) 
Profitability 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (9.14) (9.05) (9.60) (9.57) (7.33) (7.32) (7.35) (9.26) 
Tangibility 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (10.43) (10.64) (11.03) (11.00) (8.17) (8.17) (9.61) (10.54) 
Cash flow 
volatility 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01+ -0.01+ 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01+ 
 (-1.51) (-1.55) (-1.89) (-1.93) (0.44) (0.42) (-1.63) (-1.91) 
Book leverage 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
 (21.52) (21.58) (23.00) (22.84) (18.53) (18.60) (16.13) (22.99) 
Log GDP per cap 0.04** 0.03* 0.04** 0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.02+ 
 (3.03) (2.29) (2.84) (2.67) (-1.39) (-1.64) (-0.18) (1.66) 
inflation 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (3.51) (3.51) (3.76) (3.82) (2.80) (2.74) (2.76) (3.07) 
Gdp growth 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.25) (1.02) (0.43) (0.91) (-0.45) (-0.45) (0.57) (0.87) 
Private credit to 
GDP 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02* 
 (1.44) (1.32) (0.61) (0.88) (1.38) (1.46) (1.55) (2.55) 
Stocks traded 
GDP 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02* 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.72) (1.47) (1.39) (-0.40) (-0.38) (2.18) (0.21) 
Sovereign ratings 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03** 0.04*** 
 (5.48) (5.51) (5.13) (5.20) (5.55) (5.47) (2.96) (5.04) 
Information 
sharing 
0.15*** 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.09*** -0.03* 
 (11.08) (7.81) (11.04) (7.25) (13.86) (11.21) (5.64) (-2.41) 
Public registry 0.01* 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 
 (2.26) (3.51) (3.47) (4.24) (3.67) (3.47) (4.18) (3.02) 
Private registry -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.00 
 (-10.10) (-8.36) (-5.96) (-6.96) (-4.65) (-4.46) (-6.89) (-0.87) 
Check formalism 
index 
-0.07***        
 (-7.57)        
English legal 
origin 
 0.02***       
  (5.20)       
French legal origin   0.09***      
  (9.19)      
German legal 
origin 
   -0.54***     
   (-5.84)     
137 
 
Table 4.8- Cont’d 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Religion, Atheism     -0.03***    
    (-3.86)    
Religion, 
Buddhism 
     0.06***   
     (7.43)   
Religion, 
Catholicism 
      -0.01  
      (-0.65)  
Religion, Islam -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.02 -0.05+ -0.23*** -0.10*** 
(-3.98) (-6.85) (-5.50) (-5.73) (-0.72) (-1.71) (-7.76) (-4.10) 
Religion, 
Orthodoxy 
-0.36*** -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.22*** -0.10** -0.11** -0.19*** -0.20*** 
(-9.93) (-7.53) (-8.93) (-6.68) (-2.73) (-3.18) (-5.62) (-5.55) 
Constant -0.68*** -0.74*** -0.78*** -0.72*** -0.55*** -0.54*** -0.69*** -0.20*** 
 (-23.41) (-27.56) (-28.70) (-27.48) (-18.28) (-18.03) (-25.85) (-6.63) 
Observations 160516 164584 177432 177432 116733 116733 130677 177432 
Within  R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Between R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.31 0.38 





Table 3.15. Main maturity results for a sample without cross-listed firms 
This table reports the CRE regression estimates when the dependent variable is the ratio of long term to total debt for 
a subsample that excludes cross-listed firms. This table provides estimates of the effect of creditor rights and its four 
components (CR1 to CR4) and the efficiency of contract enforcement on the maturity structure of corporate debt. 
Columns 9 and 10 use samples of developed and developing countries, respectively, based on the World Bank’s GNI 
thresholds of 2013.  Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using +, *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the firm-level and year 
dummies. The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of the each variable is described in Appendix 
1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         Developed Developing 
Creditor rights -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08***     -0.09*** -0.04+ 
 (-24.34) (-19.59) (-13.61) (-16.41)     (-17.53) (-1.74) 
Efficiency 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.03** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.00 
(35.89) (36.16) (2.70) (7.37) (3.23) (5.65) (6.33) (9.19) (4.82) (0.11) 
cr1     -0.06***      
     (-10.73)      
cr2      -0.07***     
      (-14.37)     
cr3       -0.06***    
       (-8.30)    
cr4        -0.06***   
        (-10.80)   
Log Size  0.30*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 
  (23.31) (19.81) (20.37) (20.35) (19.98) (20.29) (20.39) (18.50) (8.95) 
Market to book  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 
  (1.41) (1.19) (1.14) (1.16) (1.18) (1.20) (1.13) (2.38) (0.04) 
Profitability  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05** 
  (8.91) (9.73) (9.51) (9.53) (9.59) (9.54) (9.53) (8.96) (3.01) 
Tangibility  0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 
  (10.26) (11.36) (10.90) (10.90) (11.01) (10.92) (10.91) (10.83) (3.62) 
Cash flow 
volatility 
 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.00 
 (-1.29) (-1.54) (-1.87) (-1.76) (-1.88) (-1.72) (-1.79) (-1.84) (-0.27) 
Book leverage  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
  (22.69) (22.51) (22.82) (22.77) (22.82) (22.74) (22.80) (21.31) (8.50) 
Log GDP per 
cap 
  0.22*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.13*** 
  (18.40) (7.47) (8.42) (10.07) (9.61) (7.23) (1.17) (4.53) 
Inflation   0.07*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
   (14.84) (4.21) (4.61) (4.01) (3.68) (4.91) (3.96) (5.47) 
GDP growth   -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
   (-9.37) (-7.28) (-6.86) (-6.87) (-7.29) (-8.32) (-3.38) (-4.03) 
English    -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.08 
    (-5.68) (-6.88) (-5.08) (-6.38) (-5.69) (-6.31) (-1.30) 
French    -0.22*** -0.30*** -0.14*** -0.26*** -0.09** -0.44*** 0.00 
    (-6.66) (-8.47) (-4.27) (-7.34) (-2.64) (-10.12) (.) 
German    -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.75*** -0.73*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.47*** 
    (-27.11) (-27.38) (-28.15) (-27.23) (-24.76) (-24.59) (-9.94) 
Constant -0.12** -0.09* -0.15*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.23*** -0.10 
 (-2.86) (-2.18) (-3.57) (3.95) (4.61) (3.65) (4.23) (3.37) (4.29) (-0.91) 
Observations 203656 177511 175896 175896 175896 175896 175896 175896 144091 31581 
Within  R2 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Between R2 0.12 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.36 
Overall R2 0.11 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.24 0.28 
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Table 3.16. Alternative maturity results for a sample without cross-listed firms 
This table reports the CRE regression estimates when the dependent variable is the weighted-average debt maturity 
for a sample that excludes cross-listed firms. This table provides estimates of the effect of creditor rights and its four 
components (CR1 to CR4) and the efficiency of contract enforcement on the maturity structure of corporate debt. 
Columns 12 and 13 examine developed and developing countries, respectively, based on the World Bank’s GNI 
thresholds of 2013.  Significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent levels are represented using +, *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The t-values reported in the parentheses are based on clustered standard errors at the firm-level and year 
dummies. The estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. Construction of each variable is described in Appendix 1. 
 
  
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (12) (13) 
         Developed Developing 
Creditor rights -0.32*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.29***     -0.33*** 0.10 
 (-21.16) (-17.87) (-15.32) (-16.51)     (-17.82) (0.71) 
Efficiency 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.05 0.13** 0.15*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.10 
 (33.23) (28.80) (6.58) (5.82) (1.21) (3.23) (3.80) (8.21) (6.66) (0.84) 
cr1     -0.25***      
     (-12.28)      
cr2      -0.33***     
      (-18.86)     
cr3       0.07**    
       (2.76)    
cr4        -0.23***   
        (-11.27)   
Log Size  0.72*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.44*** 
  (14.38) (13.50) (13.19) (13.13) (12.77) (12.93) (13.22) (11.79) (4.74) 
Market to book  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
  (0.57) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.33) (0.25) (0.17) (0.85) (0.37) 
Profitability  -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.04** 0.00 
  (-3.07) (-2.72) (-2.64) (-2.57) (-2.54) (-2.51) (-2.62) (-2.67) (0.03) 
Tangibility  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 
  (4.36) (4.63) (4.69) (4.68) (4.77) (4.76) (4.74) (4.00) (3.30) 
Cash flow 
volatility 
 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 -0.02+ -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06+ 
 (-1.62) (-1.49) (-1.65) (-1.47) (-1.74) (-1.39) (-1.50) (-1.20) (-1.93) 
Book leverage  0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
  (12.43) (12.39) (12.39) (12.36) (12.44) (12.31) (12.31) (11.06) (5.11) 
Ln GDP per cap   0.22*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.15** -0.12+ 0.14 
   (4.96) (3.48) (4.51) (7.01) (6.21) (2.93) (-1.74) (1.38) 
inflation   0.06*** -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.05+ 0.07** 
   (3.49) (-0.21) (0.32) (-0.51) (0.24) (0.31) (-1.69) (3.11) 
GDP growth   -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.12*** 0.00 
   (-13.07) (-12.85) (-12.49) (-11.64) (-13.28) (-14.14) (-7.75) (0.08) 
English    1.41*** 1.26*** 1.52*** 1.33*** 1.40*** 1.32*** 2.00*** 
    (17.36) (15.70) (18.43) (16.73) (17.25) (15.54) (8.97) 
French    1.04*** 0.66*** 1.41*** 1.35*** 1.55*** 1.08*** 2.02*** 
    (8.42) (5.09) (11.38) (9.65) (12.53) (6.14) (4.38) 
German    0.86*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.88*** 1.05*** 0.76*** 1.56*** 
    (9.61) (8.34) (8.46) (9.91) (11.58) (8.08) (6.83) 
Constant 2.26*** 2.15*** 2.09*** 0.93*** 1.07*** 0.82*** 0.89*** 0.83*** 1.15*** 0.00 




Figure 2.1. Evolution of the average credit ratings of firm quartiles over event time  
The evolution of average credit ratings in event time are depicted for the full sample of rated firms in the upper figure and for the 
sample of firms with at least 20 consecutive annual observations in the lower figure. The figures are obtained by first categorizing 
the rated and not-rated firms into four quartiles based on their starting-year (event year 0) credit ratings, and then producing time-
series paths for their mean credit ratings from the starting date of 1985 (event year 0) until 2012 (event year 27) for this starting 
date. The same procedure then is repeated but starting a year forward in time, and is continued until the starting year (or event year 
0) is 2004. The cross-sectional average is then calculated for each event year based on the resulting average credit ratings for each 
of the four quartiles for each sample of rated firms. This results in the credit-rating paths over event time for quartiles having very 
high, high, medium and low leverage ratios for both samples of rated firms. The credit ratings represented are converted from 







Figure 2.2. Rating transition matrix 
This figure is an excerpt from “Introducing Moody's Credit Transition Model, (2007)” special comment 
by Moody’s Analytics. The figure shows a typical one-year transition matrix. The diagonal figures show 







Figure 2.3. Cumulative hazard and survival functions for firms above/ below the Investment grade cut-off 
This figure plots the hazard and survival rates over time for the rated and not-rated firms. The event in these graphs are instances when a firm crosses a given 
leverage threshold. These thresholds are 50%, 20% and 10% of the lagged leverage values and are used in the top, middle and bottom panels respectively. Graphs 
on the left-hand-side depict the hazard ratios and right panels depict the survival estimates. Solid blue lines show firms just above the investment grade cut-off 
(BBB-) and the dashed red lines show firms just below the cut-off point (BB+). For ease of interpretation, the left panels are scaled to the range of the vertical axes, 
while the right axes are scaled at the fixed interval of zero to one. The horizontal axis represents the annual intervals over 27 years.  
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Figure 2.4.  Evolution of market leverage ratios in event time 
The evolution of average leverage ratios in event time are depicted in the following two panels. Panel A uses the base dataset of rated and not-rated firms while Panel B uses the 
sample of firms with at least 20 consecutive annual observations. In both panels, the first (second) row consists of two graphs for the mean market (book) leverage of rated and not-
rated firms on the left- and right-hand sides (LHS & RHS), respectively. Graphs are obtained by first categorizing the rated and not-rated firms into four quartiles based on their 
starting-year (event year 0) leverage ratios (book, market), and then producing time-series paths for the mean leverage ratios for the quartiles from the starting date of 1985 (event 
year 0) until 2012 (event year 27) for this starting date. The same procedure then is repeated but starting a year forward in time, and is continued until the starting year (or event year 
0) is 2004. The cross-sectional average is then calculated for each event year based on the resulting average leverage ratios for each of the quartiles for the rated and not-rated firms. 
This results in the leverage paths over event time for quartiles having very high, high, medium and low leverage ratios for both the rated and not–rated quartiles of firms.  


















Figure 2.5. Cumulative hazard and hurvival functions across rated and not-rated firms 
This figure plots the hazard and survival rates over time for the rated and not-rated firms. The event in these graphs are instances when a firm crosses a given leverage 
threshold. These thresholds are 50%, 20% and 10% of the lagged leverage values and are used in the top, middle and bottom panels respectively. Graphs on the left-hand-side 
depict the hazard ratios and right panels depict the survival estimates. Solid blue lines are for rated firms and dashed red lines for not-rated firms. For ease of interpretation, 
the left panels are scaled to the range of the vertical axes, while the right axes are scaled at the fixed interval of zero to one. The horizontal axis represents the annual intervals 
over 27 years.  
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Figure 2.6. Effect of net debt issuance on subsequent market leverage ratios 
This figure depicts the effects of active leverage management through net debt issuance (NDI) and net equity issuance (NEI) on the evolution of market leverage over 27 years. The upper and 
lower panels show the not-rated and rated sample, respectively. Left-hand (right-hand) graphs show market leverage using “NDI-based” (NDE-based) quartile formation methods. For each year, 
we form quartiles by ranking firms based on their net debt or net equity issuance and calculate the average leverages of the firms in each quartile. The construction of NDI and NEI is explained 
in Appendix 1. The first quartiles are fixed for 27 years. Similar to Figure 1, we repeat this quartile-formation method for subsequent years in the sample. After this step, we average the market 







Figure 3.1. Survival analysis with two variation thresholds 
This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the debt heterogeneity index (HHI). In Panel A (B), the survival probabilities are based on the 
variation of the debt heterogeneity index being less than 10% (20%) of its base value.  A non-survival event occurs when a firm changes its debt heterogeneity 
type in any given year by more than the indicated threshold. Solid lines show the survival estimates and the two grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals.   
Panel A: Survival function for debt heterogeneity index, 10% variation 
threshold 
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Figure 3.2. Survival analysis of the largest debt type 
This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the main (largest) debt type. The non-survival 
event occurs in time when a firm changes its main debt type. Solid lines show the survival estimates and 
the two grey lines show 95% confidence intervals.   
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Figure 3.3. Survival analysis of debt type ranks 
This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the various debt-type rank-ordered index. The non-survival event occurs when there is a 
change in the order of different debt types or discontinuation or introduction of any of them. Panel A (B) considers a change threshold in the debt 
rank index of 10% (20%). Solid lines show the survival estimates and the two grey lines show 95% confidence intervals.   
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Figure 3.4. Survival analysis of debt type ranks 
This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the 7debt-type rank-ordered index using Kendall’s tau-b measure of similarity. The non-
survival event occurs when Kendal’s tau-b index changes more than 10% (20%) in Panel A (B). Solid lines show the survival estimates and the two 
grey lines show 95% confidence intervals.   
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Figure 3.5. Survival analysis of debt type ranks, Spearman’s rho 
 This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the 7debt-type rank-ordered index using the Spearman’s rho measure of similarity. The 
non-survival event occurs when Spearman’s rho index changes more than 10% (20%) in the Panel A (B). Solid lines show the survival estimates 
and the two grey lines show 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3.6. The clustering results for the heterogeneity indexes 
Graphs in this figure show the results of a clustering study using the heterogeneity index. Panels A and C present results based on 
firm-1year observations, and Panels B and D using firm-12year observations. To obtain these heterogeneity graphs, the debt types 
are first categorized into 7 distinct categories using the CapitalIQ Debt database. In the next step for each year (or over ten years), 
the ratio of each debt type to the total debt as the percentage of that particular debt type in a firm’s total debt is calculated. In Panels 
A and B, Stata’s KMEANS command and the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule are used to categorize these percentages into the 
most efficient number of clusters. In Panels C and D, 7 clusters are arbitrarily used as a test of robustness. The horizontal axis shows 
the seven debt types, the vertical axis shows the portion of that debt type in the firm’s total debt and the depth axis shows the clusters.  
 



















Figure 3.7. The survival analysis results for various debt heterogeneity metrics 
This graph reports the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the rated and not-rated samples for the various 
debt heterogeneity metrics. In all panels, the horizontal axis shows the 1-year intervals and the vertical axis 
reports the estimated survival probabilities. Dashed red lines report survival estimates for the not rated 
sample, and the solid blue line reports the results for the rated sample. The results for the main debt type 
are reported in Panel A, those for the heterogeneity index in Panel B and those for debt ranks in Panel C.  
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            Panel B (Upper): Survival function for heterogeneity index, 10% 
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            Panel C (Upper): Survival function for all seven debt-type ordered ranks 
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Figure 3.8. Robustness: Clustering using alternative debt categorizations 
This figure shows the results of a clustering analysis using the alternative debt categorization similar to 
Colla et al. (2013). To obtain these heterogeneity graphs, the debt types are first categorized into 7 distinct 
categories; namely: (1) commercial papers, (2) lines of credit, (3) term loans, (4) senior debt, (5) 
subordinated debt, (6) capital lease and (7) other debt. Then for each year (or over ten years), the ratio of 
each debt type to the total debt is calculated as the percentage of that particular debt type in a firm’s total 
debt. Stata’s KMEANS command and the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule are used in grouping these 
percentages into the most efficient number of clusters (7). The horizontal axis shows the seven debt types, 
the vertical axis is the portion of that debt type in the firm’s total debt and the figure’s depth shows the 





Figure 3.9. Robustness using an alternative number of clusters  
This figure shows the results of a clustering analysis based on Stata’s KMEANS using the alternative debt categorization similar 
to Colla et al. (2013) with an arbitrarily chosen 7 clusters instead of using the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule.  To obtain these 
heterogeneity graphs, the debt types are first categorized into 7 distinct categories; namely: (1) commercial papers, (2) lines of 
credit, (3) term loans, (4) senior debt, (5) subordinated debt, (6) capital leases and (7) other debt. In each year (or over ten years), 
the ratio is calculated of each debt type to the total debt as the percentage of that particular debt type in a firm’s total debt. The 
horizontal axis shows the seven debt types, the vertical axis shows the portion of that debt type in the firm’s total debt and the 













Figure 4.2. Summary statistics 
This figure shows the relative position of countries based on their average corporate ratio of long-term to short-term 
debt. The average maturity in a given country is taken both across time and across all firms with headquarters in that 
country. The horizontal axis shows country names and the vertical axis shows the ratio of long term to short term debt 




Figure 4.3. Summary statistics for the weighted-average maturity index 
 This figure plots the weighted-average maturity index. The index for a given country is taken both across time and 
across all firms with headquarters in that country. The horizontal axis shows country names and the vertical axis shows 





Figure 4.4. Creditor rights index across different countries 
This graph shows the level of the creditor rights index across different countries. This index is the sum of four different 
dummy variables, where each measures a different aspect of creditor rights protection. The index takes integer values 
from [0, 4]. Higher levels of this index indicate stronger creditor rights and hence better protection for creditors. The 








Figure 4.5. Plot of the two maturity indexes against the creditor rights index 
Figure 5 provides a plot of the relationship between the creditor rights index and debt maturity as measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (decimal) in 
Figures 5a and 5b and by the weighted-average maturity index (number of years) in Figures 5-c and 5-d. The maturity index for each country is the average over 
time and across firms in that country. The interpolation line is plotted using a simple OLS regression.  
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